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Abstract
Public-key cryptography in use today is based on classically hard problems such as
factoring or solving discrete logarithms. These problems could be efficiently solved if
an adversary had access to a sufficiently large quantum computer. The potential of
such a quantum computer therefore represents a threat on current cryptography. The
field of post-quantum cryptography aims to mitigate against this threat by proposing
schemes based on alternative assumptions that are believed to be hard in both the
classical and quantum setting.
Lattice-based cryptography has emerged as a promising candidate for post-quantum
cryptography. One reason for this is the wealth of applications that are possible,
perhaps the most notable of which is Fully Homomorphic Encryption (FHE). This
enables computations to be performed on encrypted data, without requiring access
to the secret key, and for these computations to correspond to operations on the
underlying data in a meaningful way.
The Learning with Errors (LWE) problem and its variants, such as LWE with small
secret, LWE with binary error, and Ring-LWE, are used as hardness assumptions
in many lattice-based schemes. In this thesis we consider parameter selection in
cryptosystems based on LWE. We begin with a focus on security by considering the
concrete hardness of LWE. We comprehensively review the algorithms that can be
used to solve LWE and its variants with a small secret. Turning our attention to an
LWE variant where the error distribution is binary, we show there is an additional
attack applicable in this setting.
In applications, the selection of appropriate parameters is often very challenging due
to the conflicting requirements of security, correctness and performance. We highlight
this in the application setting of FHE by considering a scheme based on Ring-LWE.
In particular, we discuss the selection of parameters in SEAL, an implementation of
the scheme by Fan and Vercauteren.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Contents
1.1 Motivation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
1.2 Structure of thesis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
1.3 Original work and our individual contributions . . . . . 14
This chapter gives an overview of the thesis and its contributions. We provide the
motivation for our research and describe the structure of the thesis.
1.1 Motivation
Current public-key cryptography is based on problems such as factoring or solving
discrete logarithms. These problems have been widely studied and are believed to
be hard to solve on a classical computer. However, an adversary equipped with a
sufficiently large quantum computer can solve these problems easily using Shor’s
algorithm [203]. Such a quantum computer does not exist today; nonetheless, its
potential is considered such a threat that, since 2016, NIST is seeking to standardise
quantum-resistant public-key cryptographic algorithms [180].
The field of post-quantum cryptography, encompassing schemes based on various al-
ternative assumptions that are believed to be hard in both the classical and quantum
setting, has received increasing attention in recent years (although some schemes,
such as [162, 164], now falling under this umbrella have been considered for longer,
and even predate Shor’s algorithm). There are five main sub-fields of post-quantum
cryptography: multivariate cryptography, hash-based cryptography, cryptography
based on supersingular elliptic curve isogenies, code-based cryptography, and lattice-
based cryptography. The work in this thesis falls into this final area, mainly focussing
on assumed hard problems underlying lattice-based cryptography, but also consider-
10
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ing an application made possible in the lattice setting.
Lattice-based cryptography has become popular in recent years for several reasons
in addition to its potential use in a post-quantum world. A key reason dates back
to the work of Ajtai [5] who linked the average case complexity of lattice problems
to the worst case, showing that solving certain lattice problems in the average case
is at least as hard as solving approximate shortest vector problem in the worst case.
Another reason is the wealth of applications of lattice-based cryptography (see the
survey [187]). These include (Hierarchical) Identity Based Encryption [54, 111],
Attribute-Based Encryption [49], Oblivious Transfer schemes [190], Circular-Secure
Encryption [23], and Leakage-Resilient Encryption [114].
Fully Homomorphic Encryption (FHE) is perhaps the flagship application of lattice-
based cryptography. FHE enables computations to be performed on encrypted data,
without requiring access to the secret key, and for these computations to correspond
to operations on the underlying data in a meaningful way. First proposed by Rivest
et al. [198] in 1978, it remained a longstanding open problem to construct such a
scheme. This was finally resolved by Gentry [106] in 2009, who proposed a Fully
Homomorphic Encryption scheme based on problems in ideal lattices.
The Learning with Errors problem (LWE), introduced in 2005 by Regev [194], is
a presumed hard problem underlying many lattice-based schemes. A prominent
variant of LWE, which we discuss in detail in Chapter 6, is the Ring Learning with
Errors problem (Ring-LWE) [210, 157]. Ring-LWE is widely preferred for its smaller
key sizes compared with LWE. Other presumed hard problems used in lattice-based
cryptography include the Short Integer Solutions problem (SIS) [5], which can be
seen as dual to LWE [165]; and the Approximate Greatest Common Divisor problem
(AGCD) [132], which has a reduction from LWE [71]. A prominent lattice-based
scheme is the NTRU encryption scheme [131], a variant of which is based on Ring-
LWE [209]. It is therefore clear that LWE is a central problem in lattice-based
cryptography.
Besides Ring-LWE, many other variants of LWE have been proposed in the liter-
ature [183, 47, 191, 102, 166, 45, 147, 67, 199]. Work in this direction is often
motivated by the needs of applications: for example, the use of a small secret for
11
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efficiency reasons [119], or a modified error distribution, for ease of sampling [19].
Confidence in some variants is bolstered by reductions from standard lattice prob-
lems [157, 166, 189]; indeed, certain variants have been introduced as intermediates
in reductions [45, 67].
For several variants of LWE it is the case that more attacks apply [29, 10, 8], some-
times so devastating that the variant would be considered easy in settings where
the analogous standard LWE instance would be considered infeasible to solve [129].
Motivated by identifying what would characterise an easy LWE variant, the line of
work [97, 99, 62, 145, 63, 56, 55, 188] has considered the limitations of the use of
LWE as a hardness assumption. In Chapter 5 we augment the literature, focussing
on LWE with uniform binary error [166, 10]. We show that this variant is easier than
expected, by exhibiting an additional attack that applies in this setting.
A common criticism of lattice-based cryptography is that it is challenging to select
secure parameters for lattice-based schemes. This thesis aims to address this issue,
focussing on schemes based on LWE. Such schemes are very often supported by
a security reduction from the underlying LWE problem. An adversary breaking a
scheme based on LWE can be used to solve the underlying LWE problem, possibly
with some extra effort, which corresponds to the so-called tightness gap [57, 17].
The tightness gap, in turn, corresponds to a difference in the bit security of the
scheme versus the bit hardness of the underlying LWE problem. In practice this
issue is overwhelmingly ignored and designers of schemes typically select parameters
to ensure a certain level of security (such as 80 or 128 bits) based solely on the
underlying LWE instance: that is, the LWE instance is expected to take 280 or 2128
operations respectively to solve. In Chapters 4 and 5 we therefore focus on the
concrete hardness of the Learning with Errors problem. We comprehensively review
the algorithms that can be used to solve LWE and its variants with small secret.
When selecting parameters in applications, we must consider not only security, but
also correctness and performance. In many application settings these requirements
can be conflicting. In Chapter 7, we highlight these issues in the setting of Fully
Homomorphic Encryption. For example, on the one hand, the larger the value of
the modulus q, the larger the number of homomorphic evaluation operations that
can be performed, while on the other hand, the larger the value of q, the lower the
12
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security. We discuss the selection of parameters in the homomorphic encryption
library SEAL [93], which implements the scheme of Fan and Vercauteren [100].
1.2 Structure of thesis
The remainder of the thesis is organised as follows.
Chapter 2. This chapter defines notation that will be used throughout the thesis,
and introduces lattices and the Learning with Errors problem (LWE).
Chapter 3. This chapter gives a comprehensive review of lattice basis reduction
algorithms, which are an essential step in many approaches for solving LWE. Almost
all of the material is from the literature, and the chapter is meant as an extended
background on the topic. However, we also present a new result on the asymp-
totic time complexity of the BKZ algorithm. This chapter is derived from material
presented in [16].
Chapter 4. This chapter reviews strategies and algorithms in the literature for
solving LWE. The material presented is an extended and updated version of material
presented in [16]. We provide evidence that the widely-used Lindner and Peikert [150]
model for the cost of lattice reduction is inaccurate. In this chapter and the previous
chapter, we give an up-to-date account of the LWE estimator of Albrecht [6], which
was developed alongside the paper [16].
Chapter 5. This chapter considers variants of LWE with unusually small secret
or error. We begin with a discussion of small secret LWE, extending and updating
material presented in [16].
The remainder of the chapter is based on material presented in [52]. We focus on the
variant of LWE with binary error and show that the hybrid attack, introduced by
Howgrave-Graham [133] as an attack on NTRU, can be applied in this setting. We
13
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adapt algorithms discussed earlier in the chapter, and in the previous chapter, to the
binary error setting. A comparison of the hybrid attack with other approaches was
presented in [52], but used the Lindner and Peikert [150] model for the cost of lattice
reduction. We provide an updated comparison using a more realistic cost model.
Chapter 6. This chapter considers the Ring Learning with Errors problem (Ring-
LWE) and provides relevant algebraic and statistical background material that will
be required in the following chapter, based on material presented in [173]. We also
review a result of Ducas and Durmus [95], highlighting and correcting an error in
their proof: this is based on joint (unpublished) work with Cid and Murphy.
Chapter 7. This chapter considers homomorphic encryption schemes based on
variants of Ring-LWE. We begin by highlighting two general issues in such schemes,
namely security and encoding. We then turn our attention to parameter selection
in SEAL [93], a homomorphic encryption library developed by Microsoft Research
that the author became involved with during an internship [146, 58, 59, 60]. The
main task undertaken by the author during the internship was to implement the FV
scheme [100] which was released as SEAL v2.0 [146]. Previously, SEAL had been
based on the YASHE scheme [41]. We give a thorough analysis of noise growth
behaviour, considering both inherent and invariant noise, and argue that invariant
noise is more natural. We discuss parameters affecting security, and parameters
affecting the relinearization operation, which impact on noise growth and the running
time of key generation. The chapter is based on material presented in [146, 58, 59, 60].
1.3 Original work and our individual contributions
The material in Chapter 3, Chapter 4 and the first half of Chapter 5 is based on the
paper [16], which was a joint work of Albrecht, myself and Scott. I wrote the first
draft of most sections of [16], except [16, Section 5.4], a version of which appears here
as Section 4.7; and [16, Section 7 and Section 8], which are omitted here. Albrecht
then edited the draft sections I wrote, in some cases majorly. All authors contributed
to later stages of editing of the document. The paper [16] was a survey and so is
14
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largely not original, although the work does include the following contributions: an
asymptotic bound on the cost of BKZ, the details of a Meet-in-the-Middle algorithm
for solving LWE, evidence that the Lindner and Peikert [150] cost model for BKZ is
inaccurate, and the LWE estimator [6] sage tool. The last two of these contributions
are due to Albrecht.
The analysis of a Meet-in-the-Middle algorithm, presented here in Section 4.3.1, was
developed for [16] through joint discussions among all the authors, and has been
refined for the thesis by Albrecht and myself. The asymptotic bound on BKZ is due
to myself. The version presented here in Section 3.2.1 is a more clear formulation
of the original [16, Lemma 5]. Other parts of Chapter 3, Chapter 4 and the first
half of Chapter 5 extend or update [16]. The case λ2(L(B)) = q, discussed in
Section 4.8, provides the analysis required to fix an open issue1 in [6] and is an
additional contribution of the thesis.
The material in the second half of Chapter 5 is based on the paper [52], which was
a joint work of Buchmann, Göpfert, myself and Wunderer. The main idea of the
paper [52], that the hybrid attack would apply to LWE instances with binary error,
was developed jointly during a research visit in Prof. Buchmann’s group. A theo-
retical analysis of the hybrid attack given in [52, Section 3.2] is due to Göpfert and
Wunderer, so the details are omitted here. Adapting other algorithms for the case of
LWE with binary error, presented here in Sections 5.7, 5.8 and 5.9, is another original
contribution of [52], due to Göpfert and myself. For other parts of the paper [52],
Göpfert, myself and Wunderer contributed equally, while Prof. Buchmann acted in
a supervisory role and suggested improvements to the structure and motivation of
early drafts of the paper.
The comparison to other approaches for solving LWE with binary error, presented
here in Section 5.11, improves on the comparison presented in [52, Section 4] as it
no longer uses the Lindner and Peikert cost model for BKZ, and is an additional
contribution of the thesis. Correspondingly to the general LWE case, the Meet-in-
the-Middle algorithm presented in Section 5.7 has been updated compared to [52]
and is an additional contribution of the thesis.
1https://bitbucket.org/malb/lwe-estimator/issues/4/lambda_2-not-implemented
15
1.3 Original work and our individual contributions
Most of the material in Chapter 6 is derived from parts of the paper [173], which is
a joint work with Murphy. In particular, the chapter is an extended version of [173,
Sections 1 and 2], which were largely written by myself. The material presented in
Section 6.3 is based on [173, Section 5], and is due to Murphy. The original material
in [173] consists of statistical results due to Murphy that are omitted here. Section 6.6
arose from discussions with Cid and Murphy and contains material based on original
drafts by Murphy and myself. This is the only part of the chapter containing original
work: namely, the correction to the proof [95, Theorem 5].
The material in Chapter 7 is based on the paper [146], which was a joint work of Laine
and myself, and the papers [58, 59, 60], which were joint works of Chen, Laine and
myself. The technical report [146] describes the implementation of the FV scheme
in SEAL [93] to form SEAL v2.0, which is work I undertook during an internship at
Microsoft Research. I drafted the paper [146] and it was later edited and improved
by Laine and myself.
Improvements to SEAL were later released as SEAL v2.1 [58] and v2.2 [60]. The
technical reports [58, 60] are extensions of [146] reporting on these improvements
and in general the sections extending [146] were not written by me, since I have not
been involved in the development of code for SEAL since v2.0. However, during a
subsequent research visit to Microsoft Research, I was involved with producing the
invariant noise estimates described in [60], which are presented here in Section 7.4.2
and arose from joint discussions with Chen and Laine. The definition of invariant
noise is a new notion of noise for FV and an original contribution of [60].
The publication [59] is derived from [58] with a new section on related work and
and extended discussion on security, which were drafted by myself, and subsequently
edited by all authors. These sections, which have themselves been extended for the
thesis, form the basis of Sections 7.1.1 and 7.2 respectively.
The full proofs for the noise bounds, presented in Section 7.4 have not previously
been published and are additional contributions of the thesis. The discussion on
relinearization, presented in Section 7.6, has also not previously been published.
This section arose from joint discussions with Laine.
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Notation and background
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This chapter establishes notation used throughout the thesis, and provides background
material.
2.1 Notation
We denote vectors in bold: for example, a; and matrices in upper-case bold: for
example, A. By a(i) we denote the ith component of a; that is, a scalar. In contrast,
ai denotes the ith element of a list of vectors. For a vector a ∈ Rn we write a mod q
for its unique representative modulo q in [−b q2c, q2)n. We denote by 〈·, ·〉 the usual
dot product of two vectors and by 〈·, ·〉p this dot product modulo p.
The base-a logarithm of x is denoted loga(x) except for the natural logarithm of x
which is denoted ln(x). Logarithms are base 2 if no base is explicitly stated.
The complex conjugate of z is denoted z. We denote by A† the complex conjugate
transpose of the matrix A, so A† = AT .
The expectation of a random variable X is denoted E [X] and the variance is denoted
Var[X]. A Gaussian or Normal distribution with mean µ and standard deviation σ
17
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is denoted N(µ, σ). A complex Normal distribution with mean µ, covariance matrix
Γ and relation matrix C is denoted CN(µ,Γ,C) and is real if and only if Γ = C.
By a $← S we denote that a is sampled uniformly at random from the finite set S. By
e ← χ we denote that e is sampled according to the distribution χ. Such sampling
is independent of any other sampling.
For a ring R and an integer q, we denote by Rq the quotient ring R/qR. Euler’s
totient function is denoted ϕ(m). The tensor product of the vector spaces V and W
over a field K is denoted V ⊗K W .
We use b·c and d·e to denote respectively rounding down and up to the nearest
integer. We use b·e to denote rounding to the nearest integer, rounding up in case of
ambiguity. When these operations are applied to a polynomial, we mean performing
the corresponding operation to each coefficient separately. The operation [·]t denotes
the reduction of an integer or a polynomial modulo an integer t. When applied to
polynomials, the reduction modulo t is applied to every integer coefficient separately.
The reductions are always done into the symmetric interval
[− t2 , t2).
The norm ‖ · ‖ always denotes the infinity norm, while the usual Euclidean norm is
denoted ‖ · ‖2. The norm ‖ · ‖1 denotes the `1 norm. The norm ‖ · ‖can denotes the
canonical embedding norm, which will be defined in Chapter 7.
A negligible function negl : N→ R is a function such that for all c ∈ N, there exists
Nc ∈ N such that for all n > Nc, |negl(n)| < 1nc . The error function (see [3]) of
a value x ≥ 0 is denoted erf(x). We write 2 ≤ ω < 3 for any constant such that,
for sufficiently large n, there is an algorithm that multiplies two n × n matrices in
O (nω) arithmetic operations.
2.2 Lattice background
A lattice L is a discrete additive subgroup of Rm. We always consider a lattice in
terms of a specified basis B = {b0, . . . ,bn−1} of n linearly independent vectors where
n ≤ m. The lattice L(B) is the set of linear combinations of the basis vectors with
18
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integer coefficients:
L(B) =
{
n−1∑
i=0
xibi
∣∣∣∣∣xi ∈ Z
}
.
We slightly abuse notation and let B also denote the matrix whose rows are the basis
vectors. The rank of the lattice L is defined to be the rank of the matrix B. If the
rank equals m we say that L is full-rank. For a full-rank lattice L, the dual lattice is
defined as
L∗ = {v ∈ Rm | ∀w ∈ L, 〈w,v〉 ∈ Z} .
We will very often be concerned with lattices L such that qZm ⊆ L ⊆ Zm: these are
known as q-ary lattices. Every q-ary lattice is full-rank.
A unimodular matrix is a square integer matrix having determinant ±1. There are
infinitely many lattice bases for n > 1, and it is a standard result that two bases
generate the same lattice if they are related by a unimodular matrix in the following
way.
Lemma 1. Let B and B′ be two bases. Then L(B′) = L(B) if and only if B′ = UB
where U is a unimodular matrix.
The determinant or volume vol (L) of a full-rank lattice L is the absolute value of
the determinant of any basis of the lattice. This can be seen to be an invariant of the
lattice: suppose B and B′ are two bases of the lattice, then, by Lemma 1, B′ = UB
for some unimodular matrix U. So, since unimodular matrices have determinant ±1,
|det(B′)| = | det(UB)| = |det(U) · det(B)| = |det(U)| · | det(B)| = |det(B)| .
The fundamental parallelepiped of a lattice L(B) where B = {b0, ...,bn−1} is given
by
P(B) =
{
x ∈ Rm | x =
n−1∑
i=0
αibi for − 1
2
≤ αi < 1
2
}
.
An equivalent definition of the volume vol (L) of a lattice L = L(B) is the volume
of its fundamental parallelepiped P(B).
The ith successive minimum of a lattice, λi(L), is the radius of the smallest ball
centred at the origin containing at least i linearly independent lattice vectors. In
particular, λ1(L) is the length of a shortest nonzero lattice vector.
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Definition 1. The Shortest Vector Problem (SVP) is defined as follows. Given a
basis B of a lattice L = L(B), find a vector v ∈ L such that ‖v‖2 = λ1(L).
We now define a series of problems related to SVP. Each is parameterised by an
approximation factor γ > 1.
Definition 2. The γ-Approximate Shortest Vector Problem (SVPγ) is defined as
follows. Given a basis B of a lattice L = L(B), find a nonzero vector v ∈ L such
that ‖v‖2 ≤ γ · λ1(L).
Definition 3. The γ-Gap Shortest Vector Problem (GapSVPγ) is defined as follows.
Given a basis B of a lattice L = L(B) and a real number d > 0, return YES if
λ1(L) ≤ d and NO if λ1(L) > γ · d. If d < λ1(L) ≤ γ · d, there are no requirements
on the output.
Definition 4. The γ-Shortest Independent Vector Problem (SIVPγ) is defined as
follows. Given a basis B of a lattice L = L(B), find n linearly independent vectors
v1, . . . , vn such that max (‖vi‖2) ≤ γ · λn(L).
Definition 5. The γ-unique Shortest Vector Problem (uSVPγ) is defined as follows.
Given a basis B of a lattice L = L(B) such that λ2(L) > γλ1(L), find a vector v ∈ L
such that ‖v‖2 = λ1(L).
It may be difficult to verify a solution to approximate SVP in a lattice L as even the
length λ1(L) itself may not be known [104]. In contrast, the volume vol (L) can be
computed easily from any basis. By Minkowski’s second theorem [172],
λ1(L) ≤ √γn · vol (L)
1
n ,
where γn is Hermite’s constant [126] in dimension n. This motivates the following
problem.
Definition 6. The γ-Hermite Shortest Vector Problem (γ-HSVP) is defined as fol-
lows. Given a basis B of a lattice L = L(B), find a nonzero vector v ∈ L such that
‖v‖2 ≤ γ · vol (L)
1
n .
The Gaussian heuristic states that for a measurable subset K ⊂ Rm and a lattice
L ⊂ Rm, we expect that the number of lattice points in K is approximately equal
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to vol(K)vol(L) . Specialising this to K being the unit Euclidean ball we can approximate
λ1(L) as follows.
Heuristic 1. The Gaussian heuristic states that
λ1(L) ≈
√
m
2pie
vol (L)1/m .
There are several occasions when we wish to find a lattice point close in Euclidean
distance to a given point in space.
Definition 7. Let L be a lattice and let x be a point. Let y ∈ L be the lattice point
for which the length ‖x− y‖2 is minimised. We define the distance to the lattice L
from the point x to be this length, which we denote dist(x, L).
The Closest Vector Problem is to find a closest lattice vector to a target point in space.
This can be seen as an inhomogeneous version of SVP, which could be formulated
as finding a closest nonzero lattice vector to the point 0.
Definition 8. The Closest Vector Problem (CVP) is defined as follows. Given a
basis B of a lattice L = L(B) and a target vector t, find a vector y ∈ L such that
‖t− y‖2 is minimised.
Again, for an approximation factor γ > 1, we can define two problems related to
CVP.
Definition 9. The γ-Closest Vector Problem is defined as follows. Given a basis
B of a lattice L = L(B) and a target vector t, find a vector y ∈ L such that
‖t− y‖2 < γ · dist(t, L).
Definition 10. The γ-Bounded Distance Decoding problem (BDDγ) is defined as
follows. Given a basis B of a lattice L = L(B) and a target vector t such that
dist(t, L) ≤ γ · λ1(L), find the vector y ∈ L that is closest to t.
Babai’s Nearest Plane algorithm [27] solves the approximate Closest Vector Problem.
Its input is a lattice basis B ⊂ Zm and a target vector t ∈ Rm. Its output is a vector
e ∈ Rm such that t− e ∈ L(B), which we denote by NPB(t) = e. If the basis B is
clear from the context, we omit it in the notation and simply write NP(t). Babai’s
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Nearest Plane algorithm works by recursively computing the closest vector on the
sublattice spanned by subsets of the Gram-Schmidt vectors b∗i .
Definition 11. For a lattice basis b0, . . . ,bn−1 ∈ Zm, the Gram-Schmidt vectors
are defined as b∗0, . . . ,b∗n−1 with
b∗0 = b0
b∗i = bi −
i−1∑
j=0
µi,jb
∗
j
where µi,j =
〈b∗j ,bi〉
〈b∗j ,b∗j〉 are the Gram-Schmidt coefficients.
As with a basis, the Gram-Schmidt vectors can be arranged in a matrix, which we
denote B∗. The product of the norm of the Gram-Schmidt vectors is equal to the
volume of the lattice.
In general, the Gram-Schmidt vectors b∗i do not themselves form a basis of the lattice
L(B). By an abuse of notation, for a matrix of Gram-Schmidt vectors B∗ we define
the parallelepiped P(B∗) as for the definition of the fundamental parallelepiped. We
will use the following result about the output of Babai’s Nearest Plane algorithm.
Lemma 2 ([28]). For a lattice basis B with Gram-Schmidt vectors B∗ and a target
vector t as input, Babai’s Nearest Plane algorithm returns the unique vector e ∈
P(B∗) that satisfies t− e ∈ L(B).
As noted above, lattice bases are not unique, and certain bases may be preferable to
others. In Chapter 3 we will discuss lattice basis reduction algorithms, which take
as input a basis and output a reduced basis that can be considered more preferable.
The quality of a reduced basis is characterised by the Hermite factor δn0 , which can
be easily computed. We adopt the convention that the first nonzero vector, say b0,
in a reduced lattice basis is a shortest vector in the basis.
Definition 12. Let {b0, . . . ,bn−1} be a basis output by a lattice reduction algorithm.
The Hermite factor δn0 is such that the shortest nonzero vector b0 in the basis has
the following property:
‖b0‖2 = δn0 vol (L)1/n .
We may also refer to δ0 itself, and call it the root-Hermite factor. The logarithm to
base 2 of δ0 is called the log root-Hermite factor.
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The Gram-Schmidt vectors of a reduced lattice basis are commonly estimated using
the Geometric Series Assumption [201].
Heuristic 2. Let {b0 . . .bn−1} be a basis of a lattice L that is output by a lattice
basis reduction algorithm of quality given by root-Hermite factor δ0. Let b∗i denote
the corresponding Gram-Schmidt vectors. Then the Geometric Series Assumption
asserts that, for some 0 < υ < 1, the length of b∗i is approximated by
‖b∗i ‖2 ≈ υi ‖b0‖2 .
Using Heuristic 2 we have that
vol (L)
1
n =
n−1∏
i=0
‖b∗i ‖2 =
(
n−1∏
i=0
υi ‖b0‖2
) 1
n
=
√
‖b0‖22 υn−1 = ‖b0‖2
√
υn−1 .
Using the Definition 12, we can conclude that δ−n0 =
√
υn−1 and hence υ = δ−2n/(n+1)0 .
Approximating this as υ ≈ δ−20 and again using Definition 12 gives a reformulation
of Heuristic 2 as
‖bi‖∗2 ≈ δ−2i+n0 vol (L)
1
n .
2.3 The Learning with Errors problem
The Learning with Errors (LWE) problem was introduced by Regev [194, 195] and is
provably as hard as certain worst-case lattice problems [194, 45]. LWE can be thought
of as a generalisation of the Learning Parity with Noise (LPN) problem [137] into
large moduli q. We now define LWE and the related Short Integer Solutions problem
[5, 167].
Definition 13. The Learning with Errors problem (LWE) is defined as follows. Let
n, q be positive integers, χ be a probability distribution on Z and s be a secret vector
in Znq . We denote by Ls,χ the probability distribution on Znq ×Zq obtained by choosing
a ∈ Znq uniformly at random, choosing e ∈ Z according to χ and considering it in Zq
and returning
(a, c) = (a, 〈a, s〉+ e) ∈ Znq × Zq .
Decision-LWE is the problem of deciding whether pairs (a, c) ∈ Znq ×Zq are sampled
according to Ls,χ or the uniform distribution on Znq × Zq.
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Search-LWE is the problem of recovering s from (a, c) = (a, 〈a, s〉 + e) ∈ Znq × Zq
sampled according to Ls,χ.
Definition 14. The Short Integers Solutions problem (SIS) is defined as follows.
Let A ∈ Zn×mq be a matrix. Let β ∈ R be a bound. Find a short vector ‖v‖2 < β in
the lattice
L = {w ∈ Zmq | wA ≡ 0 mod q} .
Typically, the distribution χ in Ls,χ is a discrete Gaussian distribution on Z with cen-
tre parameter zero and width parameter αq, denoted by DZ,αq. A discrete Gaussian
distribution with centre parameter µ and width parameter αq samples elements with
a probability proportional to exp(−pi (x−µ)2
(αq)2
). The standard deviation of a continuous
Gaussian with width parameter αq is σ = αq√
2pi
.
The smoothing parameter η(L) of a lattice L [167] is equal to the smallest s > 0
such that the distribution obtained by sampling a continuous Gaussian of width
parameter s and reducing modulo L is very close to uniform. In particular, the two
distributions have a pointwise probability density to within a (1 ± ) factor of each
other [74]. If σ ≥ η(Z) is the standard deviation of a discrete Gaussian with width
parameter αq, then we also have that σ = αq√
2pi
is a good approximation [96].
We will use the following standard fact about the Gaussian distribution.
Lemma 3. Let χ denote the Gaussian distribution with standard deviation σ. For
x > 0, denote Q(x) =
(
1− erf
(
x√
2
))
. Then, for all C > 0,
P(e
$← χ : |e| > C · σ) ≈ Q(C) ≤ 2e
−C2/2
C
√
2pi
.
Suppose we sample m times independently from the distribution Ls,χ. The resulting
LWE instance is parameterised by its dimension n, its modulus q, the number of
samples m and the error distribution, characterised by the parameter α. This gives
the most generic characterisation of an LWE instance.
In this thesis we are mainly concerned with choosing parameters for security and
hence a key question is how hard it is to solve a given LWE instance. To consider the
widest range of possible approaches, we typically assume the attacker, who is trying
24
2.3 The Learning with Errors problem
to solve LWE, may query Ls,χ for as many samples m as they like. One argument
why this is reasonable is that given a fixed polynomial number of samples, we can
generate arbitrarily many more independent samples, with only a slight worsening
in the error [111, 23, 196]. In addition, there is typically an optimal choice for m,
and the best strategy if the number of available samples is larger is to discard the
extra samples. Therefore, in most cases we will ignore m, or assume it is chosen to
be the most convenient value, and characterise LWE instances just by n, α, and q.
A typical choice for q and α is given by the following. Inspired by Regev’s choice [195]
of αq = 2
√
n, we let c > 12 be a small constant, then choose q = n
c and α ≈ n 12−c.
In this case we may characterise the LWE instance by n and c. This choice of width
parameter αq ≈ √n can be considered typical since we require αq > √n for the
reduction from GapSVP to LWE to go through [195] and furthermore if αq <
√
n
then Arora and Ge’s algorithm [25] becomes subexponential.
In some applications, the secret s does not have components s(i) chosen from the
whole of Zq as in Definition 13 but instead chosen such that they are small, for
example taking values in {0, 1} or {−1, 0, 1}. We call such an LWE instance a small
secret LWE instance. In this case we characterise the instance by n, α, q, and ψ
where ψ is the distribution of the s(i).
In Chapter 5 we will consider a variant of LWE where χ is not a discrete Gaussian
but instead is the uniform distribution on {0, 1}. We call this LWE with binary
error.
Definition 15. The LWE with binary error problem is defined as follows. Let n, q
be positive integers, U be the uniform distribution on {0, 1} and s $← Un be a secret
vector in {0, 1}n. We denote by Ls,U the probability distribution on Znq ×Zq obtained
by choosing a ∈ Znq uniformly at random, choosing e $← U and returning
(a, 〈a, s〉+ e) ∈ Znq × Zq .
The search variant of LWE with binary error is the problem of recovering s from m
samples (ai, 〈ai, si〉+ ei) ∈ Znq × Zq sampled according to Ls,U , with i ∈ {1, . . . ,m}.
The decision variant of LWE with binary error is the problem of deciding whether
m pairs (ai, ci) ∈ Znq × Zq with i ∈ {1, . . . ,m} are sampled according to Ls,U or the
uniform distribution on Znq × Zq.
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We show in Lemma 4 that we can transform an LWE instance where the secret is
chosen uniformly at random from Znq into one where the secret vector follows the
same distribution as the error, at the cost of n samples. Lemma 4 considers LWE
with a discrete Gaussian error distribution, but the same argument can be generalised
to other error distributions, for example a uniform binary error distribution. This is
why in Definition 15 we used a secret following the same distribution as the error,
rather than a general secret, chosen uniformly at random from Znq .
Lemma 4 ([23]). Let q be prime. Let DZn,αq be an n-dimensional extension of DZ,αq
where each component is sampled according to DZ,αq. Then, given access to an oracle
Ls,χ returning samples of the form (a, c) = (a, 〈a, s〉+e) ∈ Znq ×Zq with a $← U
(
Znq
)
,
e
$← DZ,αq and s ∈ Znq , we can construct samples of the form
(a, c) = (a, 〈a, e〉+ e) ∈ Znq × Zq
with a $← U (Znq ), e $← DZ,αq and e $← DZn,αq in 2n2 operations in Zq per sample,
at the loss of n samples overall and with O (nω) operations for precomputation.
Proof: Take n samples from Ls,χ and write:
(A0, c0) = (A0,A0 · s + e0)
where A0 ∈ Zn×nq . With probability
∏n
i=1(q
n − qi−1)/qn2 this matrix is invertible.
Precompute A−10 and store it; this costs O (nω) operations. Now, to produce samples
of the form (a, c) = (a, 〈a, e〉 + e) ∈ Znq × Zq with a $← U
(
Znq
)
, e $← DZ,αq and
e
$← DZn,αq we sample
(a1, c1) = (a1, 〈a1, s〉+ e1)
from Ls,χ and compute:
a1 ·A−10 · c0 − c1 = a1 ·A−10 (A0 · s + e0)− a1 · s − e1
= a1 ·A−10 ·A0 · s + a1 ·A−10 e0 − a1 · s − e1
= a1 · s + a1 ·A−10 e0 − a1 · s − e1
= a1 ·A−10 e0 − e1 .
Since DZ,αq is symmetric and A−10 has full rank, we see that
(a1 ·A−10 ,a1 ·A−10 c0 + c1) = (a1 ·A−10 ,a1 ·A−10 e0 − e1)
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is a valid sample of the form (a, c) = (a, 〈a, e〉 + e) ∈ Znq × Zq with a $← U
(
Znq
)
,
e
$← DZ,αq and e $← DZn,αq. 
We now show that Decision-LWE and Search-LWE are equivalent. The direction
from search to decision is trivial: suppose samples (ai, ci) are given to a search
oracle, and it returns a vector s. We then compute ci − 〈ai, s〉, which is distributed
according to χ if (ai, ci) are LWE samples, and is uniformly distributed if (ai, ci)
is uniform. Hence we can distinguish these cases. The nontrivial direction, due to
Regev [195], is reproduced in Lemma 5. Having established equivalence, whenever
a method can be shown to solve Search-LWE or Decision-LWE we can speak of it
solving LWE.
Lemma 5 ([195]). Let n ≥ 1 be an integer, 2 ≤ q ≤ poly(n) be a prime, and χ be
some distribution on Zq. Assume that we have access to a procedure W that, for all
s, accepts with probability exponentially close to 1 on inputs from Ls,χ and rejects
with probability exponentially close to 1 on uniformly random inputs. Then, there
exists an efficient algorithm W ′ that, given samples from Ls,χ for some s, outputs s
with probability exponentially close to 1.
Proof: We show how W ′ finds the first component s(0) of s; finding the other com-
ponents is similar. For any k ∈ Zq consider the following transformation. Given a
pair (a, c) as input to W ′, let it output the pair (a +(l, 0, . . . , 0), c+ lk) where l ∈ Zq
is chosen uniformly at random. It is easy to see that this transformation takes the
uniform distribution to itself. On the other hand suppose the input pair (a, c) is
sampled from Ls,χ. If k = s(0) then this transformation takes Ls,χ into itself. If
k 6= s(0) then this transformation takes Ls,χ to the uniform distribution. There are
only polynomially many (namely q) possibilities for s(0), so we can try all of them as
possible k values. For each k value, let the output of W ′ be the input to W . Then
as W can distinguish Ls,χ from uniform, it can tell whether k = s(0). 
In certain cases, given samples from Ls,χ, we can construct LWE instances where
the modulus is now p for some particular p < q using a technique known as modulus
switching. This was initially introduced to improve homomorphic encryption [46]
but, as we will discuss in Chapter 5, can also be employed to reduce the cost of
solving LWE in certain cases. In the context of solving LWE, modulus switching is
the process of considering an instance of LWE with modulus q as a scaled instance
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of LWE with modulus p. Modulus switching is achieved by scaling and rounding,
and this process incurs a noise increase that depends on s. Therefore, the technique
can only be used for LWE instances with sufficiently small secret.
Lemma 6 ([46, 45]). Let (a, c) = (a, 〈a, s〉 + e) ∈ Znq × Zq be sampled from Ls,χ.
Let p ≈
√
2pi n
12 · σsα , where σs is the standard deviation of elements in the secret s. If
p < q then
(⌊
p
q · a
⌉
,
⌊
p
q · c
⌉)
∈ Znp×Zp follows a distribution close to Ls,DZ,√2αp+O(1).
Hence, we can heuristically treat
(⌊
p
q · a
⌉
,
⌊
p
q · c
⌉)
as an LWE sample parameterised
by n,
√
2α, p.
Proof: Consider⌊
p
q
· c
⌉
=
⌊
p
q
(〈a, s〉+ e)
⌉
=
⌊〈
p
q
· a, s
〉
p
+
p
q
· e
⌉
=
⌊〈⌊
p
q
· a
⌉
, s
〉
p
+
〈
p
q
· a −
⌊
p
q
· a
⌉
, s
〉
p
+
p
q
· e
⌉
=
〈⌊
p
q
· a
⌉
, s
〉
p
+
〈
p
q
· a −
⌊
p
q
· a
⌉
, s
〉
p
+
p
q
· e+ e′
=
〈⌊
p
q
· a
⌉
, s
〉
p
+ e′′ +
p
q
· e+ e′ ,
where e′ ∈ [−0.5, 0.5] is the error from rounding and e′′ =
〈
p
q · a −
⌊
p
q · a
⌉
, s
〉
p
. As an
inner product, e′′ approaches a discrete Gaussian as n increases. Since the rounding
p
q ·a−
⌊
p
q · a
⌉
takes values uniformly in [−0.5, 0.5] we have that e′′ ≈√n/12σs. We
have that pq · e is also a discrete Gaussian, since it is a scaling of e. We choose p to
balance the dominant noise terms and thus the resulting overall noise is approximated
by a discrete Gaussian (plus a small O (1) noise given by the e′ term). We require
p
q
· αq/
√
2pi ≈
√
n/12σs
p · α/
√
2pi ≈
√
n/12σs
p ≈
√
2pi
α
·
√
n/12σs
p ≈
√
2pi n
12
· σs
α
.

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We note that
(⌊
p
q · a
⌉
,
⌊
p
q · c
⌉)
can only heuristically be considered as an LWE
sample parameterised by n,
√
2α, p because
⌊
p
q · a
⌉
is not exactly uniform and the
error distribution is not exactly DZ,√2αp. This is not problematic from a cryptana-
lytic point of view because, as we will see in Chapter 4, the complexity of attacks
typically depends on the size of the error, rather than its exact distribution. For
BKW-type algorithms (see Section 4.5), the non-uniformity of
⌊
p
q · a
⌉
may even be
beneficial as we would expect to require fewer samples before encountering a pair
that agrees on the first several components.
In Lemma 6, we chose p to ensure that
∥∥∥∥〈pq · a − ⌊pq · a⌉, s〉p
∥∥∥∥
2
≈ pq · ‖e‖2 if s is
small enough. This means that after modulus switching, the new error e′′+ pq · e+ e′
is essentially a scaling of the previous error e (ignoring the small contribution of e′).
In principle, one can modulus switch to any p, even one larger than q, but reducing
p is typically advantageous as it will reduce the running time of most algorithms.
However, picking p too small could make e′ or e′′ a more dominant noise term and
increase the overall noise level leading to a higher solving complexity.
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Many algorithms for solving LWE rely on a lattice reduction step. In this chapter we
review lattice reduction algorithms and discuss estimates in the literature for their
running time. We also give a new result on the asymptotic time complexity of BKZ.
This chapter is based on material presented in [16].
As discussed in Chapter 2, in dimension n ≥ 2 there are infinitely many bases of
a lattice. A natural question is whether one possible basis should be preferred to
another possible basis. Indeed, a basis that would be considered good is one that
has short vectors that are close to orthogonal. Knowing a good basis typically makes
lattice problems, such as finding the lattice point closest to a given target point, easier
to solve. The goal of a lattice basis reduction algorithm is to transform an input
lattice basis into a better basis, with vectors that are shorter and more orthogonal.
Recall that the quality of a basis that is output by a lattice reduction algorithm is
characterised by the Hermite factor δn0 , which is easy to compute.
BKZ [202] is a prominent family of lattice reduction algorithms, parameterised by
a block size k, that we will discuss in detail. When k = 2 the algorithm produces
an output basis containing a short vector that is only guaranteed to be within an
exponential factor of a shortest vector. In particular, the basis that is output sat-
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isfies the LLL-reduced property of Lenstra, Lenstra and Lovász [148], specified in
Definition 16. The definition depends on a value δ ∈ (14 , 1); a typical choice for this
value is δ = 34 .
Definition 16 ([148]). Let {b0, . . . ,bn−1} be a basis of a lattice. Let b∗i be the
Gram-Schmidt vectors and µi,j be the Gram-Schmidt coefficients. The basis is size
reduced if |µi,j | ≤ 12 for 0 ≤ j < i ≤ n− 1. Let δ ∈ (14 , 1). The Lovász condition is‖b∗i ‖2
‖b∗i−1‖2 ≥ δ − µ
2
i,i−1. The basis is LLL-reduced if it is size reduced and satisfies the
Lovász condition for some δ.
When the block size k = n; that is, the block size is equal to the full size of the
basis, then the output basis is said to be HKZ-reduced, after Hermite, Korkine and
Zolotarev [127, 140]. Let v0, . . . ,vm−1 be vectors spanning a subspace V . The
orthogonal complement V ⊥ = 〈v0, . . . ,vm−1〉⊥ is the set of all vectors orthogonal to
every vector in V .
Definition 17. Let {b0, . . . ,bn−1} be a basis of a lattice L and let {b∗0, . . . ,b∗n−1}
be the Gram-Schmidt vectors. The basis is HKZ-reduced if ‖b0‖2 = λ1(L) and
‖b∗i ‖2 = λ1(pii(L)) where pii(L) = 〈b0, . . . ,bi−1〉⊥ for 1 ≤ i ≤ n− 1.
In some sense, a HKZ-reduced basis is optimally reduced, since it contains a shortest
nonzero vector of the lattice. Indeed, each HKZ-reduced basis vector is known to be
close in length to the respective successive minimum.
Theorem 1 ([144, 161]). Let {b0, . . . ,bn−1} be a HKZ-reduced basis of a lattice L.
Then for 0 ≤ i ≤ n− 1,
4
i+ 4
≤ ‖bi‖
2
2
λ2i+1(L)
≤ i+ 4
4
.
However, BKZ with block size n runs in at least exponential time in the worst case.
In practice, a variant of BKZ with some intermediary block size 2 < k < n would be
used.
In the remainder of this chapter we review the lattice reduction algorithms LLL [148]
and BKZ [202]. For brevity we do not describe Slide reduction [103] or Dual BKZ
[171], although Micciancio and Walter [171] show experimentally that these are com-
petitive with BKZ: for example, the average root-Hermite factor achieved by these
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algorithms is shown to converge to that of BKZ. We introduce LLL in Section 3.1 and
BKZ in Section 3.2. We conclude in Section 3.3 by specifying the runtime estimates
for lattice reduction that will be used later in the thesis.
3.1 The LLL algorithm
Introduced by Lenstra, Lenstra and Lovász in [148], the LLL algorithm was initially
proposed as an algorithm for factoring polynomials, but has since found a wealth
of applications [179]. The LLL algorithm can be considered as a generalisation of
the two dimensional lattice reduction algorithm due to Lagrange (see, for example,
[134, 179]), which is sometimes attributed to Gauss.
The output of Lagrange’s lattice reduction algorithm is a basis {b0,b1} such that
λ1 = ‖b0‖2 ≤ ‖b1‖2 = λ2 and the Gram-Schmidt coefficient |µ1,0| ≤ 12 . The algo-
rithm works by taking in a pair of vectors {b0,b1} arranged such that ‖b0‖2 ≤ ‖b1‖2
and then setting b1 = b1 − bµ1,0eb0, then swapping the vectors and repeating until
no more changes can be made. Thus, when this terminates, we must have |µ1,0| ≤ 12 .
To extend into higher dimensions we would like to do something similar, but the
optimal way to do this is not immediately clear because of the additional choice of
directions. As we will see below, the LLL algorithm can be seen as a generalisation
of the Lagrange algorithm that is relaxed in some sense; other generalisations are
discussed for example in [178].
The Lagrange algorithm ensures that ‖b1‖2‖b0‖2 is not too small; in particular, we have
‖b1‖2
‖b0‖2 ≥ 1 − µ
2
1,0. The Lovász condition (recall Definition 16) is a relaxed general
version of this. Essentially, the LLL algorithm works by size reducing each basis
vector, updating the Gram-Schmidt vectors and coefficients, and then checking if
the Lovász condition still holds; if it does not, then it swaps the current vector with
the previous vector. In more detail, let the input basis be {b0, . . . ,bn−1}. Starting
at i = 1 and incrementing upwards, consider bi and size reduce with respect to bj
for j = i− 1 down to j = 0. Then check if bi and bi−1 satisfy the Lovász condition.
If they do, increment i; if not, swap them and decrement i to ensure the swap has
not affected the Lovász condition holding in the previous pair.
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Lenstra, Lenstra and Lovász in [148] showed that their algorithm runs in polynomial
time. Several provable variants of the LLL algorithm, which improve the running
time, have been proposed [135, 200, 176, 181, 175]. Suppose a bound B is known on
the norms of the input basis, so that ‖bi‖2 < B for all 0 ≤ i ≤ n − 1. The variant
due to Neumaier and Stehlé [175], for example, runs in time O (n4+ log1+B) for
any  > 0. Heuristically, variants of LLL, such as L2 [176], perform even better: for
example, Stehlé [206] showed that O (n2 log2B) can be achieved in practice.
In terms of quality of output, the LLL algorithm theoretically achieves a Hermite fac-
tor of
(
4
3
)n−1
4 [148], although in practice, the output quality is much better. Nguyen
and Stehlé [177] conclude from experiments in dimension up to n = 130 that the root-
Hermite factor δ0 appears to converge towards 1.02 as the dimension increases. For
comparison, the theoretical root-Hermite factor in dimension 130 is approximately
1.074.
3.2 The BKZ algorithm
The BKZ algorithm was introduced by Schnorr and Euchner [202]. As mentioned
above, BKZ is in fact a family of algorithms parameterised by a block size k. We
call a basis that is output by the BKZ algorithm with block size k a BKZk-reduced
basis. The BKZ algorithm requires an algorithm solving exact SVP in dimension up
to k as a subroutine, which we refer to as calling an SVP oracle.
The BKZ algorithm with block size k runs as follows, where at every stage the
updated basis is denoted b0, . . . ,bn−1. The input basis is LLL-reduced, and the first
block is b0, . . . ,bk−1. We call the SVP oracle to obtain a short vector, b′0, in the
space spanned by these vectors. We now have k+1 vectors spanning a k dimensional
space, so we call LLL to obtain a new set of k linearly independent vectors. The
second block is made of vectors that are the projections of b1, . . . ,bk onto 〈b0〉⊥
(the space that is the span of the orthogonal complement of b0). Again we call the
SVP oracle to obtain a short vector in this space, b′1, which can be viewed as the
projection of some b′′1 in the lattice. Now we call LLL on b0,b1, . . . ,bk,b′′1 to update
the list of basis vectors. The next block is made of vectors that are the projection of
b2, . . . ,bk+1 onto 〈b0,b1〉⊥ (the space that is the span of the orthogonal complement
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of b0 and b1), and again the SVP oracle is called to obtain a short vector in this
space, which can be viewed as a projected b′′2; and this procedure carries on through
the basis. The first n − k + 1 blocks are all of size k, and then after this point
each block is one vector shorter than the previous block. The output basis of this
process is another LLL-reduced basis, which can be treated as a new input, and the
whole process continues, until a basis passes through unchanged, at which point the
algorithm terminates. We can see that BKZ constructively achieves a basis with the
following property: each block of size k, that is, all the first n − k + 1 blocks, is a
HKZ-reduced basis.
To implement the SVP oracle in dimension k, four main possibilities exist: sieving,
enumeration, computing the Voronoi cell and Discrete Gaussian sampling. Discrete
Gaussian sampling takes 2k+o(k) operations and 2k+o(k) memory [4]. Computing the
Voronoi cell of the lattice takes 22k+o(k) operations and 2k+o(k) memory [169]. The
provable variant of sieving takes 2k+o(k) operations and 2k+o(k) memory [192, 4]. The
best heuristic classical variant of sieving takes 20.292 k+o(k) operations [33] and the
best heuristic quantum variant of sieving takes 20.265 k+o(k) operations [141]. The run-
ning time of provable variants of enumeration depends on the preprocessing. Fincke
and Pohst [101] show that by preprocessing with LLL, enumeration requires 2O(k
2)
operations and poly(k) memory. Kannan [136] showed that with stronger prepro-
cessing, enumeration be done in kO(k) operations and poly(k) memory. Achieving
kO(k) was considered prohibitively expensive in practice until recently, but Miccian-
cio and Walter [170] proposed a variant that achieves kO(k) with smaller overhead.
Moreover, Walter [213] showed that preprocessing local blocks with BKZ-k′ where
k′ = O (k) before enumeration also reduces the complexity of BKZ-k to kO(k).
In terms of quality of output, Chen [64] gives a limiting value of the root-Hermite
factor δ0 achievable by BKZ as a function of the block size k. Experimental evidence
suggests that we may use Chen’s limiting value as an estimate also when n is finite.
Lemma 7 ([64]). Let vk be the volume of the unit ball in dimension k and let δ0
be the root-Hermite factor achievable by BKZ with block size k. Assume that both
Heuristic 1 and Heuristic 2 hold. Then
lim
n→∞ δ0 =
(
v
−1
k
k
) 1
k−1
≈
(
k
2pie
(pik)
1
k
) 1
2(k−1)
.
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Another approximation for the δ0 achievable for a fixed k is known as the lattice rule
of thumb (see, for example [207]) and states that δ0 = k
1
2k . This expression itself is
often [208] approximated by δ0 = 2
1
k . However, we will show that this simplification
implies a subexponential algorithm for solving LWE.
Several possible improvements to BKZ have been suggested, namely early termina-
tion [124], local block preprocessing, extreme pruning [105] and optimising the enu-
meration radius. These improvements have been combined and tested as so-called
BKZ 2.0 [65].
No closed formula for the expected number of BKZ rounds ρ is known and the
best upper bound is exponential [124, 104]. However, it has been observed that the
quality of the output basis increases more dramatically in the earlier rounds of BKZ,
and this gives rise to the idea of early termination. Assuming n calls to an SVP
oracle per round, Hanrot et al. [124] show that after ρ = n
2
k2
log n many rounds, the
quality of the basis is already very close to the final output. The choice to terminate
BKZ early may therefore still return a basis close to the desired quality, whereas
performing more rounds would increase the runtime while not increasing the basis
quality much.
Recall that in BKZ the local basis (of a block) is always LLL-reduced. Local block
preprocessing involves performing a stronger reduction of the local basis, so that it
is more than just LLL-reduced. For example, it could be a basis that is BKZk′-
reduced with some block size k′ < k. Chen and Nguyen [65] use a recursive BKZ
with early termination as preprocessing. We can also consider a global preprocessing:
computing a BKZk-reduced basis by beginning with a BKZk′-reduced basis for some
k′ < k, rather than an LLL-reduced basis. The BKZk′-reduced basis could itself be
computed by beginning with a BKZk′′-reduced basis for some k′′ < k′, rather than
an LLL-reduced basis, and so on. This idea is known as progressive BKZ [22].
Pruning is an improvement that can be applied when the SVP oracle is implemented
as enumeration. Rather than exploring all branches in the search tree, we instead
explore only a subset of the branches, according to some rule. This is faster than
exploring all branches, but may not return the shortest vector.
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For optimising the enumeration radius, Chen and Nguyen [65] use ν =
√
1.1 times
the Gaussian Heuristic as an upper bound for the enumeration radius, where the
fixed value ν is determined from experiments, while Aono et al. [22] allow the value
ν to be varied.
3.2.1 Asymptotic running time of BKZ
In this section we consider the asymptotic runtime behaviour of the BKZ algorithm,
and in the following section we will discuss estimates from in the literature for the
running time of BKZ in practice.
We determine an asymptotic lower bound of the running time of BKZ required to
achieve a certain basis quality characterised by δ0 as a function of δ0 as follows. We
know that BKZ with block size k should cost at least as much as the cost of calling
an SVP oracle in dimension k. Thus, we can write k in terms of δ0, using one of
the estimates of quality of output of BKZ with block size k. We then substitute this
value for k into an appropriate asymptotic cost of an SVP oracle.
In order to relate k and δ0 we use the lattice rule of thumb (recall Section 3.2). Recall
that this states δ0 = k
1
2k , which implies klog k =
1
2 log δ0
. We will lower bound k using
Lemma 8.
Lemma 8. Let gn(t) for some t be the sequence defined such that g0(t) = 2 and for
i ≥ 1, gi(t) = t log(gi−1(t)). For a > 0, define b = alog a . If a ≥ 2 then a ≥ gn(b) for
any n ≥ 0.
Proof: We prove the claim by induction. For the base case, by assumption we have
a ≥ 2 = g0(b). For the inductive step, suppose a ≥ gi(b). This implies
log a ≥ log (gi(b))
b log a ≥ b log (gi(b))
b log a ≥ gi+1(b)
a ≥ gi+1(b)
since b log a = a by definition, and we are done. 
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In BKZ the block size k ≥ 2, so by Lemma 8 we have k ≥ gn
(
1
2 log δ0
)
for all n. In
particular, we can use k ≥ g2
(
1
2 log δ0
)
= − log(2 log δ0)2 log δ0 to lower bound the log of the
asymptotic time complexity of the BKZ algorithm as follows.
Corollary 1. The log of the asymptotic time complexity for running BKZ to achieve
a root-Hermite factor δ0 is:
Ω
(
log2 (2 log δ0)
4 log2 δ0
)
if calling the SVP oracle costs 2O(k
2),
Ω
− log
(− log (2 log δ0)
2 log δ0
)
log (2 log δ0)
2 log δ0
 if calling the SVP oracle costs kO(k),
Ω
(− log (2 log δ0)
2 log δ0
)
if calling the SVP oracle costs 2O(k).
For sufficiently large k, the bound of Lemma 8 becomes tighter as n increases. In
particular, applying the following lemma shows that k is the limit of the sequence
gn
(
1
2 log δ0
)
when k ≥ 4.
Lemma 9. Let gn(t) for some t be the sequence defined such that g0(t) = 2 and for
i ≥ 1, gi(t) = t log(gi−1(t)). Define g∞(t) = limn→∞ gn(t), if it exists. For a > 0,
define b = alog a . If a ≥ 4, then a = g∞(b).
Proof: By Lemma 8, since a ≥ 4 > 2, the sequence gn(b) is bounded above by a.
We will show that gn(b) is a monotonic sequence and hence we can conclude it is
convergent. We will use the fact that if a ≥ 4 then alog a = b ≥ 2. We prove by
induction that gn(b) ≥ gn−1(b) for all n ≥ 1. For the base case, we have
g1(b) = b log (g0(b)) = b log 2 = b ≥ 2 = g0(b) .
For the inductive step, suppose gi(b) ≥ gi−1(b). This implies
gi(b)
gi−1(b)
≥ 1
log
(
gi(b)
gi−1(b)
)
≥ 0
b log
(
gi(b)
gi−1(b)
)
≥ 0
b log gi(b)− b log gi−1(b) ≥ 0
gi+1(b)− gi(b) ≥ 0
gi+1(b) ≥ gi(b)
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as required. We have shown than gn(b) is convergent and we may denote its limit
by g∞(b). This satisfies g∞(b) = b log (g∞(b)) and since b = alog a we have that
g∞(b)
log (g∞(b)) =
a
log a . For x ≥ 4, the function xlog(x) is one-to-one. By assumption, a ≥ 4
and we can conclude g∞(b) = a as desired. 
3.2.2 Estimating running time of BKZ in practice
We now review various estimates for the running time of BKZ that exist in the
literature. Perhaps the most prominent and widely used estimate is due to Lindner
and Peikert [150] who estimate that the runtime (in seconds) of BKZ is
log tBKZ(δ0) =
1.8
log δ0
− 110 .
To convert the estimate to a more general metric we convert to clock cycles. Lindner
and Peikert obtained their estimate based on experiments using the implementation
of BKZ in the NTL library [204]. The experiments were performed on a 2.3 GHz
computer, so the estimate corresponds to a runtime of approximately 2
1.8
log δ0
−78.9
clock cycles.
We argue the Lindner and Peikert model is inaccurate. One reason for this is due to
the implementation of the SVP oracle in NTL. This is implemented as enumeration
without improvements such as extreme pruning, local block preprocessing, and early
termination, which means the SVP oracle requires 2O(k
2) time. According to the
Lindner and Peikert model the log of the running time is linear in 1log δ0 whereas
using Corollary 1 it is clear that the log of the running time is nonlinear in 1log δ0 .
Even deriving an analogous result to Corollary 1 using the less tight bound
k ≥ g1
(
1
2 log δ0
)
=
1
2 log δ0
we would obtain that the log of the running time is Ω
(
1
4 log2 δ0
)
, which is still nonlin-
ear in 1log δ0 . A second reason, which we will discuss in Section 4.6, is that applying
this model to predict the behaviour of BKZ leads to a subexponential algorithm for
solving LWE.
Albrecht et al. [9] use data points of Liu and Nguyen [152] to extrapolate a model
similar to Lindner and Peikert’s [150]. We refer to the model of Albrecht et al. [9]
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as the delta-squared model. The running time in seconds on a 2.3 GHz computer of
BKZ 2.0 is estimated to be
log tBKZ(δ0) =
0.009
log2 δ0
− 27 ,
corresponding to a runtime of 2
0.009
log2 δ0
+4.1
clock cycles. We note that this model
also assumes that enumeration in BKZ 2.0 has a complexity of 2O(k
2), and that the
running times on which this model is based were not independently verified, which
limits their utility.
Chen and Nguyen [65, 64] provide a simulation algorithm for BKZ 2.0 for arbitrarily
high block size k, under the assumption that each block behaves as a random basis.
They note that this assumption may not hold for block sizes k < 50. The algorithm
takes as input the logs of the norms of the Gram-Schmidt vectors belonging to the
input matrix and a block size k. It outputs the expected logs of the norms of the
Gram-Schmidt vectors of the BKZk-reduced basis as well as the number of rounds ρ
needed. The simulation algorithm allows us to calculate the block size k that will be
required to obtain the given approximate δ0 by BKZ 2.0 (see [65, Table 2]). Chen
and Nguyen assume the SVP oracle is implemented using a pruned enumeration and
they estimate the upper bound of the cost of this, for various values of k, in terms of
the number of nodes of the enumeration tree (see [65, Table 3]). Each round of BKZ
is estimated to cost n−k enumeration calls, so the total cost of BKZ is estimated to
be the number of rounds multiplied by n−k multiplied by the cost of an enumeration
call.
In [211] van de Pol and Smart consider the problem of estimating the cost of BKZ
from the perspective of using BKZ to solve an LWE instance or some other compu-
tational problem in lattices. They assume we have a desired level of security 2λ; that
is, a maximum number of operations an adversary can perform, and a given lattice
dimension m. These values are used to find the lowest δ0 that can be achieved in 2λ
operations, minimising over possible choices of the block size k and the number of
rounds ρ = ρ(k,m, λ). This is in contrast to an approach where the parameters of
the system correspond to a δ0, which then implies a certain security level. They use
data of Chen and Nguyen [65, Table 3] to estimate the cost of one enumeration for
a given k and to calculate the total number of enumerations that can be performed
for this k, to reach the maximum of 2λ operations. Note that this means they do not
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consider block sizes k > 250 as Chen and Nguyen do not give estimates for those.
They remark that δ0 seems to converge to a value depending only on k, corroborat-
ing other results in the literature. They note further that the convergence is slower
in higher dimension. The approach of van de Pol and Smart was later refined by
Lepoint and Naehrig [149].
Alkim et al. [19] and Bos et al. [39] also consider the cost of BKZ in the setting of
estimating security of their respective key exchange schemes. Suppose an attacker
uses BKZ with appropriate block size to obtain an output basis of quality such that
they expect to be able to break the scheme. It can be argued that this attacker can
be expected to make at most a polynomial number of SVP oracle calls, for example
by using an early termination strategy [124]. In particular, experiments of Chen [64]
suggest that a linear number of calls to the SVP oracle may be sufficient. Alkim et
al. [19] and Bos et al. [39] take a more conservative view and instead imagine that
the attacker is successful after just one call to the SVP oracle. In [39] it is argued
that this accounts both for potential improvements to BKZ, as well as for a case in
which the attacker requires to run BKZ several times and may be able to amortise
its cost.
Albrecht [7] estimates the cost of BKZ in clock cycles as
tBKZ = 8 · n ·
(
20.292k+12.31
)
.
This follows Chen [64] in estimating a linear number of calls to the SVP oracle,
namely c · n calls for a constant c, and assumes the SVP oracle is implemented via
sieving. The constant c = 8 is chosen based on experiments using fplll [88]. The
0.292k term is based on the asymptotic estimate of the cost of sieving given by
Becker et al. [33] and the 12.31 term is based on experiments of Laarhoven [142].
3.3 Estimating lattice reduction in this thesis
Alongside the article [16], Albrecht developed a module in Sage for determining the
bit security of LWE instances [6], which we call the LWE estimator. The LWE
estimator takes as input an LWE instance parameterised by n, α and q and returns
estimates for the bit operations required to solve that instance via various algorithms,
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SVP oracle Data source Log of cost tk of SVP oracle
Enumeration [66] 0.270 k log(k)− 1.019 k + 16.10
Classical sieve small [33] 0.387 k + 16.4
Classical sieve asymptotic [33] 0.292k + 16.4
Quantum sieve [141] 0.265 k + 16.4
Table 3.1: Estimates used in the LWE estimator for the log of the cost in clock cycles
log(tk) to solve SVP in dimension k.
as well as the amount of memory and number of LWE samples that would be required
when using each algorithm. As we will discuss in detail in Chapter 4, lattice reduction
is required in many approaches for solving LWE. In this section we discuss how the
cost of lattice reduction is estimated in the LWE estimator. We focus on commit
f13c4a7, which is the version we will use in the remainder of the thesis.
Let tk be an estimate for the cost in clock cycles for an SVP oracle in dimension k. In
earlier versions of the LWE estimator, for example at the time of publication of [16],
the cost of BKZ in dimension n with block size k was estimated in clock cycles as
n ·ρ · tk. The number of rounds was estimated as ρ = n2k2 log n, following [124], giving
the estimate in clock cycles as
tBKZ =
n3
k2
log n · tk .
In commit f13c4a7 of the LWE estimator the cost of BKZ in dimension n with block
size k is estimated in clock cycles as
tBKZ = 8 · n · tk ,
following Albrecht [7]. It is assumed that the SVP oracle is implemented as sieving
or enumeration and estimates for tk that are used are summarised in Table 3.1. The
classical sieving estimates are based on the work of Becker et al. [33] and the quantum
sieving estimate is based on the thesis of Laarhoven [141]. The enumeration estimate
is based on the work of Chen and Nguyen [66].
The enumeration estimate, given in the first row of Table 3.1, was derived by fitting
a k log(k) + b k + c to data in [66, Table 4] and assuming one enumeration costs 200
clock cycles as in [66]. Although BKZ 2.0 does perform local block preprocessing
with BKZ-k′ before calling the SVP oracle, it is not clear when implemented as in [66]
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that it achieves a complexity of kO(k). This is because [66] does not give sufficient
details to decide if preprocessing was performed with k′ = O (k). However, from a
cryptanalytical perspective, it is safer to assume it achieves this bound, which is why
the curve was fit to a k log(k) + b k + c rather than a k2 + b k + c.
The estimates for classical sieving are given in the second and third rows of Table 3.1.
Becker et al. [33] report a heuristic asymptotic time complexity of 20.292 k+o(k) and
experimental time complexities of 20.405k−16 seconds and 20.387k−15 seconds on a
2.83 GHz CPU. The faster experimental estimate is used for small k. The estimate
20.292k+c is used for k > 90; that is, the o(k) term is treated as a constant c, which
is chosen to be the same as the constant term for small k.
The estimate for quantum sieving is given in the final row of Table 3.1. An asymptotic
complexity of quantum sieving of 20.265 k+o(k) is reported by Laarhoven [141]. Again,
the o(k) term is treated as a constant c which is set to the same value as for the
other sieving estimates.
While it could be argued that it is unreasonable to ignore the contribution of the o(k)
terms in the sieving estimates, we note that Becker et al. [33] also fit experimental
data to a curve of the form 2ak+b for constants a and b. Furthermore, we note that
estimating the cost of sieving in practice has been stressed as an open problem by,
for example, Laarhoven and de Weger [143].
42
Chapter 4
Algorithms for solving LWE
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This chapter discusses approaches for solving the Learning with Errors problem. In
particular, we identify three strategies for solving LWE and describe the algorithms
available in the literature for solving LWE via these strategies. This chapter is based
on material presented in [16].
4.1 Motivation
The hardness of the Learning with Errors problem is considered only asymptotically
in much of the literature. Such asymptotic expressions can be useful: for example,
they give a good overview of the general behaviour of algorithms for solving LWE.
This is illustrated by Herold et al. [128], who show that for a polynomial number of
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samples, all known algorithms for solving LWE in dimension n have running time at
least 2O(n). In addition, asymptotic results can indicate weaker parameter settings.
For example, the algorithm of Arora and Ge [25] runs in time 2O˜(n
2ξ) for some ξ such
that αq = nξ and so we can conclude that it is subexponential when ξ < 12 . This
result coincides nicely with the reduction from GapSVP to LWE due to Regev [195],
which requires αq >
√
n. As another example, Kirchner and Fouque [139] give an
algorithm that is subexponential in the case of a uniform binary error. This indicates
that LWE with binary error is somewhat weaker than general LWE, an idea which
we will discuss in more detail in the following chapter.
However, asymptotic expressions for the runtime of algorithms may hide logarithmic
and constant factors in the exponent. Therefore, using such expressions can make
determining secure parameters challenging when designing cryptosystems. When
choosing parameters for an LWE-based cryptosystem we must ensure that the un-
derlying LWE instance is hard with respect to a particular security parameter λ. To
choose optimal parameters for security we must be able to identify the fastest known
way of solving LWE with that choice of parameters and be assured that this attack
requires at least 2λ operations. Our goal in this chapter is therefore to determine
the concrete hardness of LWE.
In the following section we identify three strategies for solving LWE: firstly, via
solving the Short Integer Solutions problem, known as the dual attack; secondly, via
solving the Bounded Distance Decoding problem, known as the primal attack; and
finally, recovering the secret directly by other means. In the remainder of the chapter,
for each of these strategies, we discuss the algorithms that can be used to solve LWE.
We consider all possible approaches for solving LWE, including algorithms that may
require a very large number of samples m. Indeed, in this chapter we assume the
attacker has access to an unlimited number of samples. We therefore parameterise
an LWE instance by n, α and q. This is in line with the implementation of the LWE
estimator [6] at the time of publication of [16].
For some approaches for solving LWE, it turns out that the optimal attack requires
a specific number of samples m, and the attacker having access to more should
discard any excess samples. In particular, during the attack the aim will be to find a
vector v with a target norm in a lattice L with a fixed volume vol (L) but a variable
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dimension m. In particular, the optimal attack will require m to be chosen such that
the following is minimised:
‖v‖2 = δm0 vol (L)1/m .
In many applications, it holds that vol (L) = qn and in this case, this minimal value
is given by
m =
√
n log q
log δ0
and is referred to as the optimal subdimension [168].
A criticism of allowing any number of samples is that this does not always represent
the situation in practice, since there are scenarios in which an attacker attempting
to solve LWE would only have access to a limited number of samples. Hence it
can be argued [18] that allowing unlimited samples, and thus assuming the attacker
is more powerful, leads to overly conservative security estimates. To address this
issue, Bindel et al. [36] have implemented an extension to the LWE estimator [6]
that enables the user to specify a limit on the number of samples m, in addition to
the usual parameters n, α and q, and then obtain an estimate of the hardness of the
LWE instance in this case.
4.2 Strategies for solving LWE
In this section we discuss three strategies for solving LWE given samples (A, c). All
of the algorithms that we will discuss in the remainder of this chapter follow one of
these strategies.
In Section 4.2.1, we discuss the strategy of solving Decision-LWE by finding a short
vector v such that vA = 0. This strategy solves the Short Integer Solutions problem
and is also known as the dual attack.
In Section 4.2.2, we discuss the strategy of solving Search-LWE by finding a short
e such that Ax = c − e for some unknown x. This strategy solves the Bounded
Distance Decoding problem and is also known as the primal attack.
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In Section 4.2.3, we discuss the strategy of solving Search-LWE directly by finding
an s′ such that As′ is close to c.
4.2.1 Solving LWE via solving the Short Integer Solutions problem
The strategy of solving LWE via solving the Short Integer Solutions problem solves
Decision-LWE. The goal is to distinguish the case where m samples (A, c) follow
Ls,χ, and hence satisfy c = As + e with e(i)
$← DZ,αq, from the case where both A
and c are uniformly random. To do so, we aim to find a short vector v in the lattice
L = {w ∈ Zmq | wA ≡ 0 mod q} ,
which is the dual lattice, scaled by q, of the lattice generated by A. Finding such
a v is exactly solving the Short Integer Solutions problem. To see that such a v
will enable us to distinguish, consider the inner product 〈v, c〉. If c = As + e
then 〈v, c〉 = 〈v, e〉 which approximately follows a Gaussian distribution over Z
considered modulo q, provided not too many of the components of v are too large.
In particular, 〈v, e〉 is often small as both v and e are small. On the other hand,
if c is uniform then 〈v, c〉 is uniform over Zq. So we can indeed distinguish these
two cases, thus solving Decision-LWE. We must however ensure ‖v‖2 is suitably
short. If ‖v‖2 is too large then the Gaussian distribution of 〈v, e〉 will be too flat to
distinguish from random. In particular, we have the following lemma specifying the
distinguishing advantage for a given vector v.
Lemma 10 ([150]). Given an LWE instance parameterised by n, α, q and a vector
v of length ‖v‖2 in the scaled dual lattice L = {w ∈ Zmq | wA ≡ 0 mod q}, the
advantage of distinguishing 〈v, e〉 from random is close to exp(−pi(‖v‖2 · α)2).
Corollary 2. To obtain an advantage  in solving an LWE instance that is pa-
rameterised by n, α and q via the SIS strategy, we require a vector v of norm
‖v‖2 = 1α ·
√
ln( 1 )
pi .
Stehlé [208] states that a suitably short choice to distinguish Ls,χ from random is
‖v‖2 · αq ≤ q; that is, ‖v‖2 ≤ 1α . By Lemma 10, choosing ‖v‖2 = 1α results in an
advantage of about 123 to distinguish correctly.
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Depending on the algorithm used to obtain the short vector v, it may be advan-
tageous to accept a longer vector as output. This decreases the distinguishing ad-
vantage , but, by the Chernoff bound [72], running the algorithm about 1
2
times
will achieve a success probability close to 1. This may be faster than the alternative,
which uses fewer vectors at a higher success probability, but takes significantly longer
to obtain these shorter vectors.
4.2.2 Solving LWE via solving Bounded Distance Decoding
The strategy of solving LWE via solving the Bounded Distance Decoding problem
(BDD) solves Search-LWE. Given m samples (A, c) following Ls,χ, we may observe
that c = As + e is close to a linear combination of the columns of A. Furthermore,
since the noise e is Gaussian, almost all of the noise is bounded in norm by a small
multiple of the standard deviation. Considering the lattice spanned by the columns
of A, we can see that c is a point within a bounded distance from the lattice point
w = As. Hence, we may view the LWE instance as an instance of the BDD problem
for this lattice. In this case, our solution to the BDD problem would be the lattice
point w, from which we may then use linear algebra to recover s and therefore solve
Search-LWE. In the case that A is not invertible, we call for more samples until it
is.
Let ′ be the overall target success probability. Depending on the algorithm used, it
may be advantageous to run the algorithm independently t times, each with a lower
success probability . Since we are solving a search problem, we will fail overall only
if we fail on all of the t attempts. Hence we have 1− ′ = (1− )t and so an overall
success probability of ′ is achieved after repeating t = log(1−
′)
log(1−) times.
4.2.3 Solving LWE via recovering the secret directly
The final strategy is to solve Search-LWE directly by searching for a suitable s′ such
that ‖As′ − c‖2 is small. While this and the BDD strategy are related by simple
linear algebra, since knowing e trivially allows us to recover s and vice versa, they
differ in which of e or s they target.
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4.3 Exhaustive search for LWE
The most naive approach for solving LWE is an exhaustive search. This directly
solves for s as in Section 4.2.3.
Theorem 2. Let an LWE instance be parameterised by n, α and q. The time com-
plexity of solving Search-LWE with success probability  with exhaustive search is
m · (2tαq + 1)n · 2n = 2n log (2tαq+1)+logn+1+logm
operations in Zq. The memory complexity is n and the number of samples required
is n+m with
m =
log(1− )− n log(2tαq + 1)
log(2tα)
for some small parameter t = ω(
√
log n).
Proof: Consider {−tαq, . . . , tαq} for t = ω(√log n). By Lemma 3, an LWE sample
has error that falls in this range with high probability. Applying Lemma 4 we obtain
an LWE instance with s(i)
$← DZ,αq; that is, the secret s follows the same distribution
as the error. Therefore we are able to estimate the size of each component s(i) of
the secret s as |s(i)| ≤ tαq and so to check all possible secrets we must enumerate
approximately (2tαq + 1)n vectors. For each guess s′ and for all available samples
(ai, ci) we calculate xi = ci−〈ai, s′〉 and see if xi follows the error distribution, which
would be the case for the correct secret. For each guess s′ and for each sample we
perform about 2n operations in Zq when computing the inner product, which gives
the stated time complexity.
We require n of the overall set of samples to apply Lemma 4. We determine the
number of additional samples m required by bounding the probability of a false
positive. We know that the correct secret s′ = s will produce ei = ci − 〈ai, s〉 with
ei ∈ {−tαq, . . . , tαq} with overwhelming probability. Wrong guesses s′ will produce
random elements in Zq that land within the acceptable range with probability at most
d2tαqe+1
q ≈ 2tα. For an incorrect guess s′ 6= s to pass the test it must pass for all m
samples, which happens with probability (2tα)m. There are (2tαq + 1)n − 1 wrong
choices for s. By the union bound, we will accept a false positive with probability
pf ≤ (2tα)m · (2tαq + 1)n. For small failure probability pf = 1 −  we obtain the
stated bound on the number of additional samples m. 
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In the LWE estimator [6] commit f13c4a7, the parameter t is set to t =
⌈
2
√
lnn
⌉
.
Using Lemma 3, the probability of the error falling outside the range {−tαq, . . . , tαq}
is at most
2e−4pi lnn(
2
√
2pi
√
lnn
)
· √2pi
=
2eln (n
−4pi)
4pi
√
lnn
=
1
n4pi · 2pi√lnn .
Corollary 3. Let an LWE instance be parameterised by n, α and q where q = nc
for some constant c and αq =
√
n. Then the time complexity of solving Search-LWE
with success probability  with exhaustive search is
2n log (2t
√
n+1)+logn+1+logm .
The memory complexity is n. The number of samples required is m+ n with
m =
log (1− )− n log (2t√n+ 1)(
1
2 − c
)
log n+ log (2t)
.
4.3.1 Meet-in-the-Middle for LWE
There is a Meet-in-the-Middle (MITM) algorithm to solve LWE, which directly solves
for s as in Section 4.2.3. This is a time-memory trade-off and is therefore a faster
method than a naive brute force at the cost of an increased memory requirement. The
existence of an MITM algorithm for LWE was mentioned by Bai and Galbraith [29]
but a detailed description was not provided.
Theorem 3. Let an LWE instance be parameterised by n, α and q. If there are n+m
samples satisfying
(
2tαq+1
q
)m ·((2tαq + 1)n2 − 1) = poly(n) and 3tαm ≤ 1C for some
small parameter t = ω(
√
log n), then there is a Meet-in-the-Middle algorithm that
solves Search-LWE with non-negligible probability that runs in time
(2tαq + 1)
n
2 ·
(
m · n+ log
(n
2
)
+ log (log tαq) +
n
2
· log (2tαq + 1)
)
and requires memory n2 · log (tαq) · (2tαq + 1)
n
2 .
Proof: We apply Lemma 4, which costs n samples, to obtain an LWE instance with
s(j)
$← DZ,αq. That is, the secret follows the same distribution as the error, and by
Lemma 3 has elements in the range {−tαq, . . . , tαq} for t = ω(√log n) with high
probability.
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With each of the remaining m samples (ak, 〈ak, s〉 + ek), we split ak = akl ||akr in
half. For every possible first half of the secret sil, and for each of the m samples ak,
we compute
〈
ak
l, si
l
〉
. Let the output of a guess sil ∈ Zn/2q be the vector
usil =
(〈
a0
l, si
l
〉
, . . . ,
〈
am−1l, sil
〉)
.
We store a table T whose entries map usil to si
l. In particular, we index sil by the
(log q − log (tαq)) most significant bits of usil in T .
Since the secret follows the error distribution, we expect (2tαq + 1)
n
2 candidate secret
halves sil and for each candidate we must calculate m inner products. Therefore,
generating the table costsm·n·(2tαq + 1)n2 operations. We need to store (2tαq + 1)n2
candidates sil, each of which has n2 components, each of which requires log (tαq)
space. Hence the memory requirement is |T | = n2 · log (tαq) · (2tαq + 1)
n
2 .
Once the table is generated and sorted, for each candidate sjr ∈ Zn/2q for the second
half of the secret, and for each of the samples ak, we compute ck − 〈akr, sjr〉. Let
the output for a guess sjr be the vector
vsjr = (c0 − 〈a0r, sjr〉 , . . . , cm−1 − 〈am−1r, sjr〉) .
We take the (log q − log (tαq)) most significant bits of vsjr and query T . If T returns
a value sil, we treat sil || sjr as a candidate secret. By construction, if T is queried
for the guess sjr and returns sil, then ‖vsjr − usil‖ ≤ tαq since vsjr and usil agree
except for the least log (tαq) significant bits. If this process returns no candidate
secret, we call for more samples and repeat.
For each guess sjr, we can query vsjr in
log(|T |) = log
(n
2
· log (tαq) · (2tαq + 1)n2
)
= log
(n
2
)
+ log (log tαq) +
n
2
log (2tαq + 1)
operations by binary search. Since there are (2tαq + 1)
n
2 possible guesses sjr, the
overall cost of querying is (2tαq+ 1)
n
2 · (log (n2 )+ log (log tαq) + n2 · log (2tαq + 1)).
Let the kth component of vsr be vsr,k and let the kth component of usl be usl,k. For
the correct secret s = sl || sr, if the (log q − log (tαq)) most significant bits of vsr
and usl agree, then
vsr,k − usl,k = ck − 〈ark, sr〉 −
〈
alk, s
l
〉
= ck − 〈ak, s〉 = ek mod q
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for all k. By Lemma 3 the errors ek are in the range {−tαq, . . . , tαq} with overwhelm-
ing probability. Therefore, if this process returns any candidate secrets sil || sjr at
all, then with overwhelming probability, one of them will be the correct secret s.
We need to ensure the b = (log q − log (tαq)) most significant bits of vsr and usl
agree. We denote this requirement as MSBb (vsr) = MSBb
(
usl
)
. For all k, by
definition of the LWE samples,
ck = 〈ak, s〉+ ek mod q
ck =
〈
ak
l, sl
〉
+ 〈akr, sr〉+ ek mod q
ck − 〈akr, sr〉 =
〈
ak
l, sl
〉
+ ek mod q
vsr,k = usl,k + ek mod q
MSBb (vsr,k) = MSBb
(
usl,k + ek
)
.
Hence, it is sufficient to show thatMSBb
(
usl,k + ek
)
= MSBb
(
usl,k
)
for all k. Since
with overwhelming probability ‖ek‖ ≤ tαq, this holds whenever the inner product〈
ak
l, sl
〉
takes a value in the range {tαq, . . . , q − 1 − 2tαq}. In this range, adding
ek will not cause a wrap around modulo q or influence the b most significant bits.
We would like the probability that the inner product is not in this range to be
small. Since a is uniformly random, so is the inner product
〈
ak
l, sl
〉
. Therefore the
probability that
〈
ak
l, sl
〉
is not in the range {tαq, . . . , q−1−2tαq} is tαq+2tαqq = 3tα.
By the union bound, the probability that this occurs for any of the m samples is less
than or equal to 3tαm. We therefore require that m satisfies 3tαm ≤ 1C for some
constant C.
Consider now the probability of a false positive, that is, a wrong candidate secret sil
being suggested for some candidate sjr. Since ak is uniformly random, for any sil,
we have that usil is essentially a random vector where each component takes one of
q values. The probability of a wrong candidate sjr producing a vsjr matching to a
given usil is the probability of getting to within ±tαq on every component. Therefore
the probability of a false positive is
(
2tαq+1
q
)m
. There are (2tαq + 1)
n
2 − 1 wrong
choices for sil. We hence expect to test
(
2tαq+1
q
)m · ((2tαq + 1)n2 − 1) candidates
per sjr and thus we also require that m satisfies(
2tαq + 1
q
)m
·
(
(2tαq + 1)
n
2 − 1
)
= poly(n) .

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In the LWE estimator [6] commit f13c4a7, the required number of samples m is
estimated heuristically as follows. The probability of a false positive is approximated
as (2tα)m. The number of wrong choices for sil is approximated as (αq)n/2. The
choice 2n is fixed for poly(n). Hence the required number of samples is estimated as
m =
log
(
2n
(αq)n/2
)
log (2tα)
.
To heuristically ensure the second condition on the number of samples, it is then
checked that
2mα > 1− 1
2n
.
4.4 The Arora-Ge algorithm
Arora and Ge [25] proposed an algorithm that solves Search-LWE via recovering the
secret directly as described in Section 4.2.3. The algorithm works by setting up a
system of noise-free nonlinear polynomials of which the secret s is a root. The system
is then solved by linearisation to recover s.
In more detail, the algorithm proceeds by assuming that the error always falls in
the range [−t, t] for some t ∈ Z such that d = 2t + 1 < q. This is a reasonable
assumption in the case of a Gaussian error distribution since by Lemma 3 the chance
of falling outside this interval drops exponentially fast. Polynomials are constructed
from the observation that the error, when falling in this range, is always a root of
the polynomial P (x) = x
∏t
i=1(x+ i)(x− i). Then, we know the secret s is a root of
P (a · x − c) constructed from LWE samples. This system of nonlinear equations is
solved by linearisation; that is, by replacing each monomial with a new variable and
solving the resulting linear system. This approach requires a large number, O (nd),
of samples and as we increase the number of samples, we increase the probability
that the error falls outside of the interval [−t, t]. We then have to increase the range,
which in turn requires even more samples. Balancing these two requirements of
keeping t low and acquiring enough samples, the overall complexity is given by the
following result.
Theorem 4 ([10]). Let an LWE instance be parameterised by n, q and σ = αq, let ω
denote the linear algebra constant, and define DAG = 8σ2 log n + 1. If DAG ∈ o(n)
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then the Arora-Ge algorithm solves Search-LWE in time complexity
O
(
2
ω·DAG log nDAG · σ q log q
)
= O
(
2 8ω σ
2 logn(logn−log(8σ2 logn))
)
and memory complexity
O
(
2
2·DAG log nDAG · σ q log q
)
= O
(
2 16σ
2 logn(logn−log(8σ2 logn))
)
.
If n ∈ o(DAG) then the Arora-Ge algorithm solves Search-LWE in time complexity
O
(
2ω n log
DAG
n · σ q log q
)
= O
(
2ω n log(8σ
2 logn)−ωn logn
)
and memory complexity
O
(
2 2n log
DAG
n · σ q log q
)
= O
(
2 2n log(8σ
2 logn)−2n logn
)
.
Corollary 4 ([10]). Let an LWE instance be parameterised by n, q and σ =
√
n.
Then the time complexity of the Arora-Ge algorithm is O (2(1+)ωn log logn) where
 = 3log logn .
Albrecht et al. [10] show that the Arora-Ge algorithm can be improved by using
Gröbner basis techniques. As mentioned above, to solve via linearisation as in [25] we
require O (nd) samples, but Gröbner basis algorithms will work when fewer samples
than this are available at the cost of a more expensive solving step. This approach
requires the assumption that random systems behave like semi-regular sequences, a
justification for which is given in [10]. In particular, in the case that αq =
√
n, we
obtain Theorem 5.
Theorem 5 ([10]). Let (ai, ci) for i ≥ 1 be elements of Znq × Zq sampled according
to Ls,χ with αq =
√
n and let ω denote the linear algebra constant. Then there is
a heuristic algorithm recovering the secret with time complexity O (22.35ωn+1.13n),
memory complexity O (25.85n) and sample complexity m = exp(pi4 · n).
4.5 The BKW algorithm
The BKW algorithm, named for its inventors Blum, Kalai and Wasserman [37], was
introduced as an algorithm for solving Learning Parity with Noise (LPN). As noted
by Regev [195], the BKW algorithm can be adapted to solve LWE.
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The BKW algorithm is parameterised by a and b = na , and solves LWE via the SIS
strategy as described in Section 4.2.1. To solve with this strategy, given m samples
(A, c) following Ls,χ, we require short vectors vi in the scaled dual lattice of the
lattice generated by A. The vectors vi are obtained by adding elements from a
tables where each table is used to find collisions on b components of a row of A.
Albrecht et al. [9] gave the first analysis of the BKW algorithm for LWE. In their
variant, the vectors vi are constructed as follows. Given a sample a; that is, a row of
A, the BKW algorithm splits the n components into a blocks each of width b. There
are a stages of the algorithm in which tables are created by searching for collisions
in the appropriate b coefficients of a. In the first stage, after an appropriate number
of samples, we obtain two vectors that agree on a(0), . . . ,a(b−1). The algorithm will
then take these and subtract them producing a row with a(0) = · · · = a(b−1) = 0
which is stored for use in the next stage. The next stage considers a(b), . . . ,a(2b−1),
and so on. This means that the algorithm must maintain a tables of size qb and its
running time is typically dominated by this magnitude.
The vi are of length
√
2a. In the first stage, suppose we find a collision on the first
b components. Adding those vectors to clear the first b components in a produces
a vi candidate of length
√
2 as we are adding two vectors. Moving on to the next
stage, two such vectors are added to clear the next b components, resulting in a vi
candidate of length
√
22, and so on for all a stages.
Albrecht et al. [9] give the following complexity for solving Decision-LWE with the
BKW algorithm. We note that [9] optimistically gives m = 
exp(−pi α2 2a) , but by the
Chernoff bound we need about m = 1
exp(−pi α2 2a)2 samples to distinguish.
Theorem 6 ([9]). Let (ai, ci) be samples following Ls,χ or a uniform distribution
on Znq × Zq, 0 < b ≤ n be a parameter and a = dnb e the addition depth. Then the
expected cost (over the randomness of the oracle generating samples) of the BKW
algorithm to distinguish Ls,χ from random with success probability  is(
qb − 1
2
)
·
(
a(a− 1)
2
· (n+ 1)− ba(a− 1)
4
)
− b
6
(
qb − 1
2
)(
(a− 1)3 + 3
2
(a− 1)2 + 1
2
(a− 1)
)
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additions/subtractions in Zq to produce elimination tables, and
1
exp (−pi α2 2a)2 ·
(a
2
· (n+ 2)
)
additions/subtractions in Zq to produce samples. Furthermore,
a ·
⌈
qb
2
⌉
+
1
exp (−pi α2 2a)2
calls to Ls,χ and storage for(
qb
2
)
· a ·
(
n+ 1− b · a− 1
2
)
elements in Zq are needed.
To pick a, which determines a choice for b, recall from Section 4.2.1 that in order
to distinguish Ls,χ from random using SIS an appropriately short choice for vi is
‖vi‖2 · αq =
√
2a · αq ≤ q, and hence a suitable choice for a is a ≤ log(α−2).
Corollary 5 ([9]). Let a = −2 logα and b = na . Then the expected cost of the BKW
algorithm to distinguish Ls,χ from random is(
qb − 1
2
)
·
(
a(a− 1)
2
· (n+ 1)
)
+ poly(n) ≤ qb · a2n+ poly(n)
= O
(
qn/(−2 logα) · (−2 logα)2n
)
= O
(
2n log q/(−2 logα) · (−2 logα)2n
)
operations in Zq. Furthermore, a ·
⌈
qb
2
⌉
+ poly(n) calls to Ls,χ and storage for(
qb
2
)
· a · n elements in Zq are needed.
Specialising Corollary 5 with q = nc and αq =
√
n we obtain the following time
complexity.
Corollary 6 ([9]). Let q = nc, αq =
√
n, a = −2 logα and b = na . Then the expected
cost of the BKW algorithm to distinguish Ls,χ from random is(
qb − 1
2
)
·
(
a(a− 1)
2
· (n+ 1)
)
+ poly(n) ≤ qb · (a2n)+ poly(n)
= O
(
2n log q/−2 logα · poly(n)
)
= O
(
2
cn logn
(2c−1) logn · poly(n)
)
= 2
n
2−(1/c) · poly(n)
operations in Zq.
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Albrecht et al. [9] also give a variant of BKW that solves Search-LWE. The idea is
that after a number of iterations, each of which clears a subset of the components
of the ai, we are left with a small-dimensional LWE instance with a secret s′ whose
components are a subset of the components of the original secret s. Candidates for
s′ are tested using the log-likelihood ratio, and once the s′ part of the secret s is
recovered, back substitution is used to recover the next subset of s, and so on. This
variant was improved by Duc et al. [94] who use a discrete Fourier transform to
recover a correct subset s′, arriving at the following complexity result.
Theorem 7 ([94]). Let an LWE instance be parameterised by n, α, and q and let a,
b ∈ N be such that a · b = n. Let CFFT be the small constant in the complexity of the
fast Fourier transform computation. Let 0 <  < 1 be a targeted success probability
and define ′ = 1−a . For 0 ≤ j ≤ a− 1 let
mj, = 8 · b · log
(q

)
· (1− α2pi)−2a−j .
The time complexity to recover the secret s with probability at least  is c1+c2+c3+c4
where
c1 =
qb − 1
2
·
(
(a− 1)(a− 2)
2
(n+ 1)− b
6
(a(a− 1)(a− 2))
)
is the number of additions in Zq to produce tables,
c2 =
a−1∑
j=0
mj,′ · a− 1− j
2
(n+ 2)
is the number of additions in Zq to recover s,
c3 = 2
a−1∑
j=0
mj,′
+ CFFT · n · qb · log q
is the number of operations in C to prepare and compute the discrete Fourier trans-
forms, and
c4 = (a− 1)(a− 2) · b · q
b − 1
2
is the number of operations in Zq for back substitution. Furthermore we require
(a− 1) qb−12 +m0,′ calls to Ls,χ and storage for
qb − 1
2
(a− 1)
(
n+ 1− ba− 2
2
)
+m0,
elements in Zq and qb elements in C.
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A variant called Coded-BKW was proposed by Guo et al. [120], and a similar variant
was proposed concurrently by Kirchner and Fouque [139]. Recall that in standard
BKW, a vector a1 is added or subtracted with a second vector a2 when both a1 and
a2 agree on a certain range of coordinates, so that many coordinates can be cancelled
out at once. This means a smaller LWE instance is produced in a process incurring
minimal noise growth. The process is then iterated until a very small dimensional
instance is left, which can be easily solved. The main idea in [120, 139] is to find
other ways to classify vectors as agreeing, other than having the same values in
many adjacent coordinates. As remarked in [139], this is similar to the BKW variant
of Albrecht et al. [12] known as lazy modulus switching, which we will discuss in
Section 5.3.
In Coded-BKW, vectors are mapped to the lattice codeword that is nearest in Eu-
clidean norm, and vectors that are mapped to the same codeword are cancelled.
This process, known as quantisation, introduces noise, which can be controlled so
that it is not more than the noise that would have been introduced with a standard
BKW procedure. Indeed, the algorithm calls for a certain number of standard BKW
operations followed by a number of Coded-BKW operations.
As observed for example by Albrecht [7], in light of these algorithms we can see
BKW-type algorithms as a general framework: firstly we create a small dimensional
LWE instance via iterations of some quantisation method, then we solve the small
dimensional instance via any preferred method.
4.6 Solving Decision-LWE via lattice reduction
Lattice reduction is another means to find short vectors in the scaled dual lattice,
enabling us to solve LWE via the SIS strategy as described in Section 4.2.1. We
construct this lattice L = {w ∈ Zmq | wA ≡ 0 mod q} from a given A ∈ Zm×nq
as follows. First we compute a basis B for the left kernel of A over Zq, then we
extend it by qI. In more detail, with high probability A is full rank and so B is an
(m − n) ×m matrix. We express B in row echelon form as (Im−n |B′), and hence
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obtain a basis for L as (
Im−n B′
0 qIn
)
.
The lattice L has dimensionm, rankm and with high probability volume vol (L) = qn
[168].
By our convention lattice reduction will return the shortest nonzero vector it found
as the first vector b0 of a reduced basis, which by definition is a short vector in L,
so that b0 A = 0 mod q. Heuristically, for a good enough output basis all vectors
could be used, as they will all be somewhat short, that is, not too dissimilar in length
from each other.
Lemma 11. Let an LWE instance be parameterised by n, α and q. Any lattice
reduction algorithm achieving log root-Hermite factor
log δ0 =
log2
(
1
α ·
√
ln( 1 )
pi
)
4n log q
leads to an algorithm distinguishing Ls,χ from uniform with advantage .
Proof: In order to distinguish with advantage  we require ‖v‖2 = 1α
√
ln( 1 )
pi by
Corollary 2. By definition the Hermite factor is δm0 =
‖v‖2
vol(L)
1
m
and with high prob-
ability vol (L) = qn so using lattice reduction we can achieve ‖v‖2 = δm0 q
n
m . We
choose the optimal subdimension m =
√
n log q
log δ0
which minimises the quantity δm0 q
n
m .
Rearranging with this value of m, we obtain
log δ0 =
log2
(
1
α ·
√
ln( 1 )
pi
)
4n log q
as our desired log root-Hermite factor. 
Corollary 7. Let an LWE instance be parameterised by n, α and q where q = nc
for some constant c and αq =
√
n. Any lattice reduction algorithm achieving log
root-Hermite factor
log δ0 =
((
c− 12
)
log n+ log
√
ln( 1 )
pi
)2
4cn log n
can distinguish Ls,χ with advantage .
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Proof: As in the proof of Lemma 11 with high probability we can obtain a vector of
norm ‖v‖2 = δm0 q
n
m , and we require a vector ‖v‖2 = 1α
√
ln( 1 )
pi in order to distinguish
Ls,χ with advantage . We therefore require δ0 such that
δm0 q
n
m =
1
α
√
ln
(
1

)
pi
δm0 n
cn
m = nc−
1
2
√
ln
(
1

)
pi
.
Again we use the optimal subdimension m =
√
n log q
log δ0
=
√
cn logn
log δ0
. Rearranging with
this value of m, we obtain our required log root-Hermite factor as follows:√
cn log n
log δ0
log δ0 +
cn√
cn logn
log δ0
log n =
(
c− 1
2
)
log n+ log
√
ln
(
1

)
pi
2cn log n((
c− 12
)
log n+ log
√
ln( 1 )
pi
) = √cn log n
log δ0
((
c− 12
)
log n+ log
√
ln( 1 )
pi
)2
4cn log n
= log δ0 .

As noted in Section 4.2.1 above, the approach as discussed so far may not be optimal
in terms of running time. Given access to sufficiently many samples m it is usually
faster to run several lattice reductions, each with a small success probability , as
opposed to running one very strong lattice reduction with target success probability
close to 1. Namely, we expect to run lattice reduction with success probability 
about 1
2
times to achieve the overall target success probability ′ ≈ 1. For example,
the LWE estimator commit f13c4a7 with Regev [195] parameters with n = 128 gives
that the lowest overall running time is obtained using  = 0.003906.
From the discussion above, in order to solve Decision-LWE using lattice reduction,
we must either run a very strong lattice reduction once, or run a somewhat strong
lattice reduction several times. Albrecht [7] argues that it might be possible to amor-
tise the cost of lattice reduction in the latter case using rerandomisation. That is,
it may be sufficient to perform the somewhat strong lattice reduction only once,
and we can obtain the other short vectors, which are also required to distinguish
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Model Block size k log clock cycles
Lattice rule of thumb klog k =
4n log q
log2 ( 1α)
O (k)
Simplified lattice rule of thumb 4n log q
log2 ( 1α)
O
(
4n log q
log2 ( 1α)
)
Lindner and Peikert [150] N/A 7.2n log q
log2 ( 1α)
− 78.9
Albrecht et al. [9] N/A 0.144n
2 log2 q
log4 ( 1α)
+ 4.1
Table 4.1: Time complexity for distinguishing Ls,χ from random with advantage
 ≈ 123 based on lattice reduction estimates from the literature.
successfully, by rerandomising the output basis. This is done as follows: the basis is
rerandomised by multiplication with a sparse unimodular matrix with small entries,
and this rerandomised basis is then is given as input to a cheaper lattice reduction,
such as LLL. The vector vi is then read off as the shortest vector of the basis that is
output from the cheaper lattice reduction. This approach loses statistical indepen-
dence, so requires the heuristic assumption that this issue is negligible. Albrecht [7]
provides experimental evidence that this is a reasonable assumption.
4.6.1 Verifying lattice reduction models
Having established the root-Hermite factor δ0 required to solve an LWE instance via
lattice reduction, we can combine it with estimates of the running time of lattice
reduction algorithms from the literature to estimate the runtime of solving LWE
in this way. In particular, we will show that some lattice reduction estimates in
the literature imply a subexponential algorithm for LWE. Algorithms to solve LWE
in general are expected to be exponential, so we can conclude that these lattice
reduction estimates are inaccurate.
In Tables 4.1 and 4.2 we list estimates for how long it would take lattice reduction
algorithms to achieve the target δ0 for
√
ln( 1 )
pi = 1, that is, success probability  ≈ 123 .
Considering the right-most column of Table 4.2 it is clear that both the Lindner and
Peikert model [150] as well as the simplified lattice rule of thumb would predict a
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Model Block size k log clock cycles
Lattice rule of thumb klog k =
4cn logn
((c− 12) logn)
2 O (n)
Simplified lattice rule of thumb 4cn logn
((c− 12) logn)
2 O
(
4cn logn
((c− 12) logn)
2
)
Lindner and Peikert [150] N/A 7.2cn logn
((c− 12) logn)
2 − 78.9
Albrecht et al. [9] N/A 0.144c
2n2 log2 n
((c− 12) logn)
4 + 4.1
Table 4.2: Time complexity for distinguishing Ls,χ from random with advantage
 ≈ 123 in the case that q = nc and α = n
1
2
−c for a constant c based on lattice
reduction estimates from the literature.
subexponential running time for solving Decision-LWE using lattice reduction.
4.7 Algorithms for solving Bounded Distance Decoding
The approach of solving an LWE instance by viewing it as an instance of the Bounded
Distance Decoding (BDD) problem was first suggested by Lindner and Peikert [150].
We describe this approach using Babai’s Nearest Plane algorithm [27], which is the
most basic way of solving BDD. Let there be m samples (A, c) of an LWE instance
parameterised by n, α and q. We perform lattice reduction on the lattice L(AT ) to
obtain a new basis B for this lattice, where the quality of this basis is characterised
as usual by the root-Hermite factor δ0. The basis B and the target vector c are input
to Babai’s Nearest Plane algorithm, and assuming the basis is of sufficient quality,
the output is the LWE error vector e. One can then subtract e from c and use linear
algebra to recover the secret s.
Using Lemma 2, the probability that this approach finds the vector s is given by the
probability that the error vector e lies in the parallelepiped P(B∗). So, it can be
seen that the success probability is determined by the quality of the lattice reduction.
In particular, solving LWE via decoding using Babai’s Nearest Plane recovers the
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vector s with probability
m−1∏
i=0
erf
(‖b∗i ‖√pi
2αq
)
under the assumption that sampling from a discrete Gaussian is approximately the
same as sampling from a continuous Gaussian [150].
Lindner and Peikert [150] suggest an alteration of Babai’s algorithm, designed to
widen the fundamental parallelepiped in the direction of b∗i by a factor of some
integer di > 0, thereby increasing the chance of e falling inside it. This will find
multiple solutions, which can be searched through exhaustively to find the correct
solution. This modifies the success probability to
m−1∏
i=0
erf
(
di · ‖b∗i ‖
√
pi
2αq
)
.
Given m, n, α and q as above, let di be chosen such that the success probability is
at least . Let tnode be the number of clock cycles it takes to visit one node and let
tNP (δ0, ) = tnode ·
m−1∏
i=0
di .
Then the time required for a decoding approach to achieve success probability  can
be determined as
tdec() = min
δ0
{tBKZ(δ0) + tNP (δ0, )} .
As noted in Section 4.2.2 we may also opt to repeat the attack several times, each
with a lower advantage.
There is no obvious way to analytically determine the optimal di to achieve a desired
success probability. Lindner and Peikert [150] suggest that the di should be chosen
to maximise min1≤i≤m (di · ‖b∗i ‖). On the one hand, with a more reduced basis,
the values of di can be smaller, so the Nearest Planes algorithm requires less time.
On the other hand, the lattice reduction takes significantly more time to achieve
a smaller δ0. We note that in [150, Figure 4] it appears as though tdec() has not
been optimised. Lindner and Peikert [150] find values for δ0 for which the time of
a decoding approach is less than an equivalent distinguishing approach, but these
values are not necessarily optimal; that is, the lattice reduction step and the decoding
step are not always balanced.
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Liu and Nguyen [152] note that the algorithm of Lindner and Peikert, as well as
Babai’s Nearest Plane, can be viewed as a form of pruned enumeration, but with
a different rule to the pruned enumeration described by Gama et al. [105]. Let v
be a node, t be a target vector and ζi(x) =
〈x,b∗i 〉
||b∗i || . The pruning of Gama et al.
keeps nodes with bounded projections whereas the Lindner and Peikert algorithm
keeps nodes with bounded coordinates, in particular |ζi(v − t)| ≤ di||b
∗
i ||
2 . Liu and
Nguyen note that this can be generalised to arbitrary bounds on coordinates; that is
they suggest |ζi(v − t)| ≤ Ri for some parameters Ri not necessarily dependent on
the norms of the Gram-Schmidt vectors b∗i . Liu and Nguyen implement a variant
of the Lindner and Peikert algorithm in the context of pruning algorithms, using
arbitrary Ri. They also randomise the input basis, allowing them to repeat the
algorithm multiple times, which has the result of increasing both the runtime and
success probability linearly. Since we assume access to as many samples as required,
we do not rely on rerandomisation when estimating complexity. These two factors
result in more flexibility in tuning the parameters, and improved results for solving
BDD.
However, instead of using the enumeration framework as simply a method to improve
the algorithm of Lindner and Peikert [150], Liu and Nguyen [152] go on to directly
apply pruned enumeration to solve BDD. This follows the earlier work of Gama et
al. [105], and uses linear pruning with the bounds Rk =
√
k
mRm. Over the same
parameters used by Lindner and Peikert, this linear pruning is shown to improve on
both the original Nearest Plane algorithm and the Lindner and Peikert variant.
Aono et al. [21] give an alternative method for pruning, which they refer to as band
pruning. A node at depth k is pruned if the projected length is outside the range
[Lk, Rk], where the bounds Lk and Rk can be efficiently computed given a desired
success probability. Herold et al. [128] propose a generalised framework for enu-
meration techniques in the decoding approach, and show that the approaches of
[150, 202, 105] achieve the same running time asymptotically.
The LWE estimator [6] provides an estimate of the cost of the Lindner and Peikert
decoding attack [150], and does not provide an estimate of other variants, such
as [152, 21]. The Lindner and Peikert estimate that tnode = 215.1 clock cycles [150]
is used. For comparison, Gama et al. [105] achieve 0.94 · 107 ≈ 223 enumerations per
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second on a 1.86 GHz machine, which corresponds to tnode = 27.9 clock cycles. Since
there is no closed formula to determine the optimal di, in the LWE estimator the
values di are increased one by one. The lattice reduction and enumeration steps are
balanced.
4.8 Solving LWE via unique Shortest Vector Problem
Another approach for solving an instance of BDD is by reducing it to an instance of
the γ-unique Shortest Vector Problem (γ-uSVP). Albrecht et al. [13] were the first
to consider the complexity of solving LWE in this way.
To reduce BDD to γ-uSVP the embedding technique of Kannan [136] is used. Recall
that the usual lattice of consideration when solving LWE via the BDD strategy is
L(A) = {Au | u ∈ Znq } ,
the lattice generated by the columns of the matrix A in the LWE instance (A, c).
The idea is to embed L(A) into a higher-dimensional lattice L(B) with γ-uSVP
structure. In particular, B is constructed as
B =
(
A˜ c
0 t
)
,
where t = dist(c, L(A)) is the embedding factor and A˜ is a basis for the q-ary lattice
spanned by the columns of A. Lyubashevsky and Micciancio [156] show that if
the embedding factor t < λ1(L(A)))2γ then L(B) contains a γ-unique shortest vector,
c′ = (e,−t). If we can find this vector, we can take the firstm components to recover
e, hence solving the BDD instance.
To solve a γ-uSVP instance, we may reduce the problem to κ-Hermite Shortest Vector
Problem (κ-HSVP). Intuitively, a lattice with uSVP structure has one direction in
which its shortest vector is somewhat shorter than all other directions. A sufficiently
good lattice reduction algorithm, for example, can produce a vector so short it must
be in this special direction. More precisely, Lovász [154] showed that any algorithm
that can solve κ-HSVP, such as a lattice reduction algorithm, can be used linearly
many times to solve approximate SVP with approximation factor κ2. A solution
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to κ2-approximate SVP would be a vector v such that ‖v‖2 ≤ κ2λ1(L). For a
lattice with κ2-uSVP structure, any vector w that is not a shortest vector and that
is independent of the shortest vectors satisfies ‖w‖2 ≥ λ2(L) > κ2λ1(L). So, we
must have v is a multiple of a shortest vector, and hence we have solved γ-uSVP for
γ = κ2. Ling et al. [151] improve on this result and show that, for N the dimension
of the lattice, if κ >
√
N then any algorithm solving κ-HSVP can be used to solve
γ-uSVP for γ ≈ √Nκ.
The above discussion concerns theoretical results, but we are concerned with using
lattice reduction in practice to solve LWE via uSVP. In particular, there are two
estimates in the literature for the quality of lattice reduction needed to solve LWE
in this way in practice. The more recent estimate is due to Alkim et al. [19], and
the older estimate is due to Gama and Nguyen [104]. In this thesis we use the
latter estimate, following [13, 16], as implemented in commit f13c4a7 of the LWE
estimator [6].
Gama and Nguyen [104] observe that lattice reduction of a quality given by a δ0
such that λ2(L)λ1(L) > τδ
m
0 is sufficient in order to solve a uSVP instance with some
probability depending on the value τ , which is taken to be a constant. For a success
probability of 0.1, experimental results in [13, 104] show that τ ≤ 0.4.
Albrecht et al. [13] give the following lemma, under the assumption that t = ‖e‖2.
Lemma 12 (Lemma 2 in [13]). Let A ∈ Zn×mq , let αq > 0 and let ′ > 1. Let
e ∈ Zmq such that each component is drawn from χ and considered mod q. Assuming
the Gaussian heuristic for L(A), and that the rows of A are linearly independent
over Zq, we can create an embedding lattice with λ2λ1 -gap greater than
min{q, q1− nm√ m2pie}
′αq
√
m√
pi
with probability greater than 1−
(
′ · exp
(
1−(′)2
2
))m
.
Proof: By construction, λ1(L(B)) = ‖(e,−t)‖2 and λ2(L(B)) = min{q, λ1(L(A))}.
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We see that
λ1(L(B)) = ‖(e,−t)‖2
= ‖(e,−‖e‖2)‖2
=
√
‖e‖22 + ‖e‖22
=
√
2 ‖e‖2 .
By the Gaussian heuristic for L(A), λ1(L(A)) = vol (L(A))1/m ·
√
m
2pie . Since the
rows of A are linearly independent, vol (L(A)) = qm−n. Hence we can estimate
λ2(L(B)) = min
{
q, q1−
n
m
√
m
2pie
}
.
Therefore we can construct an embedding lattice with
λ2(L(B))
λ1(L(B))
=
min
{
q, q1−
n
m
√
m
2pie
}
√
2 ‖e‖2
.
Let σ = αq√
2pi
be the standard deviation of the error distribution. We can bound the
norm of the error vector as follows [155, Lemma 4.4 (3)]: we have that
‖e‖2 ≤ ′ · σ ·
√
m
with probability greater than 1−
(
′ − exp
(
1−(′)2
2
))m
. Hence we have a gap
λ2(L(B))
λ1(L(B))
≥
min
{
q, q1−
n
m
√
m
2pie
}
√
2′ · σ · √m =
min
{
q, q1−
n
m
√
m
2pie
}
√
2′ · αq√
2pi
· √m =
min{q, q1− nm√ m2pie}
′αq
√
m√
pi
with probability 1−
(
′ − exp
(
1−(′)2
2
))m
. 
Lemma 12 results in an overly pessimistic estimate for the cost of solving LWE via
reduction to uSVP for two reasons. Firstly, the size of ‖e‖2 is determined via an
upper bound, but we can also estimate its size using the expectation. Secondly, in
practice one would set t = 1 rather than t = ‖e‖2. We typically have τ ≈ 0.3 in this
case [13]. Göpfert [116] provides a more refined estimate.
Lemma 13 ([116]). Let A ∈ Zn×mq , let αq > 0 and let ′ > 1. Let e ∈ Zmq such
that each component is drawn from χ and considered mod q. Assuming the Gaussian
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heuristic for L(A), and that the rows of A are linearly independent over Zq, we can
create an embedding lattice with λ2/λ1-gap greater than
min
{
q, q1−
n
m
√
m
2pie
}
√
m · αq√
2pi
.
Proof: By construction, λ1(L(B)) = ‖(e,−t)‖2 and λ2(L(B)) = min{q, λ1(L(A))}.
By the argument given for Lemma 12 we can estimate λ2(L(B)) = min
{
q, q1−
n
m
√
m
2pie
}
.
We determine λ1(L(B)) as follows, using t = 1:
λ1(L(B)) = ‖(e,−1)‖2
=
√
‖e‖22 + 1
≈
√
‖e‖22
= ‖e‖2 .
Therefore we can construct an embedding lattice with
λ2(L(B))
λ1(L(B))
=
min
{
q, q1−
n
m
√
m
2pie
}
‖e‖2
.
Since e is a vector of dimension m with components chosen from a Gaussian distri-
bution with standard deviation σ = αq√
2pi
we can estimate
‖e‖2 =
√
m · σ .
Hence we have a gap of
λ2(L(B))
λ1(L(B))
=
min
{
q, q1−
n
m
√
m
2pie
}
√
m · σ =
min
{
q, q1−
n
m
√
m
2pie
}
√
m · αq√
2pi
.

We note that Lemma 12 and Lemma 13 are the same up to a factor of ′ · √2 in
the denominator, which comes from the differing estimates of ‖e‖2 and λ1(L(B)).
Using Lemma 13 we can now determine the δ0 required to solve LWE via reduction
to uSVP. Recall that we require a gap of λ2(L(B))λ1(L(B)) > τδ
m
0 . We have two cases,
depending on the value of min
{
q, q1−
n
m
√
m
2pie
}
. In the first case, in which we have
min
{
q, q1−
n
m
√
m
2pie
}
= q1−
n
m
√
m
2pie , we can state the following lemma.
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Lemma 14. Let an LWE instance be parameterised by n, α and q. Then any lattice
reduction algorithm achieving log root-Hermite factor
log δ0 =
log2 (τα
√
e)
4n log q
can be used to solve LWE via reduction to uSVP for some fixed τ ≤ 1.
Proof: Albrecht et al. [13] show that for a fixed δ0 the optimal subdimension is
m =
√
n log q
log δ0
. From the above discussion we require a δ0 determined by the following:
λ2(L(B))
λ1(L(B))
= τδm0
q1−
n
m
√
m
2pie√
m · αq√
2pi
= τδm0
−n log q = n log q
log δ0
log δ0 +
√
n log q
log δ0
log
(
τα
√
e
)
.
Rearranging the above expression gives the required δ0. 
In [16], an analogous argument using Lemma 12 shows that the required log root-
Hermite factor is log δ0 =
log2 (′τα
√
2e)
4n log q for some 
′ > 1. This differs from the estimate
given in Lemma 14 by a ′ · √2 term in the numerator, which corresponds to the
difference between Lemma 12 and Lemma 13.
Corollary 8. Let an LWE instance be parameterised by n, α and q where q = nc
for some constant c and αq =
√
n. Any lattice reduction algorithm achieving log
root-Hermite factor
log δ0 =
((
c− 12
)
log n− log (τ√e))2
4cn log n
can be used to solve LWE for some fixed τ ≤ 1.
In the second case we have min
{
q, q1−
n
m
√
m
2pie
}
= q and we can state the following
lemma.
Lemma 15. Let an LWE instance be parameterised by n, α and q. Let W (·) denote
the Lambert W function. Any lattice reduction algorithm achieving log root-Hermite
factor
log δ0 =
1
4n2 ln2 q
·
(
W
(
(−2n ln q) ·
(√
n log q
)
· (τα)
2
2pi
))2
can be used to solve LWE via reduction to uSVP for some fixed τ ≤ 1.
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Proof: From the above discussion we require a δ0 determined by the following:
τδm0 =
λ2(L(B))
λ1(L(B))
τδm0 =
q√
m · αq√
2pi
.
We assume that the optimal subdimension is m =
√
n log q
log δ0
. We therefore require:
δm0
√
m =
√
2pi
τα
δ4m0 m
2 =
4pi2
(τα)4
4pi2
(τα)4
log δ0 = δ
4
√
n log q
log δ0
0 n log q
4n
√
log δ0 log q + log (n log q) = log
(
4pi2
(τα)4
)
+ log (log δ0) .
Let x = log δ0. We now solve this for x:
4n
√
x log q + log (n log q) = log
(
4pi2
(τα)4
)
+ log x
log
(
q4n
√
x · (n log q)
)
= log
(
x · 4pi
2
(τα)4
)
e4n
√
x ln q · (n log q) = x · 4pi
2
(τα)4
(n log q) · (τα)
4
4pi2
= x · e−4n ln q
√
x .
Setting x = y2, we require:
(n log q) · (τα)
4
4pi2
= y2 · e(−4n ln q)y(√
n log q
)
· (τα)
2
2pi
= y · e(−2n ln q)y
(−2n ln q) ·
(√
n log q
)
· (τα)
2
2pi
= (−2n ln q) · y · e(−2n ln q)y .
Let z = (−2n ln q) · y. We solve for z using the Lambert W function [3]:
z · ez = (−2n ln q) ·
(√
n log q
)
· (τα)
2
2pi
z = W
(
(−2n ln q) ·
(√
n log q
)
· (τα)
2
2pi
)
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We trace back through our substitutions to arrive at a value for log δ0:
(−2n ln q) · y = W
(
(−2n ln q) ·
(√
n log q
)
· (τα)
2
2pi
)
y2 =
1
4n2 ln2 q
·
(
W
(
(−2n ln q) ·
(√
n log q
)
· (τα)
2
2pi
))2
x =
1
4n2 ln2 q
·
(
W
(
(−2n ln q) ·
(√
n log q
)
· (τα)
2
2pi
))2
log δ0 =
1
4n2 ln2 q
·
(
W
(
(−2n ln q) ·
(√
n log q
)
· (τα)
2
2pi
))2
.

Alkim et al. [19] propose an alternative success condition for lattice reduction in
solving LWE via reduction to uSVP. For an LWE instance parameterised by n, α, q
and m with standard deviation σ = αq√
2pi
, let d = m+n+ 1. The requirement is that
√
k · σ ≤ δ2k−d0 · vol (L)
1
d .
Albrecht et al. [14] provide experimental evidence that when used to solve LWE via
uSVP, lattice reduction behaves according to the estimate of Alkim et al. [19]. In
particular this implies that for some parameter settings, BKZ with a smaller blocksize
than would be required according to the Gama and Nguyen [104] estimate will be
successful. Hence, a less costly lattice reduction would succeed in solving LWE via
uSVP than predicted as in [104, 13, 16, 116] and security claims justified by this line
of work may be overly optimistic [14]. Since commit e7c9c59, the estimate for the
cost of the uSVP approach in the LWE estimator [6] is implemented according to
the estimate of Alkim et al. [19].
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In this chapter we turn our attention to algorithms for solving variants of LWE with
unusually small secret or error. We firstly survey algorithms that are applicable in
the case of a small secret. We then focus on the variant of LWE with binary error.
We show that this variant is vulnerable to the Howgrave-Graham attack on NTRU,
known as the hybrid attack, which is a combination of lattice techniques and a Meet-
in-the-Middle approach. We describe other approaches to solving LWE in the case
of binary error, and compare the performance of the hybrid attack with these other
approaches. This chapter is based on material presented in [16, 50, 52].
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5.1 Introduction to LWE with small secrets
In this chapter we consider variants of LWE where the secret is unusually small, which
we call small secret variants. We first make more precise what we mean by a small
secret variant of LWE. In the most general definition of LWE, the secret s is a vector
with components s(i) chosen uniformly at random from Zq. By Lemma 4, an LWE
instance can always be transformed into an instance where the secret components
follow the error distribution, so in general we expect to see components of the secret
s(i) of size at most tαq for some t = ω(
√
log n). For small secret variants, we are
considering a secret with components much smaller than this: for example, bounded
in norm by a small constant.
In particular, we characterise a small secret LWE instance by n, α, q, and ψ, where ψ
is the distribution of s(i). In many applications based on LWE [100, 121, 51, 70], the
secret is chosen such that the s(i) have norm at most 1. This choice is typically for
efficiency or performance reasons. For example, Buchmann et al. [51] are motivated
by lightweight applications for the Internet of Things. Fan and Vercauteren [100]
suggest the use of a small secret as an optimisation in their Fully Homomorphic
Encryption scheme, which improves the noise growth behaviour in the ciphertexts
and may improve performance by enabling a higher depth computation to be homo-
morphically evaluated without having to choose larger parameters.
To improve noise growth behaviour in homomorphic encryption further, in addition
to using a small secret, we could use a sparse secret; that is, a secret with low
Hamming weight. This is done for example in HElib [121, 122, 123] which implements
the BGV scheme [44]. HElib recommends a Hamming weight h = 64 [121], while
the dimension n of the secret is typically at least 103 or 104 in applications (see, for
example, [109]). Sparse secrets have also been considered outside of homomorphic
encryption applications: motivated by practicality, Cheon et al. [67] propose a PKE
scheme based on a variant of LWE where the secret s is sparse but its components
s(i) are not necessarily small in norm.
A prominent example is the variant where the components s(i) are chosen uniformly
from {0, 1}. This variant is termed binary secret [45] and its hardness has been
considered in some detail. It has been shown [45, 166] that an LWE instance with a
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binary secret s and dimension n log q is at least as hard as general LWE in dimension
n. On the other hand, Bai and Galbraith [29] conclude from experiments that
increasing only to dimension n log log n may be sufficient.
Small secret variants of LWE can arise as one of two cases; we consider both in the
remainder of this chapter. In both cases the secret s is small, but in the first case
the error is of a typical size, whereas in the second case the error is also small.
As an example of the the first case, we could consider instances parameterised by n,
α, q, and ψ where αq =
√
n and ψ is the uniform distribution on {−1, 0, 1}. In the
case of a small or sparse secret, modifications can be made to the generic algorithms
for LWE described in Chapter 4. For example, the algorithm of Arora and Ge [25]
can be adapted to the small secret case as follows. A small secret is encoded by
adding equations of the form
k−1∏
i=0
(x− ji)
where k is the cardinality of the support for ψ and ji are the elements of the support.
In Section 5.2 we discuss solving small secret LWE by exhaustive search. In Sec-
tion 5.3 we discuss variants of the BKW algorithm [37] that apply in the case of
a small secret. In Section 5.4 we introduce an algorithm of Bai and Galbraith [29]
that is applicable in the case of a small secret. In Section 5.5 we discuss various
improvements possible when using lattice reduction techniques to solve LWE in the
case of a small or sparse secret, including the work of Albrecht [7]. This part of the
chapter is based on material presented in [16].
As an example of the second case, with very small error, we could consider instances
where the errors are chosen uniformly from a narrow range. Since the distribution
of the secret can be assumed to follow the error distribution, this also leads to a
small secret. Following [50, 52] we focus on the variant of LWE with binary error;
that is, the error is chosen uniformly at random from {0, 1}. We give a thorough
introduction to LWE with binary error in Section 5.6.
Algorithms for solving general LWE instances can be applied in the binary error case.
In addition to algorithms for standard LWE, we may also be able to apply algorithms
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for the Inhomogeneous Short Integer Solution problem [5, 111]. We refer the reader
to Bai et al. [30] for a discussion of these algorithms. In Sections 5.7, 5.8 and 5.9
we discuss respectively the Meet-in-the-Middle algorithm for LWE with binary error,
distinguishing LWE with binary error from uniform via lattice reduction, and solving
LWE with binary error via reduction to uSVP. In Section 5.10 we describe in detail
the hybrid attack for LWE with binary error and in Section 5.11 we compare the
hybrid attack with other approaches.
5.2 Exhaustive search for small secret LWE
In Section 4.3 we saw that an LWE instance parameterised by n, α and q can be
solved by exhaustive search by checking all the vectors within a sphere of radius tαq,
for some parameter t = ω(
√
log n), since tαq is essentially the size of components of
the secret. In the case of a small secret instance, parameterised by n, α, q, and ψ,
we can ignore the exact distribution of ψ and simply exhaustively search over the
support of ψ. For example, the support may be the set {−1, 0, 1}, and so we check
all possible s with s(i) chosen from this set. By the same argument as in Theorem 2,
if we have m LWE samples with s(i) ∈ {−1, 0, 1} then exhaustive search will take
time m · 3n · (2n) = 2n log 3+logn+1+logm.
Using the same argument as in Theorem 3, whatever cost we would expect for exhaus-
tive search, which depends on the support of ψ, by applying a Meet-in-the-Middle
strategy we may achieve essentially the same speed up as we would do in the case
of a general LWE instance. For example, if the components s(i) are selected from
{−1, 0, 1} then a Meet-in-the-Middle strategy will take time O (3n/2) and require
poly(n) · 3n/2 memory.
As observed by Bai and Galbraith [29] we can combine exhaustive search with other
algorithms to improve the complexity. For example, we may guess r components of
the secret, leaving us with a small secret LWE instance of reduced dimension n− r.
We may then run our favourite algorithm to solve small secret LWE on this lower
dimensional instance, which will be faster. Using this strategy any algorithm dis-
cussed below can be turned into an algorithm that has at most the cost of exhaustive
search.
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5.3 Small secret variants of the BKW algorithm
Several variants of the BKW algorithm [37] are applicable in the small secret case,
such as [12, 120, 139]. All these variants follow the idea of repeated quantisation;
that is, cancelling vectors that are close to each other on some components, then
solving a low dimensional (easy) resulting LWE instance. The algorithms [120, 139],
which apply to general LWE instances and were discussed in Section 4.5, are partic-
ularly effective in the case of small secret. For example, the variant of Kirchner and
Fouque [139] solves LWE with binary secret in subexponential time.
The variant of Albrecht et al. [12] requires small secret instances because the quan-
tisation is achieved through a variant of modulus switching. This is termed lazy
modulus switching ; that is, only modulus switching when necessary. Lazy modu-
lus switching means, for example, searching for collisions mod p but remaining in Zq
when doing arithmetic on the rows. An optional preprocessing step termed unnatural
selection is additionally proposed.
Theorem 8 ([12]). Let an LWE instance be parameterised by n, α, and q and let
b ∈ Z with 1 ≤ b ≤ n. Define a = dnb e and pick a pair (p,m∗), which parameterise
respectively the modulus to be switched to and the unnatural selection. Then BKW
with lazy modulus switching and unnatural selection costs
pb
2
(
a(a− 1)
2
(n+ 1)
)
+ (m+m∗)na
additions in Zq and ap
b
2 +m+m
∗ calls to Ls,χ.
In particular, if q = nc for some small c ≥ 1, αq = √n and b = nlogn , recall that
standard BKW has complexity O (2cn · n log2 n). Let 0 < d ≤ 1 be a constant. It
is shown in [12] that the complexity of solving is O
(
2
n
(
c+ log d
logn
)
· n log2 n
)
if naive
modulus switching is used, whereas an approach using lazy modulus switching gives
a complexity of O
(
2
n
(
c+
log d− 12 log logn
logn
)
· n log2 n
)
.
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5.4 Solving small secret LWE via unique Shortest Vector
Problem
Bai and Galbraith [29] show that for a secret with very small components, such as
a binary secret, we may embed our LWE lattice into a lattice with uSVP structure,
similar to the approach described in Section 4.8 using Kannan embedding. The
target short vector is (s || e || 1), which contains among its components those of s,
in contrast to the target short vector (e || 1) of the Kannan embedding case. This
enables us to take advantage of the smallness of s, which leads to a more efficient
approach.
In particular, the smallness of s as compared with the size of the error is exploited.
If ‖s‖2  ‖e‖2, we may rescale the lattice into which the instance is embedded,
increasing its volume. This increases the δ0 that is sufficient to solve the instance,
and hence a less expensive lattice reduction is required. In the case s(i) ← {−1, 0, 1},
after an appropriate rescaling, the volume of the lattice is increased by σn, where
σ = αq√
2pi
is the standard deviation of the error. In the case s(i) ← {0, 1} the volume is
increased by (2σ)n. Bai and Galbraith observe that, perhaps surprisingly, modulus
switching does not improve their algorithm. This is because modulus switching
results in a smaller rescaling factor.
We now state the cost of Bai and Galbraith’s approach, assuming that the embedding
factor t = ‖e‖2 is used. We note that both Bai and Galbraith [29] and the LWE
estimator [6] use t = 1, as in the Kannan embedding case.
Lemma 16. Let a small secret LWE instance be parameterised by n, α and q with
s(i)
$← {a, . . . , b}. Let ξ = 2/(b−a) and let σ = αq√
2pi
. Any lattice reduction algorithm
achieving log root-Hermite factor
log δ0 =
(
log( qσ )− log(2τ
√
pie)
)2 · log( qσ )
n(2 log( qσ )− log ξ)2
solves LWE by reducing BDD to uSVP for some fixed τ ≤ 1 if we have that
(qm(ξσ)n)
1
m+n ·
√
m+ n
2pie
≤ q
where m = m′ − n =
√
n(log q−log σ)
log δ0
− n.
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Proof: We follow the discussion of Bai and Galbraith [29, Section 6.2]. For a secret
sampled from the interval [a, . . . , b], by scaling and rebalancing we can increase the
volume by a factor of (ξσ)n. Assuming that (qm(ξσ)n)
1
m+n
√
m+n
2pie ≤ q, we can
construct a lattice with a gap λ2λ1 =
(qm(ξσ)n)1/(m+n)
√
m+n
2pie√
2 (m+n)·σ .
Let m′ = m + n. By the same argument as in Section 4.8 we expect to be able to
solve this uSVP instance when λ2λ1 ≥ τδm
′
0 . Therefore we require δ0 satisfying:(
qm
′−n (ξσ)n
)( 1m′ )
√
4pie σ
= τ δm
′
0(
1− n
m′
)
log q +
n
m′
log(ξσ) = m′ log δ0 + log σ + log
(
τ
√
4pie
)
log δ0 =
m′
(
log( qσ )− log
(
τ
√
4pie
))
+ n log(ξ)− n log ( qσ )
(m′)2
.
By [29, Lemma 1] the optimal value of m′ is m′ =
√
n(log q−log σ)
log δ0
. We conclude:
log δ0 =
√
n(log q−log σ)
log δ0
(
log( qσ )− log
(
τ
√
4pie
))
+ n log(ξ)− n log ( qσ )
n(log q−log σ)
log δ0
log δ0 =
(
log
( q
σ
)− log (τ√4pie))2 · log( qσ )
n
(
2 log
( q
σ
)− log ξ)2 .

For example, specialising Lemma 16 to s(i)
$← {−1, 0, 1} and hence ξ = 1 gives
log δ0 =
(
logατ
√
2e
)2
4n
(
log q − log αq√
2pi
) .
5.5 Solving Decision-LWE via lattice reduction for small
or sparse secret
For an LWE instance parameterised by n, α, and q and with a small secret, we may
apply modulus switching and consider the instance mod p where p < q. This allows
for a larger root-Hermite factor δ0 than would be required for an instance parame-
terised by the same n, α, and q and with a secret where s(i) is chosen at random from
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Zq. After modulus switching, the transformed instance has an error that is slightly
larger and its distribution is no longer exactly a discrete Gaussian. Nonetheless,
heuristically, algorithms that solve LWE still solve these LWE-like problem instances
and so we assume that after modulus switching, we have an LWE instance charac-
terised by n,
√
2α and p. So, when we have a small secret we may obtain a speed
up by modulus switching before performing the lattice reduction required for several
approaches for solving LWE. For example, consider the dual attack solving Decision-
LWE by lattice reduction as described in Section 4.6. As with a general secret, we
assume the size of the small vector that we aim to output is ‖v‖2 = 1√2α ·
√
ln( 1 )
pi .
Lemma 17. Let a small secret LWE instance be characterised by n, α, q and ψ. Let
p be such that
∥∥∥〈pq · a − ⌊pq · a⌉, s〉∥∥∥2 ≈ pq · ‖e‖2. Any lattice reduction achieving log
root-Hermite factor
log δ0 =
(
log
(
1√
2α
·
√
ln( 1 )
pi
))2
4n log p
can distinguish the small secret LWE instance from uniform with probability .
Proof: Using Lemma 6, after modulus switching the LWE instance is parametrised
by n,
√
2α, p. Applying Lemma 11 with these parameters we obtain the result
claimed. 
Corollary 9. Let a small secret LWE instance be characterised by n, α, q, ψ. Sup-
pose αq =
√
n, q = nc for some small constant c and ψ is such that the standard
deviation of the elements in the secret s is σs. Any lattice reduction achieving log
root-Hermite factor
log δ0 =
(
log
(
1√
2n
1
2−c
·
√
ln( 1 )
pi
))2
4n
(
log
(√
pi√
6
σs
)
+ c log n
)
can distinguish the small secret LWE instance from uniform with probability .
Proof: From Lemma 6 we have p = σsα
√
2pin
12 =
σs
√
2
√
pi
√
n√
12α
=
√
pi√
6
σsn
c. Applying
Lemma 17 we obtain
log δ0 =
(
log
(
1√
2α
·
√
ln( 1 )
pi
))2
4n log p
=
(
log
(
1√
2n
1
2−c
·
√
ln( 1 )
pi
))2
4n log
(√
pi√
6
σsnc
) ,
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from which the result follows. 
Albrecht [7] proposes variants of the distinguishing attack in the case of a small
secret. The idea is that rather than solving LWE via finding a solution to the SIS
problem v ·A ≡ 0 mod q as described in Section 4.2, it is sufficient to find solutions
to
v ·A ≡ x mod q ,
for some small x mod q. In particular we want to find short vectors (w,y) in the
lattice
L = {(v,x) | v ·A ≡ x mod q} .
Given such a (w,y) and an LWE sample (A, c) we hope to distinguish
〈w, c〉 = 〈w,A · s + e〉 = 〈y, s〉+ 〈w, e〉
from uniform. It is clear that we require LWE with a sufficiently small secret s so
that 〈y, s〉 + 〈w, e〉 can be distinguished from uniform, since if a component s(i)
could take any value in Zq then this would not be possible. In many small secret
LWE instances used in practice, we have that ‖s‖2 is much smaller than ‖e‖2. In
that case we can rebalance L using the technique of Bai and Galbraith [29], so the
two summands are approximately equal in size.
Lemma 18 ([7]). Let a small secret LWE instance be parameterised by n, α, q,
and ψ where ψ is the distribution producing secrets s with components s(i) chosen
uniformly at random from {−1, 0, 1}, with the additional guarantee that at most h
components are nonzero. Any lattice reduction achieving log root-Hermite factor
log δ0 =
log
(
2n log2 
piα2h
)
8n
can distinguish this small secret LWE instance with advantage .
Albrecht [7] also provides a technique that can take advantage of the sparseness of
a secret. Given an LWE instance (A, c) one can always split A into [A0|A1] where
A1 contains the last n′ columns, and try to find a short vector in
L = {v ∈ Zm | v ·A0 ≡ 0 mod q} .
If n′ = 0 then this is simply the distinguishing attack described in Section 4.6. A
short vector v ∈ L produces an LWE sample in dimension n′ with noise the size of
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original noise multiplied by the expectation of the norm of v. If we choose n′ very
small, the new instance will be easy to solve and the overall cost of this approach
will be less than solving the n dimensional instance directly. That is, the cost of
solving the instance in dimension n′ together with the cost of finding a short vector
v is less than solving the instance in dimension n.
If the secret s is also sparse, then it may be possible to choose larger n′, and we
can also accept some probability of failure and repeat if necessary. In particular,
we choose a random permutation to transform A into [A0|A1] and we hope that all
(respectively most of) the secret components corresponding to A1 happen to be zero,
which occurs with some probability. Then we can (respectively with some exhaustive
search component) treat n′ > 0 as if it were n′ = 0. That is, we only need the cost
of lattice reduction in dimension n− n′ (respectively followed by at most the cost of
the exhaustive search) and we can still succeed in dimension n.
5.6 Introduction to LWE with binary error
In the remainder of this chapter we turn our attention to the variant of LWE where
the error is chosen uniformly from {0, 1}. We term this variant LWE with binary
error.
The hardness of LWE with binary error has been considered in some detail and
depends on the number of samples m. It is well known (see for example [92, 166, 10])
that LWE with binary error can be solved in polynomial time using the algorithm
of Arora and Ge [25] when the number of samples is m = Ω
(
n2
)
. Furthermore,
Albrecht et al. [10] show that the problem can be solved in subexponential time if
the attacker has access to m = Ω (n log log n) samples. Kirchner and Fouque [139]
show that the problem can be solved in subexponential time using m = n samples.
On the other hand, Micciancio and Peikert [166, Theorem 1.2] give a reduction from
worst-case lattice problems to LWE with binary error when m = n(1 + Ω (1/ log(n))
and q ≥ nO(1).
Decoding techniques (as described in Section 4.7) can be applied to LWE with binary
error. By Lemma 2 the error vector can be recovered using Babai’s algorithm if and
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only if it lies within P (B∗). It is shown in [50, 52] that the success probability
of decoding using Lindner and Peikert’s variant [150] of Babai’s algorithm can be
estimated as
m∏
i=1
(
1− 2
B(m−12 ,
1
2)
∫ max(−ri,−1)
−1
(1− t2)m−32 dt
)
where ri = di
δ
−2(i−1)+m
0 q
m−n
m
2
√
m/4
and di is as discussed in Section 4.7.
The algorithm of Albrecht et al. [10], which uses Gröbner basis methods to improve
the algorithm of Arora and Ge [25], can be applied to LWE with binary error. In
particular, Albrecht et al. [10, Theorem 7] show that if there are m = 2n samples
there is an algorithm solving LWE with binary error in time O(n2 · 20.43ωn).
In the following sections we discuss other algorithms that can be used to solving
LWE with binary error, including the hybrid attack [50, 52]. We then conclude the
chapter with a comparison of the hybrid attack with these other approaches.
5.6.1 Modelling LWE with binary error as general LWE
It will sometimes be convenient to model the error distribution in an LWE with
binary error instance as if it were a general LWE instance where the errors come
from some discrete Gaussian distribution of standard deviation σ and centre µ that
very often outputs a 0 or 1 and rarely outputs a different value. From Chapter 4
we can conclude that for most approaches to solve LWE, the complexity depends on
the dimension n and αq, which specifies the size of the errors. That is, most of the
algorithms only make use of the fact that the errors are small, rather than the fact
that they are discrete Gaussian. The fact that the centre of the discrete Gaussian is
0 also does not affect the algorithms. We can therefore argue that it is reasonable
to model a binary error in this way as some discrete Gaussian distribution.
Let X be a distribution on {0, 1}, then X is Bernoulli so that Pr(X = 1) = p and
Pr(X = 0) = 1−p. Its expectation is E [X] = p and its variance is Var[X] = p(1−p).
We model this as a Gaussian Y that has mean p and standard deviation p
1
2 (1− p) 12
such that its expectation and variance are the same as for X. If p = 12 then X is
the uniform distribution on {0, 1} and in this case we model this error distribution
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as a Gaussian with mean 12 and standard deviation σ =
1
2 . Since the standard
deviation of a discrete Gaussian LWE error distribution satisfies σ = αq√
2pi
, we obtain
the following heuristic.
Heuristic 3. An n, q-LWE with binary error instance can be modelled by an n, q, α-
LWE instance where α =
√
2pi
2q .
5.7 The Meet-in-the-Middle attack for LWE with binary
error
We adapt the analysis in Section 4.3 to determine an upper bound on the complexity
of a Meet-in-the-Middle attack on LWE with binary error. We obtain the analogous
result to Theorem 3.
Theorem 9. Let an LWE instance with binary error be parameterised by n and q.
If there are m+ n samples satisfying mq <
1
C for some constant C > 1 and(
2
q
)m
·
(
2
n
2 − 1
)
= poly(n) ,
then there is Meet-in-the-Middle algorithm that solves Search-LWE with binary error
with non-negligible probability that runs in time
2
n
2 ·
(
mn+ log
n
2
+
n
2
)
and requires memory n · 2n2−1.
Proof: We apply Lemma 4, which costs n samples, to obtain an LWE instance where
the secret follows the error distribution, so that the secret has elements in {0, 1}.
With each of the remaining m samples (ak, 〈ak, s〉 + ek), we split ak = akl ||akr in
half. For every possible first half of the secret sil, and for each of the m samples ak,
we compute
〈
ak
l, si
l
〉
. Let the output of a guess sil ∈ {0, 1}n/2 be the vector
usil =
(〈
a0
l, si
l
〉
, . . . ,
〈
am−1l, sil
〉)
.
We store a table T whose entries map usil to si
l. In particular, we index sil by the
log q − 1 most significant bits of usil in T .
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Since the secret follows the error distribution, we expect 2
n
2 candidate secret halves
si
l and for each candidate we must calculatem inner products. Therefore, generating
the table costs m · n · 2n2 operations. We need to store 2n2 candidates sil, each of
which has n2 components, each of which requires 1 bit of space. Hence the memory
requirement is |T | = n2 · 1 · 2
n
2 .
Once the table is generated and sorted, for each candidate sjr ∈ {0, 1}n/2 for the
second half of the secret, and for each of the samples ak, we compute ck −〈akr, sjr〉.
Let the output for a guess sjr be the vector
vsjr = (c0 − 〈a0r, sjr〉 , . . . , cm−1 − 〈am−1r, sjr〉) .
We take the log q − 1 most significant bits of vsjr and query T . If T returns a value
si
l, we treat sil || sjr as a candidate secret. By construction, if T is queried for the
guess sjr and returns sil, then ‖vsjr − usil‖ ≤ 1 since vsjr and usil agree except for
the least significant bit. If this process returns no candidate secret, we call for more
samples and repeat.
For each guess sjr, we can query vsjr in
log(|T |) = log
(n
2
· 2n2
)
= log
n
2
+
n
2
operations by binary search. Since there are 2
n
2 possible guesses sjr, the overall cost
of querying is 2
n
2 · (log n2 + n2 ).
Let the kth component of vsr be vsr,k and let the kth component of usl be usl,k. For
the correct secret s = sl || sr, if log q − 1 most significant bits of vsr and usl agree,
then
vsr,k − usl,k = ck − 〈ark, sr〉 −
〈
alk, s
l
〉
= ck − 〈ak, s〉 = ek mod q
for all k. Therefore, if this process returns any candidate secrets sil || sjr at all, then
with overwhelming probability, one of them will be the correct secret s.
We need to ensure the b = log q − 1 most significant bits of vsr and usl agree. We
denote this requirement as MSBb (vsr) = MSBb
(
usl
)
. For all k, by definition of
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the LWE samples,
ck = 〈ak, s〉+ ek mod q
ck =
〈
ak
l, sl
〉
+ 〈akr, sr〉+ ek mod q
ck − 〈akr, sr〉 =
〈
ak
l, sl
〉
+ ek mod q
vsr,k = usl,k + ek mod q
MSBb (vsr,k) = MSBb
(
usl,k + ek
)
.
Hence, it is sufficient to show that MSBb
(
usl,k + ek
)
= MSBb
(
usl,k
)
for all k.
Since ek ∈ {0, 1}, this holds whenever the inner product
〈
ak
l, sl
〉
takes a value in the
range {0, . . . , q − 2}. In this range, adding ek will not cause a wrap around modulo
q. We would like the probability that the inner product is not in this range to be
small. Since a is uniformly random, so is the inner product
〈
ak
l, sl
〉
. Therefore the
probability that
〈
ak
l, sl
〉
is not in the range {0, . . . , q−2} is 1q . By the union bound,
the probability that this occurs for any of the m samples is less than or equal to mq .
We require m such that mq ≤ 1C for some constant C.
Consider now the probability of a false positive, that is, a wrong candidate secret sil
being suggested for some candidate sjr. Since ak is uniformly random, for any sil,
we have that usil is essentially a random vector where each component takes one of
q values. The probability of a wrong candidate sjr producing a vsjr matching to a
given usil is the probability of differing by at most 1 on every component. Therefore
the probability of a false positive is
(
2
q
)m
. There are 2
n
2 −1 wrong choices for sil. We
hence expect to test
(
2
q
)m ·(2n2 − 1) candidates per sjr and thus have the additional
requirement on m that (
2
q
)m
·
(
2
n
2 − 1
)
= poly(n) .

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5.8 Solving Decision-LWE with binary error via lattice
reduction
We can solve Decision-LWE with binary error via lattice reduction as in Section 4.6.
For this approach we must find a short vector v in the scaled dual lattice
L = {w ∈ Zmq | wA ≡ 0 mod q} .
We now determine how short such a vector v must be.
Lemma 19. Let an LWE instance with binary error be parameterised by n and q.
Let v ∈ L be a vector of length
‖v‖2 = q ·
√
2 ln
(
1

)
pi
.
Then v can distinguish the LWE instance from random with advantage .
Proof: Using Heuristic 3 we can model the error distribution as a Gaussian with
mean µ = 12 and standard deviation σ =
1
2 . For the standard deviation of an
LWE error distribution we have σ = αq√
2pi
and so α2 = 2piσ
2
q2
= pi
2q2
. By Lemma 10
we can distinguish an LWE instance parameterised by n, α and q with advantage
 ≈ exp(−pi(‖v‖2 · α)2). Assuming equality, we obtain the following requirement on
v to distinguish with advantage :
−pi(‖v‖2 · α)2 = ln 
‖v‖2 =
q
√
2 ln
(
1

)
pi
.

Lemma 20. Let an LWE instance with binary error be parameterised by n and q.
Any lattice reduction algorithm achieving log root-Hermite factor
log δ0 =
(
log (q) + log
(√
2 ln ( 1 )
pi
))2
4n log (q)
can distinguish the LWE with binary error instance with advantage .
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Proof: With high probability the lattice L has rank m and volume qn [168]. By
definition of the Hermite factor we therefore have ‖v‖2 = δm0 q
n
m . By Lemma 19
we require ‖v‖2 = q ·
√
2 ln ( 1 )
pi to distinguish with advantage . We assume that
the number of samples m available is large enough to use the optimal subdimension
m =
√
n log q
log δ0
. In this case the root-Hermite factor we require to distinguish with
advantage  can be determined as follows:
δm0 q
n
m = q ·
√
2 ln
(
1

)
pi
m2 log δ0 + n log q = m
log q + log

√
2 ln
(
1

)
pi

log δ =
(
log (q) + log
(√
2 ln ( 1 )
pi
))2
4n log (q)
.

5.9 Solving LWE with binary error via unique Shortest
Vector Problem
We may solve LWE with binary error via Kannan’s embedding technique [136]. The
following analysis is analogous to Section 4.8.
Lemma 21. Let an LWE instance with binary error be parameterised by n and q
and assume that
min
{
q, q1−
n
m
√
m
2pie
}
= q1−
n
m
√
m
2pie
.
Any lattice reduction algorithm achieving log root-Hermite factor
log δ0 =
(
log q − log (τ√2pie))2
4n log q
solves LWE with binary error via reduction to uSVP for some fixed τ ≤ 1.
Proof: Since e is binary and of length m, we must have ‖e‖2 ≤
√
m. Following the
argument in Section 4.8, we can embed the LWE instance into a lattice L with uSVP
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structure such that
λ2(L)
λ1(L)
=
min
{
q, q1−
n
m
√
m
2pie
}
‖e‖2
=
q1−
n
m
√
m
2pie
‖e‖2
≥ q
1− n
m
√
m
2pie√
m
.
On the other hand we require
λ2(L)
λ1(L)
≥ τδm0
and so it is sufficient if
q1−
n
m
√
m
2pie√
m
≥ τδm0 .
For a fixed δ0 the optimal subdimension is m =
√
n log q
log δ0
and so we require:
δm0 =
q1−
n
m
τ
√
2pie
m2 log δ0 = m(log q − log
(
τ
√
2pie
)
)− n log q
n log q
log δ0
log δ0 =
√
n log q
log δ0
(
log q − log
(
τ
√
2pie
))
− n log q
4n2 log2 q =
n log q
log δ0
(
log q − log
(
τ
√
2pie
))2
log δ0 =
(
log q − log (τ√2pie))2
4n log q
.

5.10 The hybrid attack for LWE with binary error
In this section we introduce the hybrid attack for LWE with binary error as presented
in [50, 52]. This is a modification to the LWE setting of the hybrid lattice reduction
and Meet-in-the-Middle attack of Howgrave-Graham [133] on NTRU [131]. We note
that in a subsequent work, Göpfert et al. [117] present a generalised quantum version
of the hybrid attack for LWE, in which it is no longer a requirement that the errors
are binary. We do not discuss this subsequent work further and in particular, we
assume that the errors are chosen uniformly at random in {0, 1}.
Howgrave-Graham gave the first theoretical analysis of the hybrid attack, and the
analysis was improved firstly by Hirschhorn et al. [130] and then in [50, 52]. In
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a subsequent work, Wunderer [214] identifies issues with, and refines, the analysis
in [50, 52]. In light of this, in Section 5.11 we improve the comparison given in [50, 52]
of the hybrid attack with other approaches for solving LWE with binary error.
It is assumed in [50, 52] that the LWE with binary error instance is in normal form;
that is, the secret follows the error distribution. The later work of Wunderer [214]
removes this requirement on the secret by using a different lattice. We follow [50, 52]
and assume that the components of the secret are chosen uniformly at random in
{0, 1}.
The hybrid attack on LWE with binary error as presented in [50, 52] builds on
an idea of Bai and Galbraith [29], which is mentioned in Section 5.2. The idea is
to guess the first r components of the secret vector and apply a lattice attack on
the remaining problem. Howgrave-Graham’s algorithm [133] involves a Meet-in-the-
Middle component to speed up this guessing.
The hybrid attack is summarised as Algorithm 1 and proceeds as follows. Let
(A, c = As˜ + e mod q)
with A ∈ Zm×nq , c ∈ Zmq , s˜ ∈ {0, 1}n and e ∈ {0, 1}m be an LWE instance with
binary error e and binary secret s˜. To obtain a smaller error vector we subtract the
vector 12 ·1 from c. This yields a new LWE instance (A, c′ = As˜ +e′ mod q), where
c′ = c − 12 · 1 and e′ = e − 12 · 1. In particular, we expect the original error vector e
to have m2 nonzero entries e(i) = 1 so its expected norm is
√
m√
2
. The new error vector
e′ has m nonzero entries e′(i) each of which satisfies ‖e′(i)‖ = 12 , so ‖e′‖2 =
√
m
2 .
For r ∈ {1, . . . , n − 1}, let v ∈ {0, 1}r, s ∈ {0, 1}n−r be such that s˜ =
(
v
s
)
; and
let A1 ∈ Zm×rq and A2 ∈ Zm×(n−r)q be such that A = (A1|A2). We can rewrite the
LWE instance (A, c′) as
c′ = (A1|A2)
(
v
s
)
+ e′ = A1v + A2s + e′ mod q .
The main idea of the hybrid attack is to guess v and solve the remaining LWE
instance (A2, c˜ = c′ − A1v = A2s + e′ mod q), which has binary secret s and
error e′ ∈ {−12 , 12}m. The newly obtained LWE instance is solved using a decoding
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approach in the lattice Λq(A2), as discussed in Section 4.7. To briefly recall, since
c˜ = A2s + qw + e
′ for some vector w ∈ Zm and e′ is small, c˜ is close to the lattice
vector A2s + qw ∈ Λq(A2). Hence we can hope to find e′ by, for example, running
Babai’s Nearest Plane algorithm [27] in combination with a sufficient lattice basis
reduction as a precomputation. Recall (Section 2.2) that we denote by NPB(t) the
output of Babai’s Nearest Plane on input a basis B and a target vector t. If the
basis is clear from the context, we omit it from the notation and write NP(t).
The quality of the basis obtained from the precomputation is, as usual, characterised
by the root-Hermite factor δ0. Running a stronger lattice reduction algorithm would
mean more time is taken for the precomputation but the quality of the basis B of
the lattice Λq(A2) would increase and hence the running time of the hybrid attack
would decrease. The value δ0 therefore determines the trade-off between the runtime
of the precomputation and the actual hybrid attack, and should be optimised.
As well as optimising the choice of δ0 we need to optimise r, the guessing dimension.
On the one hand, increasing r increases the complexity of guessing part, since more
entries of the secret have to be guessed. On the other hand, increasing r increases the
determinant of the lattice, making the decoding part of the attack easier. Since there
are only finitely many choices for r, the optimal choice can be found numerically:
for each r, calculate the optimal δ0 that minimises the runtime; then choose the r
such that the overall runtime is minimised.
The guessing of v is sped up by a Meet-in-the-Middle approach; that is, by guessing
binary vectors v1 ∈ {0, 1}r and v2 ∈ {0, 1}r such that v = v1 + v2. In order for
this to make sense, we need to ensure two things. Firstly, we note that without
performing a Meet-in-the-Middle improvement to the guessing step, and assuming a
sufficiently good input basis B, we have
NPB(c˜) = NPB(c
′ −A1v) = e′ .
We therefore need that
NPB(c
′ −A1v) = NPB(−A1v1) + NPB(c′ −A1v2)
holds for v = v1 + v2. Secondly, we need ensure that we store guesses v1 in such a
way that we can recognise pairs v1 and v2 for which the above holds.
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Algorithm 1: The hybrid attack as presented in [50, 52].
Input: q, r ∈ Z
A = (A1|A2), where A1 ∈ Zm×rq ,A2 ∈ Zm×(n−r)q
c ∈ Zmq
B, a lattice basis of Λq(A2)
1 calculate c = br/4e;
2 calculate c′ = c − (12) · 1;
3 while true do
4 guess a binary vector v1 ∈ {0, 1}r with c 1s ;
5 calculate x1 = −NPB(−A1v1) ∈ Rm ;
6 calculate x2 = NPB(c′ −A1v1) ∈ Rm ;
7 store v1 in all the boxes addressed by A(r)x1 ∪ A(r)x2 ;
8 for all v2 6= v1 in all the boxes addressed by A(r)x1 ∪ A(r)x2 do
9 Set v = v1 + v2 and calculate x =
(
1
2
) · 1 + NPB(c′ −A1v) ∈ Rm;
10 if x ∈ {0, 1}m and ∃ s˜ ∈ {0, 1}n : c = As˜ + x mod q then
11 return x;
Let t1 = −A1v1 and t2 = c′ −A1v2. Then we can restate the first requirement as
NPB(t1) + NPB(t2) = NPB(t1 + t2) = e
′;
that is,
NPB(t2)− e′ = −NPB(t1) .
Let also x1 = −NPB(t1) and x2 = NPB(t2). Then we see that x1 = x2 − e′; that
is, x1 and x2 differ by ±12 on each component since e′ ∈ {−12 , 12}m.
To satisfy the second requirement in Algorithm 1 we store a guess v1 in hash boxes
addressed according to x1 and x2 as specified in Definition 18.
Definition 18. Let m ∈ N. For a vector x ∈ Rm the set A(m)x ⊂ {0, 1}m is defined
as
A(m)x =
{
z ∈ {0, 1}m
∣∣∣∣ z(i) = 1 for all i ∈ {1, . . . ,m} with x(i) > −1/2 , andz(i) = 0 for all i ∈ {1, . . . ,m} with x(i) < −1/2
}
.
We now give the intuition for this definition, showing that pairs v1 and v2 will be
recognised. For x1 obtained during Algorithm 1, the set A(m)x1 consists of the sign
vector of x1, where 1 represents a nonnegative sign and 0 represents a negative sign.
For x2 obtained during Algorithm 1, the set A(m)x2 captures all the possible sign
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vectors of x2 plus a vector in {−12 , 12}m. Hence since x1 = x2 − e′, valid pairs will
collide in at least one box. The above discussion proves Lemma 22.
Lemma 22. Let c′ = c − (12) · 1 and e′ = e − (12) · 1. Assume that v1 and v2
are guessed in separate loop iterations of Algorithm 1 and satisfy v1 + v2 = v. Let
t1 = −A1v1 and t2 = c′ −A1v2 and assume NP(t1) + NP(t2) = NP(t1 + t2) = e′
holds. Then v1 and v2 collide in at least one box chosen during Algorithm 1 and
Algorithm 1 outputs the error vector e of the given LWE instance.
We prove an equivalent requirement to NP(t1) + NP(t2) = NP(t1 + t2), which was
an assumption in Lemma 22. We will need the following definition.
Definition 19. Let m ∈ N. A vector x ∈ Zm is called y-admissible for some vector
y ∈ Zm if NP(x) = NP(x− y) + y.
The output of NP on input x is a vector e such that x−e is a lattice point. Intuitively,
Definition 19 captures this is the same lattice point for input x and input x − y.
We can see this as follows. Let NP(x) = e1 and let x − e1 = z1 ∈ L. Let also
NP(x− y) = e2 and let x− y − e2 = z2 ∈ L. If x is y-admissible then:
NP(x) = y + NP(x− y)
−NP(x) = −y −NP(x− y)
x−NP(x) = x− y −NP(x− y)
x− e1 = x− y − e2
z1 = z2 .
Lemma 23. Let t1 ∈ Rm, t2 ∈ Rm be two arbitrary target vectors. Then the following
are equivalent.
(i) NP(t1) + NP(t2) = NP(t1 + t2).
(ii) t1 is NP(t1 + t2)-admissible.
(iii) t2 is NP(t1 + t2)-admissible.
Proof: By symmetry it suffices to show (i) if and only if (ii). We can write
y = NP(t1 + t2) = NP(t)
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where t is defined as t = t1 + t2. Then (ii) is equivalent to the statement that t1 is
y-admissible, which by definition means NP(t1) = NP(t1 − y) + y.
For all x ∈ Rm and for all z ∈ L, we have NP(x) = NP(x − z). By definition,
t− y = t−NP(t) ∈ L. So,
NP(t1 − y) = NP(t1 − y − (t− y)) = NP(t1 − y − t + y) = NP(t1 − t) .
Therefore we have
NP(t1 − y) = NP(t1 − t) = NP(t1 − (t1 + t2)) = NP(−t2) = −NP(t2) ,
where the last equality is by symmetry. Using the above argument, we can conclude
that (i) if and only if (ii) from the following:
NP(t1) + NP(t2) = NP(t1 + t2)
NP(t1) + NP(t2) = y
NP(t1)− y = −NP(t2)
NP(t1)− y = NP(t1 − y)
NP(t1) = NP(t1 − y) + y .

We omit the remainder of the analysis of the hybrid attack given in [50, 52] but
present in Theorem 10 the main result of that work. Theorem 10 gives the probability
that Algorithm 1 terminates and its running time in the case that it does.
Theorem 10. Let c ∈ N and let r = 4c. Let (A, c) be an LWE instance with binary
error, where A = (A1|A2) for A1 $← Zm×rq and A2 $← Zm×(n−r)q . Let B be a
basis of Λq(A2) of quality given by root-Hermite factor δ0. Let q, r, A, c, B be the
input to Algorithm 1. Then, if Algorithm 1 terminates, it finds a valid binary error
vector of the LWE with binary error instance (A, c). The probability that Algorithm 1
terminates is
p0 = 2
−r
(
r
2c
) m∏
i=1
(
1− 2
B(m−12 ,
1
2)
∫ max(−ri,−1)
−1
(1− t2)m−32 dt
)
,
where B(·, ·) denotes the Euler beta function [182] and
ri =
δ
−2(i−1)+m
0 q
m−n+r
m
2
√
m/4
.
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If Algorithm 1 terminates, the expected number of operations is
216
(
r
c
)(
p
(
2c
c
))−1/2
,
where
p =
m∏
i=1
(
1− 1
riB(
m−1
2 ,
1
2)
J(ri,m)
)
,
and
J(ri,m) =

∫ ri−1
−ri−1
∫ z+ri
−1 (1− y2)
m−3
2 dydz
+
∫ −ri
ri−1
∫ z+ri
z−ri (1− y2)
m−3
2 dydz for ri < 12∫ −ri
−ri−1
∫ z+ri
−1 (1− y2)
m−3
2 dydz for ri ≥ 12 .
The value p referred to in Theorem 10 is the probability that −A1v1 is e′-admissible
for an appropriate guess v1. Howgrave-Graham [133] determines the probability p
using experiments. A mathematical calculation of p is presented by Hirschhorn et
al. [130], but this requires an additional assumption. The probability p is calculated
analytically in [50, 52] without requiring this additional assumption.
Wunderer [214] identifies two issues with the analysis in [50, 52]. The first is that the
runtime of lattice basis reduction is estimated according to Lindner and Peikert [150].
As we discussed in Section 4.6.1, Lindner and Peikert’s estimate is inaccurate as it
implies a subexponential algorithm for solving LWE. Wunderer’s second argument is
that Heuristic 2 needs to be modified for q-ary lattices, if the lattice reduction used
as preprocessing is not sufficiently strong. Since BKZ 2.0 with blocksize 60 can now
be easily run on a laptop [88], this issue can be reasonably ignored.
5.11 Comparison of the hybrid attack with other algo-
rithms for LWE with binary error
In this section we compare the hybrid attack with other algorithms for solving LWE
with binary error. This updates and extends the comparison presented in [50] and
is also based on the subsequent work of Wunderer [214].
In Chapter 4 we saw that some algorithms for (general) LWE require a large number
of samples m to be available in order to succeed. In the case of LWE with binary
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n q Hybrid attack Hybrid attack usvp dual
(overestimate) (underestimate)
128 256 47.9 26.1 58.2 53.5
160 256 58.6 35.2 74.3 60.0
192 256 65.8 44.8 91.2 73.1
224 256 75.3 54.4 109.0 86.8
256 256 85.4 64.1 127.0 101.0
288 256 94.4 79.3 145.8 115.8
Table 5.1: Comparison of approaches for solving LWE with binary error using at
most m = 2n samples. The bit hardness of the hybrid attack, reduction to uSVP
and a distinguishing attack are given.
error, we saw in Section 5.6 that once the number of samples is at least quadratic in
n, the problem can be solved in polynomial time. Furthermore, with slightly more
than linearly many samples, such asm = O(n log logn), the algorithm given in [10] is
subexponential. Therefore, it is argued in [50, 52] that it is not reasonable to deploy
a scheme whose hardness is based on LWE with binary error if the attacker would
have access to more than linearly many samples. In the analysis below, we assume
the attacker has access to linearly many samples; we fix m = 2n for concreteness.
We note that since Kirchner and Fouque [139] showed that LWE with binary error
can be solved in subexponential time using only m = n samples this may itself not
be a reasonable assumption.
We now compare the hybrid attack with alternative approaches for solving LWE with
binary error. As mentioned in Section 5.10, the comparison in [50, 52] uses Lindner
and Peikert [150] to estimate the cost of lattice reduction, which is inaccurate. We
will estimate lattice reduction differently; we specify how below.
We compare the hybrid attack with distinguishing via lattice reduction, as described
in Section 5.8; and reduction to uSVP, as described in Section 5.9. Following [50, 52]
we do not consider Arora and Ge, Meet-in-the-Middle or BKW variants. We also omit
from consideration a decoding approach analogous to that described in Section 4.7.
This was considered in detail in [50, 52] but we were unable to update the code used
to generate the estimate for the cost of this approach. The results of the comparison
are presented in Table 5.1.
To estimate the cost of the hybrid attack we update the work of Wunderer [215]. In
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particular, Wunderer gives both an overestimate and an underestimate of the cost of
the hybrid attack, using the following methodology for the cost of lattice reduction.
Given a target δ0 specifying the quality of lattice reduction, the minimal necessary
blocksize k is determined using Chen’s thesis [64]. For the underestimate, it is
assumed that one round of BKZ with blocksize k is sufficient. For the overestimate,
the BKZ 2.0 simulator [65] is used to determine the number of rounds needed. It is
assumed that the SVP oracle is implemented as enumeration.
For our hybrid attack estimates, we take a slightly different approach. We again
determine the minimal necessary blocksize k, given the δ0, using Chen’s thesis [64].
For the underestimate, we assume that lattice reduction costs one call to the SVP
oracle and the SVP oracle is implemented as sieving, as in Alkim et al. [19]. For
the overestimate, we assume the cost of lattice reduction is the same as is given in
commit f13c4a7 of the LWE estimator [6]. In particular we assume that there are 8n
calls to the SVP oracle when calling BKZ in dimension n with blocksize k, and that
the SVP oracle is implemented using sieving as in Becker et al. [33].
For both the distinguishing approach, and reduction to uSVP, we also need to es-
timate the cost of lattice reduction. To obtain estimates for these approaches, we
again assume lattice reduction costs the same as that given in commit f13c4a7 of the
LWE estimator.
Since we fix m = 2n samples, it is possible that we do not have enough samples
to use the optimal subdimension m =
√
n log q
log δ0
when estimating the uSVP or dis-
tinguishing approaches. To determine whether or not we have enough samples, we
firstly calculate δ0 assuming we have as many samples as we need for the optimal
subdimension, as specified in Lemma 21 and Lemma 20 respectively. Then we check
that the corresponding m is indeed less than or equal to 2n. If so, we use the run-
time estimate for that δ0. If not, we take m = 2n and derive the corresponding
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root-Hermite factor, and use the runtime estimate for that δ0. For uSVP we obtain:
q1−
n
m√
2pie
= τδm0
q1−
n
2n√
2pie
= τδ2n0
δ0 =
( √
q
τ
√
2pie
) 1
2n
.
For distinguishing we obtain:
δm0 q
n
m = q
√
2 ln
(
1

)
pi
δ2n0 q
n
2n = q
√
2 ln
(
1

)
pi
δ0 =

√
2q ln
(
1

)
pi

1
2n
.
In Figure 5.1 we compare the cost of the hybrid attack with the best performing
other algorithm, according to Table 5.1. For reference we also give the estimates for
the cost of the hybrid attack for these parameters as given in [50]. It can be seen
that the hybrid attack performs favourably compared with other approaches, and
outperforms the best other approach for sufficiently large n.
We can alternatively compare the hybrid attack with other algorithms using the
LWE estimator [6] directly. This also allows us to compare the cost of the hybrid
attack with a decoding approach. We have done so using commit f13c4a7 of the
LWE estimator and the results are given in Table 5.2 and Table 5.3.
The LWE estimator expects a discrete Gaussian error distribution, rather than a
uniform binary error distribution, as we have here. In order to use the LWE estimator
we need to appropriately model the error distribution as a discrete Gaussian. We
do so using Heuristic 3 so that α =
√
2pi
2q . We use the limited sample functionality
implemented by Bindel et al. [36] and call the LWE estimator with m = 2n samples.
Binary secrets are not currently supported, so we cannot indicate directly to the
LWE estimator that there is a binary secret. However, ternary secrets, where the
s(i) are uniformly chosen from {−1, 0, 1}, are supported, and there is an option to
specify the number of nonzero components h of the secret.
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Figure 5.1: Estimates of solving LWE with binary error instances with m = 2n
samples and modulus q = 256 using the hybrid attack and the best other algorithm.
In Table 5.2 we call the LWE estimator without giving any information about the
secret, whereas in Table 5.3 we model the binary secret as a ternary secret with
h = n2 . This gives a secret that has the same number of nonzero components as
the binary secret, and the components of the secret have the same norm as a binary
secret. The column labelled dec in Table 5.3 was obtained by fixing the success
probability to be 0.99, reflecting the behaviour of the LWE estimator in the later
commit 6f25340. In commit f13c4a7, the decoding approach for sparse small secret
was not well supported.
When analysing Table 5.3, we caution that the LWE estimator interprets a choice
of h as the declaration of a sparse secret. It would then assume, for example, that
the best performing distinguishing attack via lattice reduction is Albrecht’s variant
for small and sparse secret [7], whereas this may not be the case for a uniform
binary secret. Similar assumptions are made in the case of the decoding and uSVP
approaches.
Since we would expect a sparse secret instance to be easier to solve than a dense
secret, in practice it may be harder to solve the LWE with binary error instances than
it would appear from the results in Table 5.3. In contrast, it is likely that it in practice
is easier to solve the LWE with binary error instances than it would appear from
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n q Hybrid attack Hybrid attack dec usvp dual
(over) (under)
128 256 47.9 26.1 52.1 48.2 71.4
160 256 58.6 35.2 61.8 64.0 78.0
192 256 65.8 44.8 73.2 67.5 91.3
224 256 75.3 54.4 85.1 78.8 99.3
256 256 85.4 64.1 97.4 90.4 100.8
288 256 94.4 79.3 109.9 102.2 111.6
Table 5.2: Comparison of attacks on LWE with binary error obtained from the
LWE estimator [16, 6] using m = 2n samples and error distribution characterised by
α =
√
2pi/2q.
n q Hybrid attack Hybrid attack dec usvp dual
(over) (under)
128 256 47.9 26.1 45.4 53.2 56.0
160 256 58.6 35.2 60.1 64.7 65.8
192 256 65.8 44.8 62.0 74.4 76.9
224 256 75.3 54.4 71.4 85.0 87.9
256 256 85.4 64.1 81.2 96.5 99.0
288 256 94.4 79.3 91.2 108.3 109.9
Table 5.3: Comparison of attacks on LWE with binary error obtained from the
LWE estimator [16, 6] using m = 2n samples, error distribution characterised by
α =
√
2pi/2q, and ternary secret with h = n/2.
Table 5.2, which assumes a general secret, rather than a small secret. Assuming that
the decoding, uSVP and dual approaches cost somewhere in between the values given
in Tables 5.2 and 5.3, we see that the hybrid attack performs favourably compared
to the other approaches.
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This chapter considers the Ring Learning with Errors problem. Most of this chapter
is background material following the presentation in [173], which in turn follows
Lyubashevsky et al. [157, 158, 159, 160]. We also clarify a result due to Ducas and
Durmus [95]: this is based on joint (unpublished) work with Cid and Murphy.
The Ring Learning with Errors (Ring-LWE) problem, introduced by Lyubashevsky
et al. [157], is a generalisation of the Learning with Errors problem from the ring of
integers to other rings. Specifically, the problem is defined in the ring of integers R
of a number field K. In applications, R is typically the mth cyclotomic ring, and
very often m is chosen as a power of 2.
In practice, Ring-LWE is often preferred to LWE for efficiency reasons. For example,
key sizes in LWE are typically quadratic in the dimension n whereas in Ring-LWE
they are linear [196]. The homomorphic encryption scheme [100] that we will consider
in Chapter 7, as well as several others [47, 44, 160], are based on Ring-LWE. The
hardness of Ring-LWE is the assumption used in a wealth of other applications
besides homomorphic encryption [187], such as Attribute-based Encryption [84] and
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obfuscation [87]. A popular application, considered in [15, 19, 40, 186, 90, 89, 150],
is Ring-LWE based key exchange.
In Section 6.4 we discuss the hardness of Ring-LWE and related problems on ideal
lattices. There is a reduction from presumed hard problems on ideal lattices to Ring-
LWE [157, 189], assuming an appropriate error distribution is chosen. We therefore
discuss various methods proposed in the literature to ensure the error distribution
is chosen appropriately in Section 6.5. One such proposal is due to Ducas and
Durmus [95] and we revisit their result [95, Theorem 5] in Section 6.6.
6.1 Algebraic background
Rings of integers of number fields. The minimal polynomial f of an algebraic
number β is the unique irreducible monic polynomial with rational coefficients of
smallest degree d such that f(β) = 0 and whose leading coefficient is 1. A number
field K = Q(β) ∼= Q[x]/(f(x)) is an extension of Q formed by adjoining β. Its ring of
integers R = OK is the ring of all elements of K that are roots of a monic polynomial
with coefficients in Z. Each root βk of f defines an embedding σk : K → C. The
canonical embedding
σ : Q(β)→ Cd
is the direct sum of these embeddings, so that σ(z) = (σk(z))k∈{1,...,d}.
The ring of integers R embeds under σ as a lattice. The conjugate dual of this lattice
corresponds to the embedding of the dual fractional ideal :
R∨ = {a ∈ K | Tr(aR) ⊂ Z} .
We denote by (R∨)k the space of products of k elements of R∨:(
R∨
)k
=
{
s1 . . . sk | s1, . . . , sk ∈ R∨
}
.
Definition 20 ([158]). Let R be the ring of integers of a number field K. Let q ≥ 2
be an integer modulus. Let R∨ be the dual fractional ideal of R. Let Rq = R/qR and
R∨q = R∨/qR∨. Let KR = K ⊗Q R.
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Let χ be a distribution over KR. Let s ∈ R∨q be a secret. A sample from the Ring-
LWE distribution As,χ over Rq×KR/qR∨ is generated by choosing a← Rq uniformly
at random, choosing e← χ and outputting
(a, b = (a · s)/q + e mod qR∨) .
Let Ψ be a family of distributions over KR. The Search Ring-LWE problem is defined
as follows: given access to arbitrarily many independent samples from As,χ for some
arbitrary s ∈ R∨q and χ ∈ Ψ, find s.
Let Υ be a distribution over a family of error distributions, each over KR. The
average-case Decision Ring-LWE problem is to distinguish with non-negligible advan-
tage between arbitrarily many independent samples from As,χ for a random choice
of (s, χ) ← U (R∨q ) × Υ, and the same number of uniformly random samples from
Rq ×KR/qR∨.
Cyclotomic rings. Let ζm be a primitive mth root of unity. Its minimal polyno-
mial is the mth cyclotomic polynomial Φm(x). The number field Q(ζm) is the mth
cyclotomic field and its ring of integers is R = Z [ζm] ∼= Z [x] /(Φm(x)). The roots of
Φm(x) are ζim for i ∈ Z∗m, so there are n = ϕ(m) of them. Therefore Q(ζm) has n
embeddings given by σk(y) = y(ζkm) for k ∈ Z∗m. The dual fractional ideal of Z [ζm]
is Z [ζm]∨ = 1Φ′m(ζm)Z [ζm].
The canonical embedding induces a geometry on K with `2-norm ‖ · ‖2 and `∞-norm
‖ · ‖∞ given by the element’s respective norm under σ: that is,
‖a‖2 = ‖σ(a)‖2
and
‖a‖∞ = ‖σ(a)‖∞ .
Prime cyclotomic rings. If m is a prime we have n = ϕ(m) = m− 1 and
Φm(x) = x
n + · · ·+ x+ 1 .
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The ring embeddings σk are defined by ζm 7→ ζkm for 1 ≤ k ≤ n. Define t such that
t−1 = m−1(1− ζm) ,
then R∨ = 〈t−1〉 and (R∨)k = {t−kr1 . . . rk | r1, . . . , rk ∈ R}. For m ≥ 3 a prime we
let n′ = 12n =
1
2(m− 1).
Power-of-two cyclotomic rings. For m = 2k+1 for some k we have n = 2k and
Φm(x) = x
n + 1. In this case R is an exact scaling of R∨ [95]. In particular, we have
m
2 R
∨ = R.
Bases. We now specify various Z-bases of K, R and R∨ in the case when m is
prime. More general definitions can be found in Lyubashevsky et al. [160].
Definition 21 ([160]). The Powerful basis −→p of K = Q(ζm) and R = Z [ζm] is{
ζ0m, ζ
1
m, . . . , ζ
n−1
m
}
.
Definition 22 ([160]). The Decoding basis
−→
d of R∨ is{
1
m(ζ
0
m − ζnm), 1m(ζ1m − ζnm), . . . , 1m(ζn−1m − ζnm)
}
.
Definition 23 ([160]). The Scaled Decoding basis of (R∨)k is
m−(k−1)
−→
d =
{
1
mk
(ζ0m − ζnm), 1mk (ζ1m − ζnm), . . . , 1mk (ζn−1m − ζnm)
}
.
6.2 The space H
The canonical embedding σ : Q(β) → Cd is the direct sum of the ring embeddings
σ1, . . . , σd. The ring embeddings σ1, . . . , σd occur in complex conjugate pairs with
σk = σm−k. Therefore σ maps into a subset of Cd, which is denoted
H = {a ∈ Cd | a(j) = a(m−j) ∀j ∈ {1, . . . , d}} .
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Bases for H. Let I be the identity matrix and J the matrix obtained when the
columns of I are reversed. In Definitions 25 and 26 we give two bases for H in the
case that K is the mth cyclotomic field for m a prime, so that n = ϕ(m) = m− 1.
We note that these bases can be defined more generally. The I-basis is the standard
basis of H, expressing elements as a complex vector. The T -basis, given by the
columns of the conjugate pair matrix T, expresses an element of H as a real vector.
Definition 24 ([160]). The conjugate pair matrix T is given by
T =
1√
2

1 0 . . . 0 0 . . . 0 i
0 1 . . . 0 0 . . . i 0
...
...
. . .
...
...
...
...
0 0 . . . 1 i . . . 0 0
0 0 . . . 1 −i . . . 0 0
...
...
...
...
. . .
...
...
0 1 . . . 0 0 . . . −i 0
1 0 . . . 0 0 . . . 0 −i

=
1√
2
(
I iJ
J −iI
)
.
Lemma 24 ([160]). The conjugate pair matrix T is a unitary matrix with
T−1 = T† =
1√
2
(
I J
−iJ iI
)
.
Let v be a vector representing an element in the I-basis for H. Since T is unitary,
we have ‖Tv‖2 = ‖v‖2; that is, the element has the same norm when represented in
the T -basis. Expressing elements of H as vectors in the T -basis therefore gives an
isomorphism between H and Rn as an inner product space [160].
Definition 25. Let m be prime. The I-basis for H is given by the columns of the
n × n identity matrix I, that is to say by standard basis vectors. In particular the
I-basis expresses an element in H as a vector of n′ conjugate pairs.
Definition 26. Let m be prime. The T -basis for H is given by the columns of the
conjugate pair matrix
T =
1√
2
(
In′ iJn′
Jn′ −iIn′
)
.
Embeddings of sums and products. The canonical embedding under σ of a sum
in the cyclotomic number field gives a componentwise addition in H when elements
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in H are expressed as vectors in any basis. Similarly, the canonical embedding under
σ gives a componentwise multiplication when expressing the elements in H as vectors
in the I-basis. We denote this componentwise multiplication as the -product in H,
and we have:
σ(aa′) = (σ1(aa′), . . . , σn(aa′))T
= (σ1(a)σ1(a
′), . . . , σn(a)σn(a′))T
= (σ1(a), . . . , σn(a))
T  (σ1(a′), . . . , σn(a′))T
= σ(a) σ(a′) .
The canonical embedding of a product under σ gives other forms of product for the
corresponding vectors expressing elements of H when other bases are used. When
using the T -basis, the appropriate notion of a product of two elements of H, which
are expressed as real vectors, is given by Definition 27. We define this multiplication
as the ⊗-product.
Definition 27. The ⊗-product of two real vectors u = (u11, u12, . . . , un′1, un′2)T
and v = (v11, v12, . . . , vn′1, vn′2)T of length n = 2n′ is
u⊗ v =

u11
u12
...
un′1
un′2
⊗

v11
v12
...
vn′1
vn′2
 = T† (TuTv) = 2−
1
2

u11v11 − u12v12
u11v12 + u12v11
...
un′1vn′1 − un′2vn′2
un′1vn′2 + un′2vn′1
 .
6.3 Discretisation
Discretisation, in the context of Ring-LWE applications, is a process where a point
in H is rounded to a nearby point in a lattice coset. Such a discretisation process
usually involves randomisation, so gives rise to a random variable on the elements
of the coset. In this section we describe the coordinate-wise randomised rounding
method of discretisation [160, Section 2.4.2, first bullet point]. This section is based
on [173, Section 5], and proofs for all results can be found there.
In Definition 28 we define the univariate Reduction random variable. This is a
translation of the Bernoulli random variable [118], and so we can give its immediate
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basic properties in Lemma 25. In particular we need to consider the multivariate
generalisation of a Reduction random variable given by Definition 29.
Definition 28. If Bern denotes the Bernoulli distribution, then the univariate Re-
duction distribution
Red(a) = Bern(dae − a)− (dae − a)
is the discrete probability distribution defined for parameter a ∈ R as taking the values
1 + a− dae with probability dae − a and a− dae with probability 1− (dae − a).
Lemma 25. If R0 ∼ Red(a) is a (univariate) Reduction random variable for param-
eter a ∈ R, then R0 satisifies (i) |R0| ≤ 1, (ii) E [R0] = 0, (iii) Var[R0] ≤ 14 and (iv)
a−R0 ∈ {bac, dae} ⊂ Z.
Definition 29. A random variable R = (R1, . . . , Rl)T has a multivariate Reduction
distribution R ∼ Red(a) on Rl for parameter a = (a1, . . . , al)T ∈ Rl if its components
Rj ∼ Red(aj) for j = 1, . . . , l are independent univariate Reduction random variables.
We are now able to specify the coordinate-wise randomised rounding discretisation
method and show this discretisation method is valid ; that is, independent of the
chosen coset representative.
Definition 30. Suppose B is a (column) basis matrix for the n-dimensional lattice
Λ in H. The coordinate-wise randomised rounding discretisation bXeBΛ+c of the
random variable X to the lattice coset Λ + c with respect to the basis matrix B is
then defined by the conditional random variable(bXeBΛ+c∣∣X = x) = bxeBΛ+c = x + BQx,c
where Qx,c ∼ Red
(
B−1(c− x)).
Lemma 26. The coordinate-wise randomised rounding discretisation bxeBΛ+c is a
random variable on the lattice coset Λ + c and is valid.
6.4 Hardness of Ring-LWE
As for the LWE problem, the Ring-LWE problem is related to well-studied lattice
problems that are believed to be hard [189, 45, 158, 160, 185, 194]. Most notably
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for cryptographic applications, Lyubashevsky et al. [157, 158] give a reduction from
approximate SIVP on ideal lattices to Decision Ring-LWE when K is a cyclotomic
number field. Recently, a much more general result, giving a reduction from worst-
case lattice problems to Decision Ring-LWE for any number field, was presented by
Peikert et al. [189]. If Decision Ring-LWE is hard, then a Ring-LWE sample looks
pseudorandom. Hence we may argue, for example, indistinguishability of ciphertexts
from random if the ciphertext is formed by masking the message with a Ring-LWE
sample, as proposed by Lindner and Peikert [150].
Theorem 11 ([158]). If K is a cyclotomic number field with ring of integers R,
then there is a polynomial time quantum reduction from approximate SIVP on ideal
lattices in K to Decision Ring-LWE in R given a fixed number of samples, where the
error distribution is a fixed spherical Gaussian over H.
Theorem 11 is based on two results. The first is a quantum reduction from a par-
ticular hard lattice problem to Search Ring-LWE in a ring of integers R of some
number field K [158, Theorem 4.1]. The second specialises to the case of rings of
integers of cyclotomic fields, giving a reduction from Search Ring-LWE to Decision
Ring-LWE [158, Theorem 5.1]. This reduction from Search Ring-LWE to Decision
Ring-LWE was generalised by Eisenträger et al. [97] to all rings of integers R of
number fields K such that K is Galois and q splits completely in R. In turn, this
reduction was further generalised by Chen et al. [62], who removed the requirement
on q. A reduction from a particular hard lattice problem to Decision Ring-LWE for
q of arbitrary shape had previously been given by Langlois and Stehlé [147].
The existence of a reduction, such as Theorem 11, from standard problems on ideal
lattices gives more confidence that Ring-LWE is hard, since it shows that Ring-LWE
is at least as hard as a well-studied problem on ideal lattices that is believed to be
hard. However, there are at least two reasons why we might still be cautious. Firstly,
as Chatterjee et al. [57] argue, the reduction may not be tight and hence it is unclear
whether the concrete security assurance this would provide is meaningful. Secondly,
the hardness of a problem on ideal lattices may be different than its analogue on
general lattices: for example, the GapSVP problem is easy on ideal lattices [196].
Another example is the line of work [53, 79] which showed that finding short vectors in
principal ideal lattices is potentially easier than for general lattices. Cramer et al. [80]
generalised these results to show that worst-case approximate SVP on ideal lattices
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with approximation factor γ = exp(O˜(√n)) can be solved in quantum polynomial
time, whereas for a general lattice we would expect to reach γ = exp(Θ˜(n)).
Cramer et al. [80] stress that while Ring-LWE is at least as hard as approximate SVP
on ideal lattices, it is not known to be equivalent, and hence their work should not
currently impact on Ring-LWE-based schemes. Nonetheless, the inherent structure
in the Ring-LWE setting has been seen by some as worrisome and rings with less
structure have been proposed, for example by Bernstein et al. [35], as an alternative.
The use of Module-LWE [147] as an alternative hardness assumption has been pro-
posed [80], although Albrecht and Deo [11] showed that Module-LWE and Ring-LWE
are polynomial-time equivalent.
On the other hand, we can consider Ring-LWE variants for which there is no longer
a reduction from presumed hard problems on ideal lattices. Indeed in practice, some
schemes based on Ring-LWE use an error distribution that may be too narrow for a
reduction to apply. For example, the reductions would require an error distribution
characterised by αq = ω(
√
log n), where the standard deviation σ = αq√
2pi
. That
is, αq is a function of n when the reduction holds. In contrast, in homomorphic
encryption applications such as [121, 110, 58] we typically have αq = 8; that is, αq
is a constant. A number of works have given attacks on Ring-LWE variants when
the underlying number field, error distribution, or modulus is of various special
forms [56, 55, 62, 63, 97, 99].
6.5 Error distributions
Recall that in the hardness results for Ring-LWE in Section 6.4, in order for the
reduction from ideal lattice problems to hold, we need to choose error polynomials
ei from a distribution which when embedded under the canonical embedding σ is a
spherical Gaussian inH. So, we would sample the errors from a spherical Gaussian in
H, then map them back using σ−1 to elements in K; indeed, strictly speaking [160],
to elements in K ⊗Q R.
A much more convenient, and arguably more natural, way to choose an error polyno-
mial is such that each coefficient is chosen independently from a spherical Gaussian.
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This gives rise to so-called Polynomial-LWE [210, 157, 47].
Definition 31 ([210, 157, 47]). Let f(x) be a monic irreducible polynomial in Z [x] of
degree n. Let R = Z [x] /(f(x)) and Rq = Zq [x] /(f(x)). Let s ∈ Rq be a secret. Let
ai ∈ Rq be chosen uniformly. Let ei be chosen from the discrete Gaussian distribution
on R centred at 0 and with standard deviation σ, spherical with respect to the power
basis. Let ci = ais+ ei.
Decision Polynomial-LWE is the problem of deciding whether pairs (ai, ci) ∈ Rq×Rq
are sampled according to the above or are uniformly random.
Search Polynomial-LWE is the problem of recovering s given arbitrarily many samples
of the form (ai, ci) = (ai, ais+ ei).
The coefficient embedding map gives another map from K to Rn, sending the error
polynomial ei = ei,0 + ei,1x + · · · + ei,n−1xn−1 to the vector (ei,0, ei,1, . . . , ei,n−1).
The coefficient embedding and canonical embedding are related to one another by
a linear transformation of Rn and in the case of the mth cyclotomic for m a power
of 2, this transformation is an isometry [95, 160]. This means that for a power-of-2
m, a spherical Gaussian distribution in the canonical embedding corresponds to a
spherical distribution in the coefficient embedding, or equivalently, Polynomial-LWE
and Ring-LWE are equivalent for power-of-2 cyclotomics. Hence we can choose the
error polynomials in this more natural way and retain the hardness reduction. This
is a key reason why in applications, designers of cryptosystems based on Ring-LWE
favour the power-of-2 cyclotomic case, as in, for example, [47, 209, 216, 40]. This
choice can also provide efficiency in implementations [160].
Ducas and Durmus [95] propose an alternative way to sample the errors more con-
veniently. They show that for any cyclotomic field K we can equally simply sample
an error polynomial coefficient-wise in an appropriate extension of K according to a
spherical Gaussian and perform a modular reduction to obtain an error in K, which
is distributed as an elliptical Gaussian. When considered under σ, the errors retain
the appropriate spherical Gaussian distribution in H. We revisit a key result of
Ducas and Durmus in Section 6.6 below.
Another variant, used by Peikert et al. [20, 188, 81, 82] and equivalent to Ring-LWE,
is tweaked Ring-LWE. In this variant a tweak factor t ∈ R such that tR∨ = R is used.
The secret s′ is such that s′ = t · s, where s is a standard Ring-LWE secret, and
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the errors ei are chosen from a tweaked error distribution tψ, where ψ is a spherical
Gaussian as required in standard Ring-LWE.
6.6 The variant of Ducas and Durmus
In this section we review a result of Ducas and Durmus [95]. The work [95] is
motivated by the fact that Ring-LWE can be complicated to implement for a cy-
clotomic ring when m is not a power of 2, since in such a setting the Ring-LWE
definition in [157] involves R∨. Ducas and Durmus show that for any cyclotomic
polynomial Φm(x), it is possible to avoid this requirement and always work in the
ring R = Z [x] /(Φm(x)). In particular, their main result [95, Theorem 2] states the
analogue of Theorem 11; that is, for cyclotomic rings there is a quantum reduction
from approximate SVP on ideal lattices to a variant of Decision Ring-LWE, in which
we must distinguish k samples (ai, ais + ei) ∈ Rq × Rq from k uniformly random
samples, where ai, s
$←− Rq and the ei are chosen in a certain extension ring and then
reduced modulo Φm(x).
The extension ring of Q [x] /(Φm(x)) is Q [x] /(Θm(x)), where Θm(x) is the polyno-
mial that is xm − 1 if m is odd, and xm/2 + 1 if m is even. A key component in
the proof of the main result [95, Theorem 2] is the result [95, Theorem 5] showing
that if the errors are chosen in Q [x] /(Θm(x)) in an appropriate way, this implies an
appropriate spherical error distribution in H as required for hardness. However, the
proof of [95, Theorem 5] contains a small error, although the statement is correct.
Furthermore the notation used in [95] is sometimes non-standard. We revisit the
proof of [95, Theorem 5], slightly altering the presentation, and show how the error
can be corrected.
We begin by giving the relationships between the spaces Rϕ(m) ∼= H, Q [x] /(Θm(x))
and Q [x] /(Φm(x)). These are summarised in Figure 6.1. The map
β : Q [x] /(Θm(x))→ Q [x] /(Φm(x))
given by x 7→ x mod Φm(x) is reduction modulo Φm. The map
σ : Q [x] /(Φm(x))→ H
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Q [x] /(Θm(x))
Rϕ(m) Q [x] /(Φm(x))
 
 
 
 
 	
@
@
@
@
@R
-
ﬀ
T−1 ◦ σ
σ−1 ◦T
T−1 ◦ σ ◦ β β : x 7→ x mod Φm
Figure 6.1: [95, Figure 1]. Mappings between different spaces.
is the canonical embedding of the number field Q [x] /(Φm(x)). We view H in the
T -basis so that the map from H to Rϕ(m) is given by the matrix T as specified in
Definition 24. Let γ : Z [x] /(Θm(x)) → H ⊆ Cϕ(m) be the linear map from the
power basis of Z [x] /(Θm(x)) to the canonical basis of Cϕ(m); that is, the basis that
extends the I-basis of H. Then γ is the composition map σ ◦ β, as implied, though
not explicitly stated, in [95]. Let G be the ϕ(m)×m′ matrix representing γ. Then
T−1 ◦G gives the map from Z [x] /(Θm(x)) to Rϕ(m).
Following the notation of [95], we let ψs be the spherical Gaussian with mean 0 and
standard deviation s over R and ψds be the spherical Gaussian over Rd where each
component is chosen independently from ψs. We let m′ = m if m is odd and m′ = m2
if m is even.
We now describe the change in our presentation compared to [95]. Ducas and Durmus
[95] give the mapping from H to Rϕ(m) by the matrix TDD = 1√2
(
I iI
I −iI
)
,
whereas we give this mapping by the matrix T. The ordering of components of σ
does not seem consistent when using the matrix TDD. For example, when m = 5
the matrix TDD corresponds to the conjugates in the order (σ1, σ2, σ4, σ3) whereas
by definition, σ considers the canonical order (σ1, σ2, σ3, σ4). Using the conjugate
pair matrix T and the T -basis for H enables us to always use the canonical order
for σ.
We now discuss and correct the proof presented by Ducas and Durmus of their
result [95, Theorem 5]. We begin by presenting the theorem as stated in [95].
Theorem 12 ([95]). Let v ∈ Q [x] /(Θm(x)) be a random variable distributed as ψm′s
in the power basis. Then the distribution of (T−1DD ◦ σ ◦ β)(v), seen in the I-basis of
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H, is the spherical Gaussian ψϕ(m)
s
√
m′
.
Define the matrix EDD as EDD = T−1DD ·G. The matrix EDD represents the embed-
ding directly from Q [X] /(Θm(x)) to Rϕ(m). Let Iϕ(m) be the ϕ(m)×ϕ(m) identity
matrix.
The stated proof requires the following three claims:
(i) G ·GT = m′Iϕ(m)
(ii) T−1DD is Hermitian
(iii) EDD = EDD, or, equivalently, EDD is real.
Claim (ii) does not specify the property of TDD that we would require. In particular,
the claim that T−1DD is Hermitian would mean (T
−1
DD)
T = T−1DD. However, as we will
see below, the desired relation is of the form (T−1DD)T = TDD.
In light of our change to the matrix T, and noting the issue with the stated proof,
we now restate and prove [95, Theorem 5].
Theorem 13 ([95]). Let v ∈ Q [x] /(Θm(x)) be a random variable distributed as ψm′s
in the power basis. Then the distribution of (T−1 ◦ σ ◦ β)(v), seen in the I-basis of
H, is the spherical Gaussian ψϕ(m)
s
√
m′
.
Proof: We follow the framework of the proof stated in [95]. Define the matrices
T, G as above and define the matrix representing the embedding directly from
Q [x] /(Θm(x)) to Rϕ(m) as E = T−1 ·G.
Suppose the following claims are true:
(i) G ·GT = m′ · Iϕ(m),
(ii) (T−1)T = T,
(iii) E = E.
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In this case, the following argument holds:
E ·ET = E ·ET
= T−1 ·G · (T−1 ·G)T
= T−1 ·G ·GT · (T−1)T
= T−1 ·G ·GT ·T
= T−1 ·m′ · Iϕ(m) ·T
= m′ · Iϕ(m) ,
giving the required result.
Claim (i) and Claim (iii) hold directly as in [95] For Claim (ii), recall T = 1√
2
(
I iJ
J −iI
)
.
Therefore
T−1 =
1√
2
(
I J
−iJ iI
)
(T−1)T =
1√
2
(
I −iJ
J iI
)
(T−1)T =
1√
2
(
I iJ
J −iI
)
as required. 
6.6.1 The case m is an odd prime
In this section, we consider the case that m is an odd prime, as an extended example.
We firstly establish notation in this case, and give details of matrices representing
each of the maps between the various spaces. We then give more detail on the proof
of claim (i), which was required in the proof given in the previous section of the
result of Ducas and Durmus [95, Theorem 5]. We conclude with an alternative proof
of [95, Theorem 5] restricted to the case that m is an odd prime.
In the case m is an odd prime, we have ϕ(m) = m− 1 and Φm(x) = xm−1 + . . .+ 1.
The extension ring is Q [x] /(Θm(x)), where Θm(x) = xm − 1. Let m1 = m− 1 and
m2 =
1
2m1 =
1
2(m−1). Let I1 be the m1×m1 identity matrix, let J1 be the m1×m1
matrix with 1s on the reverse diagonal and 0 elsewhere, and let K1 be the m1 ×m1
matrix with every entry 1.
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Q [x] /(Θm(x))
Rm−1 H Q [x] /(Φm(x))
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Figure 6.2: Mappings between spaces for m an odd prime.
In Figure 6.2 we give a version of Figure 6.1 where the canonical embedding into
H and the isomorphism into Rm−1, using the T -basis, are decoupled. All maps
are given by matrices with respect to specific bases, which we now define. We
regard Q [x] /(Θm(x)) as a vector space over Q with basis {1, x, . . . , xm−1} and
Q [x] /(Φm(x)) as a vector space over Q with basis {x, . . . , xm−1}. We can obviously
extend these rational vector spaces to real or complex vector spaces in a natural way
and use the same bases. We use the I-basis for H and the standard basis for Rm−1.
The mapping β from Q [x] /(Θm(x)) to Q [x] /(Φm(x)) is a straightforward modular
reduction in which 1 is mapped to −(x+ . . . xm−1). This is realised with respect to
the bases given above by the (m− 1)×m matrix B = (−1 |I1 ), where 1 is a column
vector of 1s. Let ζm be a primitive mth root of unity. Then the canonical embedding
σ is realised by the symmetric m1 × m1 matrix A = (Ajk), where Ajk = ζjkm for
1 ≤ j, k ≤ m− 1. The (m− 1)×m matrix E = T−1AB represents the map denoted
T−1 ◦ γ = T−1 ◦ σ ◦ β.
Claim (i) in the proof of [95, Theorem 5]. We now show that Claim (i) in
the proof of [95, Theorem 5] holds in the case that m is an odd prime. That is,
we prove that GGT = mI, based on the argument as given in [95]. Recall that G
is a matrix denoting the composition map γ = σ ◦ β so in this case we may write
G = AB as a matrix representing this map for our chosen bases. We see that
G = A (−1 |I1 ) = (1 |A), so we have
GGT =

1 ζm . . . ζ
m−1
m
1 (ζ2m) . . . (ζ
2
m)
m−1
...
...
1 ζ2m . . . (ζm
2
)m−1
1 ζm . . . (ζm)
m−1


1 1 . . . 1
ζm
(
ζm
)2
. . . ζm
(ζm)
2 (ζm
2
)2 . . . ζ2m
...
...
...
(ζm)
m−1 (ζ2m)m−1 . . . ζm−1m
 .
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The ith row of G contains the root ζim raised to all powers j for 1 ≤ j ≤ m− 1. This
leads to a permutation of the roots, so each row contains all the mth roots of unity
in some order. A list of all roots is still a list of all roots after conjugation, so the
columns of GT similarly contain all roots.
Consider the (i, j)th element of GGT . This is equal to
1 + ζimζm
j
+ (ζimζm
j
)2 + · · ·+ (ζimζmj)m−1 =
{
m [i = j]
0 [i 6= j] .
When i = j we have 1 + (ζmζm)i + ((ζmζm)i)2 + · · · + ((ζmζm)i)m−1. A root of
unity multiplied by its conjugate is 1, so the (i, i)th element of GGT is equal to
1 + · · ·+ 1 = m. When i 6= j consider each summand. The value ζimζmj is equal to
a particular mth root of unity not equal to 1, and in each summand it is raised to a
different power in 1, 2, . . .m− 1. The resulting expression is a geometric progression
and hence the sum is (
ζimζm
j
)m − 1
ζimζm
j − 1
= 0 .
This shows that GGT = mI when m is an odd prime.
Analysis of the map given by the matrix T−1AB on spherical Gaussians.
By the result of Ducas and Durmus [95, Theorem 5], the matrix T−1AB represents
a real-valued map that sends a spherical Gaussian in Q [x] /(Θm(x)) of standard
deviation s to a spherical Gaussian in Rm−1 of standard deviation s
√
m′ = s
√
m,
since for odd m we have m′ = m. In this section we consider the effect of the map
given by T−1AB on a spherical Gaussian in more detail.
We first consider the effect of the map represented by the matrix B = (−1|I1) on a
spherical Gaussian.
Lemma 27. Let I1 be the m1 ×m1 identity matrix, let B = (−1|I1), and let K1 be
the m1 ×m1 matrix with every entry 1. Then BBT = I1 + K1.
Proof: By direct computation we see that
BBT = (−1|I1)
( −1T
I1
)
=
 2 1. . .
1 2
 = I1 + K1 .
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
If X ∼ Nm(0, ρ2I0) is spherically symmetric zero-mean real-valued m-dimensional
normal random variable with component variance ρ2, then mapping this under β, we
see BX ∼ Nm1(0, ρ2BBT ). By diagonalising BBT , which has eigenvalues m (with
multiplicity 1) and 1 (with multiplicity m− 2), we see that a spherically symmetric
error distribution in Q [x] /(Θm(x)) gives an error distribution in Q [x] /(Φm(x)) that
is highly elliptical.
We conclude with an alternative proof of [95, Theorem 5] in the case that m is an
odd prime. In order to do so, we require the following lemmas.
Lemma 28. Let A be the symmetric m1 ×m1 matrix A = (Ajk), where Ajk = ζjkm
for 1 ≤ j, k ≤ m−1, let I1 be the m1×m1 identity matrix and let K1 be the m1×m1
matrix with every entry 1. Then AA = mI1 −K1.
Proof: Considering each entry of AA, we see that
(
AA
)
jk
=
m−1∑
l=1
AjlAlk =
m−1∑
l=1
ζjlmζ
−lk
m =
m−1∑
l=1
ζ l(j−k)m =
{
m− 1 [j = k]
−1 [j 6= k].

Lemma 29. Let A be the symmetric m1 ×m1 matrix A = (Ajk), where Ajk = ζjkm
for 1 ≤ j, k ≤ m − 1, let J1 be the m1 ×m1 matrix with 1s on the reverse diagonal
and 0 elsewhere, and let K1 be the m1×m1 matrix with every entry 1. Then AA =
mJ1 −K1.
Proof: Considering each entry of AA, we see that
(AA)jk =
m−1∑
l=1
AjlAlk =
m−1∑
l=1
ζjlmζ
lk
m =
m−1∑
l=1
ζ l(j+k)m =
{
m− 1 [j = m− k]
−1 [j 6= m− k].

Lemma 30. Let A be the symmetric m1 ×m1 matrix A = (Ajk), where Ajk = ζjkm
for 1 ≤ j, k ≤ m − 1, and let K1 be the m1 ×m1 matrix with every entry 1. Then
AK1 = −K1.
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Proof: Considering each entry of AK1, we see that
(AK1)jk =
m−1∑
l=1
Ajl(K1)lk =
m−1∑
l=1
Ajl · 1 =
m−1∑
l=1
ζjlm = −1 .

Lemma 31. Let A be the symmetric m1 ×m1 matrix A = (Ajk), where Ajk = ζjkm
for 1 ≤ j, k ≤ m − 1, and let K1 be the m1 ×m1 matrix with every entry 1. Then
−K1A = K1.
Proof: Using Lemma 30, and the fact that A and K1 are symmetric, we obtain
AK1 = −K1
(AK1)
T = −KT1
K1A = −K1 ,
from which the result follows. 
Lemma 32. Let A be the symmetric m1 ×m1 matrix A = (Ajk), where Ajk = ζjkm
for 1 ≤ j, k ≤ m − 1, and let K1 be the m1 ×m1 matrix with every entry 1. Then
−K1A = K1.
Proof: Using Lemma 30, the fact that K1 is real, and the fact that A and K1 are
symmetric, we obtain
AK1 = −K1
AK1 = −K1
(A ·K1)T = (−K1)T ,
from which the result follows. 
Lemma 33. Let J1 be the m1 ×m1 matrix with 1s on the reverse diagonal and 0
elsewhere and let T be the m1 ×m1 matrix of Definition 26. Then J1T = T.
Proof: The jth row of J1 has entries (J1)j,l = 1 for l = m−j and (J1)j,l = 0 otherwise.
So, when multiplying any m1 ×m1 matrix M on the left by J1, the entries in the
product are given by:
(J1M)jk =
m−1∑
l=1
(J1)jlMlk = Mm−j,k .
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So J1 reflects the rows of M about a line at the midpoint of the matrix.
Let I2 and J2 be the m2 × m2 versions of I1 and J1 respectively. By definition
T = 1√
2
(
I2 iJ2
J2 −iI2
)
and its inverse is T−1 = 1√
2
(
I2 J2
−iJ2 iI2
)
. By Claim 2 in
the proof of [95, Theorem 5],
T = (T−1)T =
1√
2
(
I2 −iJ2
J2 iI2
)
.
So the reflection J1T is given by
J1T =
1√
2
(
I2 iJ2
J2 −iI2
)
= T .

We can now restate and give another proof of the result of Ducas and Durmus [95,
Theorem 5] in the case that m is an odd prime.
Theorem 14 ([95]). Let T, A and B be as defined above. Then the matrix T−1AB
represents a real-valued map sending a spherical Gaussian of standard deviation s in
Q [x] /(Θm(x)) to a spherical Gaussian of standard deviation s
√
m′ = s
√
m in Rm−1.
Proof: Recall that T−1 mapsH considered as a subset of Cm−1 to Rm−1 considered as
a subset of Cm−1. Consider Q [x] /(Θm(x)) also as a subset of a complex space. Let Z
be a spherically symmetric real-valued m-dimensional normal random variable with
component variance s2 and mean 0, and let I0 denote them×m identity matrix. Then
Z can be expressed as a complex normal random variable by Z ∼ CNm(0, s2I0, s2I0),
where both the covariance matrix E
[
ZZ
T
]
and the relation matrix E
[
ZZT
]
are s2I0.
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The complex normal random variable Y = T−1ABZ has covariance matrix
E
[
Y Y
T
]
= s2T−1AB
(
T−1AB
)T
= s2T−1A(BBT )A
(
T−1
)T
= s2T−1A(I1 + K1)AT
= s2T−1(AI1A + AK1A)T
= s2T−1(AA + AK1A)T
= s2T−1(mI1 −K1 + (AK1)A)T
= s2T−1(mI1 −K1 −K1A)T
= s2T−1(mI1 −K1 + K1)T
= s2T−1(mI1)T ,
where to obtain the second line we used Lemma 27, to obtain the fifth line we used
Lemma 28, to obtain the sixth line we used Lemma 30 and to obtain the seventh
line we used Lemma 32.
The complex normal random variable Y = T−1ABZ has relation matrix
E
[
Y Y T
]
= s2T−1AB
(
T−1AB
)T
= s2T−1A(BBT )A
(
T−1
)T
= s2T−1A(I1 + K1)AT
= s2T−1(AI1A + AK1A)T
= s2T−1(AA + AK1A)T
= s2T−1(mJ1 −K1 + (AK1)A)T
= s2T−1(mJ1 −K1 + (−K1A))T
= s2T−1(mJ1 −K1 + K1)T
= s2T−1m(J1T)
= s2T−1mT ,
where we again used Lemma 27 to obtain the second line and Lemma 30 for the
sixth line; and we used Lemma 29 to obtain the fifth line, Lemma 31 to obtain the
seventh line, and Lemma 33 to obtain the ninth line.
Thus we have Y = T−1ABZ ∼ CNm1(0,ms2I1,ms2I1) is a complex normal random
variable with identical covariance matrix and relation matrix which implies it is real-
valued. In particular it is a zero-mean spherically symmetric real-valued random
variable with component variance ms2, from which the result follows. 
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This chapter considers Ring-LWE-based Fully Homomorphic Encryption schemes.
We consider the choice of parameters for both security and correctness in this set-
ting. We focus on SEAL [93, 146, 58, 59, 60], a somewhat homomorphic encryption
library developed by Microsoft Research that implements the FV scheme of Fan and
Vercauteren [100]. This chapter is based on material presented in [146, 58, 59, 60].
7.1 Introduction to FHE
Several encryption schemes have the property that we can perform certain operations
on ciphertexts, without having access to the secret key, and have these operations
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translate meaningfully to operations on the underlying plaintexts. For example,
when we multiply two ElGamal [98] ciphertexts, we obtain a ciphertext encrypting
the product of the underlying plaintexts. As a second example, when we multiply
two Paillier [184] ciphertexts, we obtain a ciphertext encrypting the sum of the
underlying plaintexts.
Suppose an encryption scheme could be augmented with a homomorphic addition
operation that when applied to two input ciphertexts would produce an output ci-
phertext encrypting the sum of the underlying plaintexts of the input ciphertexts.
Suppose this same scheme could also be augmented with a homomorphic multiplica-
tion operation that when applied to two input ciphertexts would produce an output
ciphertext encrypting the product of the underlying plaintexts of the input cipher-
texts. This scheme would then enable arbitrary computation on encrypted data.
Constructing such a fully homomorphic encryption scheme was a longstanding open
problem since its proposal by Rivest et al. [198] in 1978. It was resolved in 2009 in
Gentry’s seminal work [107].
Homomorphic encryption enables a range of applications [174], which are typically
described in the client-server model. Homomorphic encryption allows a computa-
tionally weak client to outsource computation on their data to a powerful untrusted
server. The client encrypts their data and passes it to the server, along with a de-
scription of the computation they wish to perform. The server operates on the data
homomorphically without access to the secret key, and produces an output cipher-
text that is sent back to the client. The client decrypts this ciphertext to determine
the result of the computation. Since the server only sees an encryption of the data
and never has access to the secret key, the client can be assured that the server does
not learn anything about their data, or indeed the output of the computation.
Gentry’s original scheme [107] begins by specifying a somewhat homomorphic encryp-
tion scheme, in which ciphertexts have a noise, which grows during homomorphic
operations. Gentry then shows how to transform a somewhat homomorphic encryp-
tion scheme into a fully homomorphic encryption scheme using a technique known as
bootstrapping. A large number of somewhat homomorphic cryptosystems have since
been proposed in the literature, for example [41, 42, 44, 48, 47, 100, 112, 153, 212].
Several of these [42, 44, 47, 100] are based on Ring-LWE.
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In the remainder of this thesis we turn our attention to parameter selection in Ring-
LWE-based homomorphic encryption. We focus on the FV scheme of Fan and Ver-
cauteren [100], as implemented in SEAL [93] since version 2.0 [146, 58, 60]. We
describe this scheme in Section 7.1.1.
Ring-LWE-based FHE is particularly interesting from the perspective of selecting
parameters for security as certain attacks may be more effective in this setting.
For example, Albrecht [7] showed his improvements to the standard distinguishing
attack are very effective on the homomorphic encryption implementations HElib [121]
and SEAL v2.0 [146]. We discuss security of Ring-LWE-based FHE schemes in
Section 7.2.
A key issue in Ring-LWE based FHE is appropriate encoding (and corresponding
decoding) of raw data into the plaintext space, which is typically a polynomial ring.
The choice of plaintext space and encoder can affect the performance of the scheme
dramatically. We discuss encoding in detail in Section 7.3.
In homomorphic encryption the setting of parameters to ensure correctness is cru-
cial, due to the presence of noise in ciphertexts. The noise is typically small in a
fresh ciphertext, and grows as homomorphic evaluation operations are performed.
If the noise grows too large, then decryption fails, so a good understanding of the
noise growth behaviour of a homomorphic encryption scheme is essential to choose
appropriate parameters to ensure correctness. In schemes based on LWE and Ring-
LWE, this typically means choosing a very large q coupled with very narrow error
distributions, which is unusual and is another reason why studying the security is so
interesting. We study the noise growth behaviour in SEAL in Section 7.4 respectively.
We conclude by focussing in Sections 7.5 and 7.6 on parameter selection in SEAL
for security, performance and correctness.
7.1.1 SEAL: Implementing the FV scheme
In this section we introduce SEAL, a homomorphic encryption library developed by
Microsoft Research. In application settings such as bioinformatics, the potential user
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of homomorphic encryption is not necessarily an expert in cryptography. SEAL aims
to be accessible to this audience by providing a well-engineered and well-documented
homomorphic encryption library that would be equally easy to use both by experts
in cryptography and by those with little or no cryptographic background. SEAL was
first described by Dowlin et al. [93] and the current version at the time of writing is
SEAL v2.2 [60]. Since SEAL v2.0 [146] the underlying encryption scheme has been
the FV scheme of Fan and Vercauteren [100]. Previously the underlying encryption
scheme was YASHE, which was proposed by Bos et al. [41].
A number of other homomorphic encryption libraries exist, such as HElib [121, 122,
123], PALISADE [2], cuHE [85], TFHE [73] and HEAAN [69]. Homomorphic en-
cryption is implemented as an example application in the lattice library Λ ◦ λ [83].
Among these homomorphic encryption libraries, PALISADE is the only one that also
implements the FV scheme.
Other implementations of FV can be found. For example, an implementation of
FV in R is given by Aslett et al. [26]. FV-NFLlib [1] implements FV on top of
the ideal lattice library NFLlib [163]. Bajard et al. [31] propose a variant of FV
with adaptations to the homomorphic multiplication and decryption operations to
enable a Chinese Remainder Theorem representation of ciphertexts. They provide
an implementation, which is also based on NFLlib, and show that their variant is
faster than FV-NFLlib.
Among the most comparable projects to SEAL is the C++ library HElib, which
implements the BGV scheme [44]. The FV scheme and the BGV scheme are both
based on variants of Ring-LWE. Comparing the respective implementations of BGV
as in HElib and of FV as in SEAL would be a very interesting research direction,
but appears challenging. Many of the challenges relate to appropriate parameter
selection: on the security side, we want to ensure the underlying Ring-LWE instance
is similar; and at the same time we want to pick optimal parameters for performance.
We also want to ensure that we are able to correctly decrypt the output of the
homomorphic evaluation operation being computed.
Table 7.1 lists the parameters that the user in SEAL can select, as well as other
related parameters. For many parameters, default choices are provided for which
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Parameter Description Name in SEAL
(if applicable)
q Modulus in the ciphertext space coeff_modulus
(coefficient modulus)
t Modulus in the plaintext space plain_modulus
(plaintext modulus)
n A power of 2
xn + 1 The polynomial modulus poly_modulus
that specifies the ring R
R The ring Z[x]/(xn + 1)
Ra The ring Za[x]/(xn + 1),
that is, the ring R but with
coefficients reduced modulo a
w A base into which ciphertext
elements are decomposed
during relinearization
logw decomposition_bit_count
` There are `+ 1 = blogw qc+ 1
elements in each component
of each evaluation key
δ Expansion factor in the ring R
(δ ≤ n)
∆ Quotient on division of q by t,
that is, bq/tc
rt(q) Remainder on division of q by t,
that is, q = ∆t+ rt(q) for
0 ≤ rt(q) < t
χ Error distribution (a truncated
discrete Gaussian distribution)
σ Standard deviation of χ noise_standard_deviation
B Bound on the distribution χ noise_max_deviation
Table 7.1: Parameters in SEAL.
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performance is expected to be good. We discuss this in detail in Section 7.5. On
the other hand, the documentation available for HElib [121, 122, 123] does not make
clear how to select optimal parameters for performance, so it is difficult to assure
that a performance comparison with SEAL is fair.
A related issue is that the parameters that the user is required to select in SEAL,
and those that have a default value, are different to those in HElib. It is unclear
whether it is more reasonable to keep the default choices, which may have been
chosen for good performance; or to alter them, for example to choose parameters
that imply similar underlying Ring-LWE instances. For example, the default secret
key distribution in HElib is sparse by default [121], whereas this is not the case in
SEAL. This sparseness potentially enables more attacks, so could be seen as worse
for security. At the same time, the sparseness reduces noise growth and hence may
enable more homomorphic evaluation operations to be performed, so could be seen
as better for performance. We discuss the noise growth behaviour in SEAL in detail
in Section 7.4.
Costache and Smart [76] give a theoretical comparison of the FV, BGV, and YASHE
schemes as well as the LTV scheme [153, 91]. Several works compare two or more
different homomorphic encryption schemes for their suitability for a specific task.
For example, Lepoint and Naehrig [149] compare the use of FV and YASHE for the
homomorphic evaluation of SIMON [32]. Kim and Lauter [138] compare the use of
BGV and YASHE for computations on genomic data.
To the best of our knowledge, there are no works that compare two or more different
implementations of the same homomorphic encryption scheme, for a specific task or
otherwise. Such a comparison would be an interesting direction for future work. We
would expect that, for example, a comparison between SEAL and FV-NFLlib would
be challenging for similar reasons as discussed above for a comparison between SEAL
and HElib, such as ensuring that the choice of parameters gives optimal performance
for both implementations.
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7.1.1.1 The FV Scheme
We now give the definition of the FV scheme as originally presented by Fan and
Vercauteren [100] and in the following subsection we describe how SEAL implements
a slightly more general version of FV. The parameters n, t, q, w and ` are as described
in Table 7.1.
In FV the plaintext space is Rt = Zt[x]/(xn + 1), that is, polynomials of degree less
than n with coefficients modulo t. Ciphertexts in FV are pairs of polynomials in
Rq = Zq[x]/(xn + 1). We denote an FV ciphertext ct = (ct[0], ct[1]). In FV, the
secret key is sampled from the space R2 = {0, 1}[x]/(xn + 1).
Let λ be the security parameter. Let w be a base, and let `+1 = blogw qc+1 denote
the number of terms in the decomposition into base w of an integer in base q. We
will decompose polynomials in Rq into base-w components coefficient-wise, resulting
in `+ 1 polynomials.
The FV scheme contains the following algorithms, described below: SecretKeyGen,
PublicKeyGen, EvaluationKeyGen, Encrypt, Decrypt, Add, and Multiply.
• SecretKeyGen(λ): Sample s $← R2 and output
sk = s .
• PublicKeyGen(sk): Set s = sk, sample a $← Rq and e← χ. Output
pk = ([−(as+ e)]q, a) .
• EvaluationKeyGen(sk, w): for i ∈ {0, . . . , `}, sample ai $← Rq and ei ← χ.
Output
evk =
(
[−(ais+ ei) + wis2]q, ai
)
.
• Encrypt(pk,m): For the message m ∈ Rt. Let pk = (p0, p1), sample u $← R2
and e1, e2 ← χ. Output
ct = ([∆m+ p0u+ e1]q, [p1u+ e2]q) .
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• Decrypt(sk, ct): Set s = sk. Let ct[0] = c0 and ct[1] = c1. Output[⌊
t
q
[c0 + c1s]q
⌉]
t
.
• Add(ct0, ct1): Output
(ct0[0] + ct1[0], ct0[1] + ct1[1]) .
• Multiply(ct0, ct1): Compute
c0 =
[⌊
t
q
ct0[0]ct1[0]
⌉]
q
,
c1 =
[⌊
t
q
(ct0[0]ct1[1] + ct0[1]ct1[0])
⌉]
q
,
c2 =
[⌊
t
q
ct0[1]ct1[1]
⌉]
q
.
Let evk[i][0] = [−(ais + ei) + wis2]q and evk[i][1] = ai. Express c2 in base w
as c2 =
∑`
i=0 c
(i)
2 w
i. Set
c′0 = c0 +
∑`
i=0
evk[i][0]c(i)2 ,
c′1 = c1 +
∑`
i=0
evk[i][1]c(i)2 .
Output
(c′0, c
′
1) .
7.1.1.2 How SEAL differs from FV
Some operations in SEAL are done slightly differently, or in slightly more generality,
than in textbook FV. In this section we discuss these differences in detail.
Plaintext space and ciphertext space. Plaintext elements in SEAL are polyno-
mials in Rt, just as in textbook FV. Ciphertexts in SEAL are formed of polynomials
in Rq. In FV ciphertexts are formed of a pair of polynomials, so we say the ci-
phertext has size 2. In SEAL a ciphertext of any size greater than or equal 2 can
be valid. Note that because we consider well-formed ciphertexts of arbitrary length
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valid, we automatically lose the compactness property of homomorphic encryption.
Roughly speaking, compactness states that the decryption circuit should not depend
on ciphertexts, or on the function being evaluated [24].
Key Distribution. In textbook FV the secret key is a polynomial sampled uni-
formly from R2 so it is a polynomial with coefficients in {0, 1}. In SEAL the secret
key is sampled uniformly from R3 so it is a polynomial with coefficients in {−1, 0, 1}.
Decryption. A SEAL ciphertext ct = (c0, . . . , ck) is decrypted by computing[⌊
t
q
[ct(s)]q
⌉]
t
=
[⌊
t
q
[
c0 + · · ·+ cksk
]
q
⌉]
t
.
In textbook FV, decryption of a ciphertext ct = (c0, c1) involves computing c0 +c1s.
To make clear the generalisation of FV in SEAL it is convenient to think of each
ciphertext component as corresponding to a particular power of the secret key s, so
that the ci term is associated with si for 0 ≤ i ≤ k, as can be seen in the decryption
description. This generalises the situation in textbook FV, where the c0 term is
associated with s0 = 1 and the c1 term is associated with s1.
Multiplication. The Multiply function in FV has two steps: the first step com-
putes the intermediate object (c0, c1, c2), and the second step uses the evaluation
key to transform this into an output ciphertext (c′0, c′1). Such a transformation is
called relinearization. In fact, the intermediate object (c0, c1, c2) can be decrypted
using the generalised decryption formula above. Hence, the relinearization step is
not necessary for correctness of homomorphic multiplication and (c0, c1, c2) is a valid
ciphertext in SEAL. Nonetheless, (c0, c1, c2) is not a valid ciphertext in FV because
it is of size 3, and so relinearization is necessary in FV to obtain a valid ciphertext
(c′0, c′1) of size 2.
In SEAL, the two steps are decoupled. The Multiply function implements the first
step and outputs the intermediate ciphertext. The function Relinearize imple-
ments the second step and outputs a ciphertext of smaller size encrypting the same
underlying plaintext.
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Indeed SEAL allows a generalised version of the first step of multiplication so even
larger ciphertexts can be produced. In particular, let ct1 = (c0, c1, . . . , cj) and
ct2 = (d0, d1, . . . , dk) be two SEAL ciphertexts of sizes j + 1 and k+ 1, respectively.
Let the ciphertext ctmult output by Multiply(ct1, ct2), which is of size j + k + 1,
be denoted ctmult = (C0, C1, . . . , Cj+k). The polynomials Cm ∈ Rq are computed as
Cm =
[⌊
t
q
( ∑
r+s=m
crds
)⌉]
q
.
Relinearization. The goal of relinearization in FV is to decrease the size of the
ciphertext back to 2 after it has been increased by multiplication. Since ciphertexts in
SEAL are allowed to grow arbitrarily in size, and it is possible to decrypt a ciphertext
of any size at least 2, the relinearization operation is generalised accordingly. In
particular, the function Relinearize in SEAL takes an input ciphertext of any size k,
and appropriate evaluation keys, and outputs a ciphertext of size j where 2 ≤ j < k.
The output ciphertext encrypts the same message as the input ciphertext, but can
be decrypted using a smaller degree decryption function.
We give an intuition of the relinearization process in FV (the second step of the
multiplication operation) and explain how it is generalised in SEAL. Suppose we
have a size 3 ciphertext (c0, c1, c2) that we want to convert into a size 2 ciphertext
(c′0, c′1) that decrypts to the same result. Suppose we are also given a candidate
evaluation key pair evk =
(
[−(as+ e) + s2]q, a
)
, where a $← Rq, and e ← χ. Now
set c′0 = c0 +evk[0]c2, c′1 = c1 +evk[1]c2, and define the output to be the pair (c′0, c′1).
Interpreting this as a size 2 ciphertext and decrypting it yields
c′0 + c
′
1s = c0 + (−(as+ e) + s2)c2 + c1s+ ac2s = c0 + c1s+ c2s2 − ec2 .
This is almost what is needed, that is to say c0 + c1s + c2s2, except for the extra
additive term ec2. This can be considered as the noise incurred in relinearization: as
with any homomorphic evaluation operation, the relinearization process adds noise.
Unfortunately, since c2 has coefficients up to size q, the noise added may be extremely
large and thus we would expect decryption to fail.
Instead we use the classical solution of writing c2 in terms of some smaller base
w (see for example [48, 44, 42, 100]) as c2 =
∑`
i=0 c
(i)
2 w
i. Instead of having just
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one evaluation key pair as above, suppose we have ` + 1 such pairs constructed as
in Section 7.1.1.1. Then we can show that setting c′0 and c′1 as in Section 7.1.1.1
successfully replaces the large additive term that appeared in the naive approach
above with a term of size linear in w.
This same idea can be generalised to relinearizing a ciphertext of any size k + 1
to size k ≥ 2, as long as a generalised set of evaluation keys is generated in the
EvaluationKeyGen(sk, w) function. Namely, suppose we have a set of evaluation
keys evk2 (corresponding to s2), evk3 (corresponding to s3) and so on up to evkk
(corresponding to sk), each generated as in Section 7.1.1.1. Then relinearization
reduces the ciphertext (c0, c1, . . . , ck) in size by one, producing (c′0, c′1, . . . , c′k−1),
where
c′0 = c0 +
∑`
i=0
evkk[i][0]c
(i)
k ,
c′1 = c1 +
∑`
i=0
evkk[i][1]c
(i)
k ,
and c′j = cj for 2 ≤ j ≤ k−1. This process is then iterated as many times as desired.
Addition. We also need to generalise addition to be able to operate on ciphertexts
of any size and this is implemented with the function Add. Suppose we have two
SEAL ciphertexts ct1 = (c0, . . . , cj) and ct2 = (d0, . . . dk), encrypting plaintexts m1
and m2, respectively. Suppose without loss of generality that j ≤ k. Then
ctadd = ([c0 + d0]q, . . . , [cj + dj ]q, dj+1, . . . , dk)
encrypts [m1 +m2]t.
Other operations. SEAL implements various other homomorphic operations for
the user’s convenience. The function Sub implements subtraction, which is entirely
analogous to addition. Suppose ct1 = (c0, . . . , cj) and ct2 = (d0, . . . dk) encrypt
plaintexts m1 and m2, respectively. Suppose without loss of generality that j ≥ k.
Then
ctadd = ([c0 − d0]q, . . . , [ck − dk]q, cj+1, . . . , ck)
encrypts [m1 −m2]t.
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There is also a Negate function that takes as input a ciphertext ct = (c0, c1, . . . , ck)
encrypting a message m and outputs a ciphertext ctneg encrypting [−m]t. This is
obtained by simply negating each component ci for 0 ≤ i ≤ k, so
ctneg = (−c0,−c1, . . . ,−ck) .
Some applications of homomorphic encryption involve working with data that does
not need to be protected. For example, when wishing to homomorphically compute
a weighted average of some encrypted data, the weights themselves may be pub-
lic values. The functions AddPlain and MultiplyPlain give the user flexibility in
such scenarios as they can be used to improve performance over first encrypting the
plaintext and then performing the usual homomorphic addition or multiplication.
For example, a MultiplyPlain operation incurs much less noise to the ciphertext
than the usual Multiply.
Given as input a ciphertext ct = (c0, c1, . . . , ck) encrypting a plaintext polynomial
m and an unencrypted plaintext polynomial maddp, the function AddPlain outputs a
ciphertext ctaddp encrypting [m+maddp]t. To form this ciphertext, we multiplymaddp
by ∆ and add this to the c0 part of ct. That is, ctaddp = (c0 + ∆maddp, c1, . . . , ck).
Similarly the function MultiplyPlain takes as input a ciphertext ct = (c0, c1, . . . , ck)
encrypting a plaintext polynomialm and an unencrypted plaintext polynomialmmultp
and outputs a ciphertext ctmultp encrypting [m ·mmultp]t. This is obtained by mul-
tiplying each component ci in the ciphertext by mmultp for 0 ≤ i ≤ k; that is,
ctmultp = (mmultp · c0,mmultp · c1, . . . ,mmultp · ck).
7.2 Security of Ring-LWE based FHE schemes
The d-sample Decision Ring-LWE problem asks an adversary to distinguish whether
a set of d samples was chosen according to a Ring-LWE distribution or uniformly
at random. This reflects the situation in practice where an attacker would not nec-
essarily have unlimited access to an oracle generating samples. It has been shown
that solving the d-sample Decision Ring-LWE problem is equally as hard as solving
the (d − 1)-sample Decision Ring-LWE problem with the secret s instead sampled
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from the error distribution [159]. Furthermore, in the case of LWE (not Ring-LWE),
it is possible to argue [114] that the problem is equally as hard even if s is sam-
pled from almost any narrow distribution with enough entropy, such as the uniform
distribution on R2 or R3.
It can be shown that the FV scheme is IND-CPA secure [115] if Decision Ring-
LWE with binary secret is hard. For brevity we omit formal definitions of notions
of security, and refer the reader to [34]. Roughly speaking, for a scheme that is
IND-CPA secure, a ciphertext reveals nothing about the underlying plaintext to an
adversary who is given only the ciphertext and the corresponding public key. This is
exactly the property that we desire in the FHE setting, where we as the client wish to
outsource computation on our encrypted data to an untrusted server, in such a way
that the server cannot learn our data. A notion such as IND-CCA2 security [193],
while stronger, would not make sense in this context, since FHE ciphertexts are
malleable by design.
The FV scheme is an augmented version of an encryption scheme due to Lyuba-
shevsky et al. [157] and inherits its IND-CPA security from that scheme [100]. In
turn, SEAL inherits its IND-CPA security from FV.
We now sketch the security argument in the case of FV. The FV public key is
of the form (p0, p1) = (−(as + e), a), which is exactly a small secret Ring-LWE
sample, so the FV public key is indistinguishable from uniform assuming the hardness
of the 1-sample small secret variant of Decision Ring-LWE, and we can say the
first component p0 looks pseudorandom. Now consider the first element of a fresh
ciphertext pair, which is of the form ∆m + p0u + e1. This is formed of a term ∆m
depending deterministically on the message and a masking term p0u+ e1. Consider
the masking term: u is chosen from the Ring-LWE secret distribution, e1 is from the
Ring-LWE error distribution, and by the above argument, p0 looks pseudorandom.
So this the masking term is indistinguishable from a term of the form a1u+e1 where
a1 is uniformly random, which is exactly a small secret Ring-LWE sample. Thus the
first element of a ciphertext pair is a message term masked by something that looks
pseudorandom if Decision Ring-LWE is hard, and hence itself looks pseudorandom.
The second element of a ciphertext pair has the form au + e2 where a is uniformly
random, u is the same as before and e2 is from the Ring-LWE error distribution so
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n q α usvp dec dual
2048 260 − 214 + 1 8.0/q 125.9 127.4 118.8
4096 2116 − 218 + 1 8.0/q 127.5 125.5 121.7
8192 2226 − 226 + 1 8.0/q 130.0 126.3 124.1
16384 2435 − 233 + 1 8.0/q 135.3 130.7 130.2
32768 2889 − 254 − 253 − 252 + 1 8.0/q 132.8 127.6 127.4
Table 7.2: Default pairs (n, q) in SEAL v2.2 and estimated log of cost of attacks
according to commit f13c4a7 of the LWE estimator called with small secret and
m = 2n samples.
this is exactly a small secret Ring-LWE sample, and hence also looks pseudorandom if
small secret Decision Ring-LWE is hard. We conclude that the entire FV ciphertext is
indistinguishable from random assuming the hardness of the 3-sample Decision Ring-
LWE problem, or rather the hardness of the 2-sample small secret variant described
above, and the assumed uniformity of the public key.
The above argument omits the fact that we also need to make a weak circular security
assumption [100]. Observe that the evaluation keys, which must be made public so
that relinearization can be performed, are essentially maskings of powers of the secret
key. Indeed, we can think of the evaluation keys as an encryption of (some power of)
the secret key under the secret key itself. Unfortunately, it is not possible to argue
the uniformity of the evaluation key based on a Decision Ring-LWE assumption, so
we must make the extra assumption that the encryption scheme is secure even when
the adversary has access to all of the evaluation keys that may exist.
In order to try to pick parameters in Ring-LWE-based schemes (FHE or otherwise)
that we hope are sufficiently secure, we can choose parameters such that the un-
derlying Ring-LWE instance should be hard to solve according to known attacks.
Each Ring-LWE sample can be used to extract n LWE samples. To the best of
our knowledge, the most powerful attacks against d-sample Ring-LWE all work by
instead attacking the nd-sample LWE problem. When estimating the security of
a particular set of Ring-LWE parameters we therefore estimate the security of the
induced set of LWE parameters. To illustrate this, in Table 7.2 we estimate security
of the SEAL default parameters using commit f13c4a7 of the LWE estimator [6].
In FHE schemes based on Ring-LWE, q is typically very large, to enable several
homomorphic evaluation operations to be performed before the noise grows too large.
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An interesting question is to ask how large q can be before security is lost. The
hardness of LWE with q that is exponential in n has been considered in a number of
works [185, 45, 145]. Laine and Lauter [145] prove that when q is exponential in n,
Babai’s Nearest Plane algorithm with LLL as precomputation is sufficient to solve
LWE. They implement their attack and observe that performance is better in practice
than their proof would suggest. For example, they report that the secret key of an
LWE instance with n = 350, q = 252 and αq = 8 was recovered in approximately 4
days. For comparison, dual attack the same instance would take approximately 228
operations according to the LWE estimator (commit f13c4a7).
Bonnoron and Fontaine [38] ran similar experiments to [145]. They use a decoding
approach following [152], using enumeration, in a lattice obtained from an embedding
similar to that described by Bai and Galbraith [29]. A basis for the embedding is
constructed directly, then is reduced using LLL or BKZ with a small block size, such
as 20, and then the enumeration is performed. It is observed that Babai’s Nearest
Plane is sufficient for the enumeration step in the experiments, and it is argued that
this is because the error norm is so small compared to q. The authors conclude that
specialised variants of attacks on LWE could be more effective than generic ones in
the case of LWE-based FHE, where the error distribution is typically narrow and q
is typically large, and call for more research in this area.
7.3 Encoding in Ring-LWE based FHE schemes
In Ring-LWE-based FHE, plaintext elements are very often polynomials in Rt =
Zt[x]/(xn + 1) for an integer modulus t. A polynomial plaintext modulus x − b for
an integer b is considered for example by Chen et al. [61] in the context of the FV
scheme [100], but in this thesis we always use an integer plaintext modulus t.
Homomorphic operations on ciphertexts are reflected on the plaintext side as corre-
sponding (multiplication and addition) operations in the ring Rt. In typical appli-
cations of homomorphic encryption, the user would want to perform computations
not on polynomials but rather on data in the form of integers or rational numbers.
The solution is a suitable encoding map, converting the user’s inputs to polynomials
in Rt; and a corresponding decoding map, converting the resulting plaintext back
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into an integer or rational number. In order for the operations on ciphertexts to re-
flect the operations on the inputs, the encoding and decoding maps need to respect
addition and multiplication.
Encoding is a highly non-trivial task that has been considered in a number of
works [174, 93, 78, 69, 68, 77]. Clearly since Rt is finite, we can only hope to encode
and decode a finite subset of integers. If the subset is large enough, then this would
be sufficient in principle. However, there is still a problem, because no non-trivial
finite subset of Z is closed under additions and multiplications, so we have to settle
for something that does not respect an arbitrary number of homomorphic operations.
Therefore one must be aware of the type of encoding that is used, and perform only
operations such that the underlying plaintexts throughout the computation remain
possible to decode.
Perhaps the simplest possible encoder is the scalar encoder. Given an integer a,
we simply encode a as the constant polynomial a ∈ Rt. Obviously we can only
encode integers modulo t in this manner. Decoding amounts to reading the constant
coefficient of the polynomial and interpreting that as an integer. The problem is
that as soon as the underlying plaintext polynomial (constant) wraps around t at
any point during the computation, we are no longer doing integer arithmetic, but
rather modulo t arithmetic, and decoding might yield an unexpected result. This
means that a large t must be chosen, which can be undesirable for noise growth.
The scalar encoder would typically not be used in practice, since it is wasteful in the
sense that only one coefficient of a huge polynomial is used to encode and encrypt a
small integer. Other encoders, such as the ones we describe below, are more efficient
in the sense that many coefficients are used to encode each integer. This means that
the size of each nonzero coefficient is smaller than in the scalar encoder case, and
hence a smaller t can be chosen. Another method to encode data efficiently is so-
called batching [205, 43]. This technique, widely used in applications [108, 110, 86,
113], packs many integers into a single plaintext polynomial. The integers are each
encoded into a plaintext slot and are subsequently operated on in a Single Instruction
Multiple Data (SIMD) manner.
SEAL implements a family of encoders for encoding integers, parameterised by an
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integer base β ≥ 2. The case β = 2 corresponds to a binary encoding. The binary
encoder encodes an integer a in the range [−(2n− 1), 2n− 1] as follows. It forms the
binary expansion of |a|, say an−1 . . . a1a0, and outputs the polynomial
sign(a) · (an−1xn−1 + . . .+ a1x+ a0) .
Decoding amounts to evaluating a plaintext polynomial at x = 2. When β is set to
some integer larger than 2, instead of a binary expansion a balanced base-β expansion
is used [93]. Decoding is performed by evaluating a plaintext polynomial at x = β.
Note that with β = 3 the integer encoder provides encodings with equally small
norm as with β = 2, but with a more compact representation, as it does not waste
space in repeating the sign for each non-zero coefficient. Larger β provide even more
compact representations, but at the cost of increased coefficients. In most common
applications taking β = 2 or 3 is a good choice, and there is little difference between
these two. Recently, Cheon et al. [68] showed that using a Non-Adjacent Form
encoding [197] can be more efficient than a binary encoding or a balanced base-3
encoding.
There are two prominent methods to encode rational numbers. Each has similar
performance and limitations, but the methods are not equivalent [59]. One way
is to simply scale all rational numbers to integers, encode them using an integer
encoder as described above, and record the scaling factor in the clear as a part of
the ciphertext. We then need to keep track of the scaling during computations,
which results in some inefficiency. As an alternative, SEAL implements a family
of fractional encoders [93], where such bookkeeping is not required. This family of
encoders is again parameterised by a base β ≥ 2, the function of which is exactly
the same as in the integer case.
Example 1. We encode the rational number 5.8125 using a fractional encoder with
base β = 2 and polynomial modulus n. We first express it as a binary expansion
5.8125 = 22 + 20 + 2−1 + 2−2 + 2−4 .
The integer part is encoded as usual with the integer binary encoder, obtaining the
polynomial x2 + 1. For the fractional part, we add n to each exponent, and convert
it into a polynomial by changing the base 2 into the variable x. Finally, we flip the
signs of each of the terms, in this case obtaining −xn−1−xn−2−xn−4. The encoding
of the fractional part is then added to the encoding of the integer part, to obtain the
polynomial −xn−1 − xn−2 − xn−4 + x2 + 1.
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In Example 1, we were fortunate that the rational number 5.8125 had a finite binary
expansion. Often, the rational number we wish to encode does not have a finite base-
β expansion. In this case we allocate some number nf of the topmost coefficients
of the plaintext polynomial coefficients to correspond to the (truncated) fractional
part, and reserve the lowest ni coefficients for the integer part. Homomorphic mul-
tiplication will cause the fractional parts of the underlying plaintext polynomials to
expand down towards the integer part, and the integer part to expand up towards
the fractional part. The decoding process interprets the lowest ni coefficients as the
integer part, and all remaining n−ni coefficients as belonging to the fractional part,
so if the two parts become mixed, decoding will fail.
7.4 Noise growth in SEAL
In this section we give a thorough discussion of the noise growth behaviour of SEAL.
This section is based on, and extends, material presented in [146, 58, 60]. We consider
both the inherent noise and the invariant noise, which we now define.
Definition 32. Let ct = (c0, c1, . . . , ck) be a ciphertext encrypting the message m ∈
Rt. Its inherent noise is the unique polynomial vinh ∈ R with smallest infinity norm
such that, for some integer coefficient polynomial a,
ct(s) = c0 + c1s+ · · ·+ cksk = ∆m+ vinh + aq .
Definition 33. Let ct = (c0, c1, . . . , ck) be a ciphertext encrypting the messagem ∈ Rt.
Its invariant noise v is the polynomial with the smallest infinity norm such that, for
some integer coefficient polynomial a,
t
q
ct(s) =
t
q
(
c0 + c1s+ · · ·+ cksk
)
= m+ v + at .
The two definitions are related in the following way.
Lemma 34. Let ct be a ciphertext encrypting the message m ∈ Rt. The invariant
noise v and the inherent noise vinh are related as
v =
t
q
vinh − rt(q)
q
m .
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Proof: By definition of inherent noise,
t
q
ct(s) =
t
q
(
c0 + c1s+ · · ·+ cksk
)
=
t
q
(∆m+ vinh + aq)
=
q − rt(q)
q
m+
t
q
vinh + at ,
from which the result follows by definition of invariant noise. 
Once the (invariant or inherent) noise in a ciphertext becomes too large, the cipher-
text becomes impossible to decrypt even with the correct secret key. We now state
a bound on the inherent noise such that a ciphertext decrypts correctly.
Lemma 35. A SEAL ciphertext ct encrypting a message m can be correctly de-
crypted as long as the inherent noise satisfies ‖vinh‖ < q2t − t2 .
Proof: Consider a ciphertext ct = (c0, c1, . . . , ck) encrypting the message m under a
secret key s. By definition of inherent noise, for some integer coefficient polynomial
a, we have c0 + c1s+ · · ·+ cksk = ∆m+ vinh + aq. The decryption function outputs
m′ =
[⌊
t
q
[
c0 + c1s+ · · ·+ cksk
]
q
⌉]
t
=
[⌊
t
q
[∆m+ vinh + aq]q
⌉]
t
=
[⌊
t
q
(
∆m+ vinh + a
′q
)⌉]
t
=
[⌊
t
q
(∆m+ vinh) + a
′t
⌉]
t
=
[⌊
t
q
(∆m+ vinh)
⌉
+ a′t
]
t
=
[⌊
t
q
(∆m+ vinh)
⌉]
t
=
[⌊
q − rt(q)
q
m+
t
q
vinh
⌉]
t
=
[⌊
m− rt(q)
q
m+
t
q
vinh
⌉]
t
,
where a′ is an integer coefficient polynomial accounting for the reduction modulo q
in line 2. This means that m′ = m in Rt as long as the terms − rt(q)q m + tqvinh are
removed by the rounding. In other words, it suffices that∥∥∥∥−rt(q)q m+ tq vinh
∥∥∥∥ < 12 .
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If ‖vinh‖ < q2t − t2 then∥∥∥∥−rt(q)q m+ tq vinh
∥∥∥∥ ≤ ∥∥∥∥−rt(q)q m
∥∥∥∥+ ∥∥∥∥ tq vinh
∥∥∥∥
≤ rt(q)
q
‖m‖+ t
q
‖vinh‖
<
t
q
· t
2
+
t
q
(
q
2t
− t
2
)
≤ t
2
2q
+
1
2
− t
2
2q
=
1
2
.

It is stated in [58, 100] is that the bound ‖vinh‖ < ∆2 is sufficient for correct de-
cryption. A detailed proof of this claim was not given in [100]. In [58], the proof
only shows that it suffices to require ‖vinh‖ < q2t − t. It is subsequently shown that
q
2t − t < ∆2 , from which the bound ‖vinh‖ < ∆2 is incorrectly concluded. We note
that the requirement ‖vinh‖ < q2t − t is obtained using the bound ‖m‖ < t. Using
‖m‖ < t2 , the same bound ‖vinh‖ < q2t − t2 as in Lemma 35 would be obtained.
Note that q2t − t2 = q−t
2
2t <
q−t
2t ≤ q−rt(q)2t = ∆2 . Therefore proving the bound
‖vinh‖ ≤ ∆2 would be stronger than the maximal inherent noise bound proved in
Lemma 35. Using the same argument as Lemma 35 and the bound ‖vinh‖ < ∆2 , we
can only show ∥∥∥∥−rt(q)q m+ tq vinh
∥∥∥∥ ≤ rt(q)q ‖m‖+ tq‖vinh‖
≤ t
q
· t
2
+
t
q
· ∆
2
=
t2
2q
+
q − rt(q)
2q
=
1
2
+
t2 − rt(q)
2q
.
Since t
2−rt(q)
2q >
t2−t
2q > 0 this does not show that the rounding error is necessarily
bounded above by 12 .
In the proof of Lemma 35 the goal was to bound the inherent noise such that the
rounding procedure in decryption returns a message equal to m modulo t. If the
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inherent noise is too large, there will be a rounding error and hence decryption
failure. The invariant noise v captures this intuition, since v is exactly the term that
is rounded away in the decryption process. We see this in Lemma 36.
Lemma 36. A SEAL ciphertext ct encrypting a message m can be correctly de-
crypted if the invariant noise v satisfies ‖v‖ < 12 .
Proof: Let ct = (c0, c1, . . . , ck). By definition of invariant noise, for some polynomial
a with integer coefficients, we have tq
(
c0 + c1s+ · · ·+ cksk
)
= m+ v+ at. For some
polynomial A with integer coefficients, the decryption function computes:
em′ =
[⌊
t
q
[
c0 + c1s+ · · ·+ cksk
]
q
⌉]
t
=
[⌊
t
q
(
c0 + c1s+ · · ·+ cksk +Aq
)⌉]
t
=
[⌊
t
q
(
c0 + c1s+ · · ·+ cksk
)
+At
⌉]
t
=
[⌊
t
q
(
c0 + c1s+ · · ·+ cksk
)⌉
+At
]
t
=
[⌊
t
q
(
c0 + c1s+ · · ·+ cksk
)⌉]
t
= [bm+ v + ate]t
= [m+ bve]t .
Hence m′ = m modulo t if v is removed by the rounding. Therefore decryption is
successful if ‖v‖ < 12 . 
The invariant noise in a fresh ciphertext is typically an extremely small fraction,
which grows to at most 12 as homomorphic evaluation operations are performed.
Such small fractions could be difficult to work with. Moreover, in practice it is more
convenient to talk about how much invariant noise we have left, the invariant noise
budget, until decryption will fail. For example, this enables us to determine if we
expect to be able to perform another homomorphic multiplication.
Definition 34. Let v be the invariant noise of a ciphertext ct. Then the invariant
noise budget of ct is − log2(2‖v‖).
Lemma 37. A SEAL ciphertext ct encrypting a message m can be correctly de-
crypted if the invariant noise budget of ct is positive.
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As we have seen, if the noise in a ciphertext grows too large then it will not decrypt
correctly. It therefore is essential to understand the noise growth behaviour of ci-
phertexts under homomorphic evaluation operations in order to choose parameters
to ensure correctness. In the following subsections we will provide detailed bounds
for the inherent and invariant noise growth behaviour for various homomorphic eval-
uation operations possible in SEAL. Some of the inherent noise bounds involve rt(q),
the remainder of the coefficient modulus q on division by the plaintext modulus t.
Since 0 ≤ rt(q) < t, in the worst case this is equal to t−1 (where t may typically be 6
or 8 bits in size). However in practice the parameters q and t are often chosen so that
rt(q) = 1, and so the inherent noise growth will be smaller than the bounds would
suggest. We use the worst case bound for rt(q) to highlight the difference between
noise growth behaviour when comparing the inherent noise and the invariant noise.
However, in the derivations of the noise bounds it should be clear where the rt(q)
terms have been upper bounded by t and so we could produce tighter estimates for
the inherent noise growth behaviour if we knew the parameters would be such that
rt(q) was very small.
7.4.1 Inherent noise growth analysis
In this subsection we analyse the inherent noise growth behaviour for the various
homomorphic evaluation operations that can be performed in SEAL. We begin with
bounding the initial inherent noise in a fresh ciphertext.
Lemma 38 ([100]). Let ct = (c0, c1) be a fresh encryption of a message m ∈ Rt.
The inherent noise vinh in ct satisfies
‖vinh‖ ≤ B(1 + 2δ) .
Proof: Let ct = (c0, c1) be a fresh encryption of m under the public key pk =
(p0, p1) = ([−(as+ e)]q, a). Then, for some integer coefficient polynomials k0, k1, k2,
c0 + c1s = ∆m+ p0u+ e1 + k0q + p1us+ e2s+ k1qs
= ∆m+ (−as− e+ k2q)u+ e1 + aus+ e2s+ k0q + k1qs
= ∆m− asu− eu+ e1 + aus+ e2s+ q(k0 + k1s+ k2u)
= ∆m− eu+ e1 + e2s+ q(k0 + k1s+ k2u) ,
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so the inherent noise is
vinh = e1 − e · u+ e2 · s .
To bound ‖vinh‖, we use the fact that the error polynomials sampled from χ have
coefficients bounded by B, and that ‖s‖ = ‖u‖ = 1. Then
‖vinh‖ ≤ B(1 + 2δ) .

Next we consider the inherent noise growth in a homomorphic addition operation.
Lemma 39. Let ct1 = (c0, c1, . . . , cj) and ct2 = (d0, d1, . . . , dk) be two ciphertexts
encrypting m1,m2 ∈ Rt, and having inherent noises v1inh , v2inh, respectively. Then
the inherent noise vaddinh in their sum ctadd satisfies
‖vaddinh‖ ≤ t+ ‖v1inh‖+ ‖v2inh‖ .
Proof: By definition of homomorphic addition, ctadd encrypts [m1 + m2]t. Let
[m1 + m2]t = m1 + m2 + a0t for some integer coefficient polynomial a0. Note that
‖m1‖ < t/2 and ‖m2‖ < t/2 so ‖m1 +m2‖ ≤ ‖m1‖+ ‖m2‖ ≤ t. Therefore ‖a0‖ ≤ 1.
Suppose without loss of generality that max (j, k) = j, so that
ctadd = (c0 + d0, . . . , ck + dk, ck+1, . . . cj) .
By definition of inherent noise in ct1 and ct2, we have
ct1(s) = ∆m1 + v1inh + a1q ,
ct2(s) = ∆m2 + v2inh + a2q ,
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for some polynomials a1, a2 with integer coefficients, so
ctadd(s) = (c0 + d0) + (c1 + d1)s+ · · ·+ cjsj
= c0 + c1 · s+ . . . cj · sj + d0 + d1 · s+ · · ·+ dk · sk
= ct1(s) + ct2(s)
= ∆m1 + v1inh + a1q + ∆m2 + v2inh + a2q
= ∆(m1 +m2) + v1inh + v2inh + (a1 + a2)q
= ∆([m1 +m2]t − a0t) + v1inh + v2inh + (a1 + a2)q
= ∆[m1 +m2]t − a0∆t+ v1inh + v2inh + (a1 + a2)q
= ∆[m1 +m2]t − a0(q − rt(q)) + v1inh + v2inh + (a1 + a2)q
= ∆[m1 +m2]t + a0 · rt(q) + v1inh + v2inh + (a1 + a2 − a0)q .
Thus the inherent noise vaddinh = a0 ·rt(q)+v1inh+v2inh . We can bound this inherent
noise as follows:
‖vaddinh‖ = ‖a0 · rt(q) + v1inh + v2inh‖
≤ ‖a0‖ · rt(q) + ‖v1inh‖+ ‖v2inh‖
≤ rt(q) + ‖v1inh‖+ ‖v2inh‖
≤ t+ ‖v1inh‖+ ‖v2inh‖ .

Next we consider the inherent noise growth in homomorphic multiplication.
Lemma 40. Let ct1 = (x0, . . . , xj1) be a ciphertext of size j1 + 1 encrypting m1
with inherent noise v1inh, and let ct2 = (y0, . . . , yj2) be a ciphertext of size j2 + 1
encrypting m2 with inherent noise v2inh . Let J = j1 + j2. Then the inherent noise
vmultinh in the product ctmult satisfies the following bound:
vmultinh ≤
δJ+1 − 1
2(δ − 1) +
t2δ(δj2+1 + δj1+1 − 2)
4(δ − 1) +
2δt2 + t
2
− 3δt
3
4q
+
(
δt+
δt(δj2+1 − 1)
2(δ − 1) +
δt2
2q
)
‖V1‖+
(
δt+
δt(δj1+1 − 1)
2(δ − 1) +
δt2
2q
)
‖V2‖
+
(
3δt
q
)
‖V1‖ · ‖V2‖ .
Proof: By definition of homomorphic multiplication the output ciphertext ctmult =
(c0, . . . cJ) is of size J + 1 and, for 0 ≤ i ≤ J , ci is such that for some polynomials i
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with coefficients in
(−12 , 12], and for some polynomials Ai with integer coefficients:
ci =
[⌊
t
q
( ∑
k+l=i
xkyl
)⌉]
q
=
⌊
t
q
( ∑
k+l=i
xkyl
)⌉
+Aiq
=
t
q
( ∑
k+l=i
xkyl
)
+ i +Aiq .
For some polynomial b with integer coefficients, [m1m2]t = m1m2 + bt. We can
bound ‖b‖ as follows:
‖b‖ = 1
t
‖[m1m2]t −m1m2‖
≤ 1
t
(‖[m1m2]t‖+ ‖m1m2‖)
≤ 1
t
(
t
2
+ δ · ‖m1‖ · ‖m2‖
)
≤ 1
t
(
t
2
+ δ · t
2
· t
2
)
=
1
2
+
δt
4
.
By definition of inherent noise in ct1 and ct2, we have for some polynomials a1, a2
with integer coefficients:
ct1(s) = ∆m1 + v1inh + a1q
ct2(s) = ∆m2 + v2inh + a2q .
For the remainder of the proof, we denote by V1 the inherent noise v1inh of ct1 and
similarly we denote by V2 the inherent noise v2inh of ct2.
By writing ai = 1q (cti(s)−∆mi − Vi) and recalling that ‖s‖ ≤ 1 we can bound ‖ai‖
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as follows:
‖ai‖ =
∥∥∥∥1q (cti(s)−∆mi − Vi)
∥∥∥∥
≤ 1
q
(‖cti(s)‖+ ∆‖mi‖+ ‖Vi‖)
=
1
q
‖cti(s)‖+ ∆
q
‖mi‖+ 1
q
‖Vi‖
≤ 1
q
‖c0 + c1s+ · · ·+ cjisji‖+
∆t
2q
+
1
q
‖Vi‖
≤ 1
q
(‖c0‖+ δ · ‖c1‖ · ‖s‖+ · · ·+ δji · ‖cji‖ · ‖s‖ji)+ q − rt(q)2q + 1q ‖Vi‖
≤ 1
q
(q
2
+ δ · q
2
· 1 + · · ·+ δji · q
2
· 1
)
+
1
2
− rt(q)
2q
+
1
q
‖Vi‖
=
1
2
· (1 + δ + · · ·+ δji)+ 1
2
− rt(q)
2q
+
1
q
‖Vi‖
=
1
2
· δ
ji+1 − 1
δ − 1 +
1
2
− rt(q)
2q
+
1
q
‖Vi‖ .
We will also need the bound:∥∥∥∥∥
J∑
i=0
is
i
∥∥∥∥∥ = ‖0 + 1s+ 2s2 + · · ·+ JsJ‖
≤ ‖0‖+ ‖1s‖+ ‖2s2‖+ · · ·+ ‖JsJ‖
≤ ‖0‖+ δ‖1‖ · ‖s‖+ δ2‖2‖‖s‖2 + · · ·+ δJ‖J‖‖s‖J
≤ 1
2
+ δ · 1
2
· 1 + δ2 · 1
2
· 1 + · · ·+ δJ · 1
2
· 1
=
1
2
(
1 + δ + δ2 + · · ·+ δJ)
=
1
2
· δ
J+1 − 1
δ − 1 .
We can determine the inherent noise vmultinh in ctmult as follows:
ctmult(s) =
(
t
q
(x0y0) + 0 +A0q
)
+ · · ·+
(
t
q
(xj1yj2) + J +AJq
)
sJ
=
t
q
J∑
i=0
( ∑
k+l=i
xkyl
)
si +
J∑
i=0
is
i + q
J∑
i=0
Ais
i
=
t
q
(ct1(s) · ct2(s)) +
J∑
i=0
is
i + q
J∑
i=0
Ais
i
=
t
q
(∆m1 + V1 + a1q)(∆m2 + V2 + a2q) +
J∑
i=0
is
i + q
J∑
i=0
Ais
i
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=
t
q
(
∆2m1m2 + ∆m2V1 + ∆m1V2 + V1V2
)
+ ta1V2 + ta2V1
+ ∆t ·m1a2 + ∆t ·m2a1 +
J∑
i=0
is
i + q
(
J∑
i=0
Ais
i + ta1a2
)
=
∆t
q
·∆m1m2 + ∆t
q
m2V1 +
∆t
q
m1V2 +
t
q
V1V2 + ta1V2 + ta2V1
+ ∆t ·m1a2 + ∆t ·m2a1 +
J∑
i=0
is
i + q
(
J∑
i=0
Ais
i + ta1a2
)
=
q − rt(q)
q
·∆m1m2 + q − rt(q)
q
m2V1 +
q − rt(q)
q
m1V2 +
t
q
V1V2 + ta1V2
+ ta2V1 + (q − rt(q)) · (m1a2 +m2a1) +
J∑
i=0
is
i + q
(
J∑
i=0
Ais
i + ta1a2
)
= ∆m1m2 − ∆ · rt(q)
q
m1m2 +m2V1 − rt(q)
q
m2V1 +m1V2 − rt(q)
q
m1V2
+
t
q
V1V2 + ta1V2 + ta2V1 − rt(q)m1a2 − rt(q)m2a1 +
J∑
i=0
is
i
+ q
(
J∑
i=0
Ais
i + ta1a2 +m1a2 +m2a2
)
= ∆[m1m2]t −∆(bt)− ∆ · rt(q)
q
m1m2 +m2V1 − rt(q)
q
m2V1 +m1V2
− rt(q)
q
m1V2 +
t
q
V1V2 + ta1V2 + ta2V1 − rt(q)m1a2 − rt(q)m2a1
+
J∑
i=0
is
i + q
(
J∑
i=0
Ais
i + ta1a2 +m1a2 +m2a2
)
= ∆[m1m2]t − b(q − rt(q))− ∆ · rt(q)
q
m1m2 +m2V1 − rt(q)
q
m2V1
+m1V2 − rt(q)
q
m1V2 +
t
q
V1V2 + ta1V2 + ta2V1 − rt(q)m1a2
− rt(q)m2a1 +
J∑
i=0
is
i + q
(
J∑
i=0
Ais
i + ta1a2 +m1a2 +m2a2
)
= ∆[m1m2]t + rt(q) · b− ∆ · rt(q)
q
m1m2 +m2V1 − rt(q)
q
m2V1 +m1V2
− rt(q)
q
m1V2 +
t
q
V1V2 + ta1V2 + ta2V1 − rt(q)m1a2 − rt(q)m2a1
+
J∑
i=0
is
i + q
(
J∑
i=0
Ais
i + ta1a2 +m1a2 +m2a2 − b
)
.
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So the inherent noise vmultinh is given by
vmultinh = rt(q) · b−
∆ · rt(q)
q
m1m2 +m2V1 − rt(q)
q
m2V1 +m1V2 − rt(q)
q
m1V2
+
t
q
V1V2 + ta1V2 + ta2V1 − rt(q)m1a2 − rt(q)m2a1 +
J∑
i=0
is
i .
We can bound this inherent noise as follows:
‖vmultinh‖ ≤ rt(q) ‖b‖+
∆ · rt(q)
q
‖m1m2‖+ ‖m2V1‖+ rt(q)
q
‖m2V1‖+ ‖m1V2‖
+
rt(q)
q
‖m1V2‖+ t
q
‖V1V2‖+ t ‖a1V2‖+ t ‖a2V1‖+ rt(q) ‖m1a2‖
+ rt(q) ‖m2a1‖+
∥∥∥∥∥
J∑
i=0
is
i
∥∥∥∥∥
≤ rt(q) ‖b‖+ ∆ · rt(q) · δ
q
‖m1‖ · ‖m2‖+ δ ‖m2‖ · ‖V1‖
+
rt(q) · δ
q
‖m2‖ · ‖V1‖+ δ ‖m1‖ · ‖V2‖+ rt(q) · δ
q
‖m1‖ · ‖V2‖
+
δt
q
‖V1‖ · ‖V2‖+ δt ‖a1‖‖V2‖+ δt ‖a2‖ · ‖V1‖
+ δ · rt(q) ‖m1‖ · ‖a2‖+ δ · rt(q) ‖m2‖ · ‖a1‖+
∥∥∥∥∥
J∑
i=0
is
i
∥∥∥∥∥
≤ rt(q) ‖b‖+ ∆ · rt(q) · δ · t
2
4q
+
δt
2
‖V1‖+ rt(q) · δt
2q
· ‖V1‖+ δt
2
· ‖V2‖
+
rt(q) · δt
2q
· ‖V2‖+ δt
q
‖V1‖ · ‖V2‖+ δt ‖a1‖‖V2‖+ δt ‖a2‖ · ‖V1‖
+
δt · rt(q)
2
· ‖a2‖+ δt · rt(q)
2
‖a1‖+
∥∥∥∥∥
J∑
i=0
is
i
∥∥∥∥∥
≤ rt(q)
(
1
2
+
δt
4
)
+
∆ · rt(q) · δ · t2
4q
+
δt
2
‖V1‖+ rt(q) · δt
2q
· ‖V1‖
+
δt
2
· ‖V2‖+ rt(q) · δt
2q
· ‖V2‖+ δt
q
‖V1‖ · ‖V2‖
+ δt · ‖V2‖
(
δj1+1 − 1
2(δ − 1) +
1
2
− rt(q)
2q
+
1
q
‖V1‖
)
+ δt · ‖V1‖
(
δj2+1 − 1
2(δ − 1) +
1
2
− rt(q)
2q
+
1
q
‖V2‖
)
+
δt · rt(q)
2
·
(
δj2+1 − 1
2(δ − 1) +
1
2
− rt(q)
2q
+
1
q
‖V2‖
)
+
δt · rt(q)
2
(
δj1+1 − 1
2(δ − 1) +
1
2
− rt(q)
2q
+
1
q
‖V1‖
)
+
δJ+1 − 1
2(δ − 1)
≤ rt(q)
2
+
δt · rt(q)
4
+
∆ · rt(q) · δ · t2
4q
+
δt
2
‖V1‖+ rt(q) · δt
2q
· ‖V1‖
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+
δt
2
· ‖V2‖+ rt(q) · δt
2q
· ‖V2‖+ δt
q
‖V1‖ · ‖V2‖
+
(
t(δj1+2 − 1)
2(δ − 1) +
δt
2
− δt · rt(q)
2q
)
‖V2‖+ δt
q
‖V1‖ · ‖V2‖
+
(
t(δj2+2 − 1)
2(δ − 1) +
δt
2
− δt · rt(q)
2q
)
‖V1‖+ δt
q
‖V2‖ · ‖v1‖
+
δt · rt(q)
2
·
(
δj2+1 − 1
2(δ − 1) +
1
2
− rt(q)
2q
)
+
δt · rt(q)
2q
‖V2‖
+
δt · rt(q)
2
(
δj1+1 − 1
2(δ − 1) +
1
2
− rt(q)
2q
)
+
δt · rt(q)
2q
‖V1‖+ δ
J+1 − 1
2(δ − 1)
=
rt(q)
2
+
δt · rt(q)
4
+
∆ · rt(q) · δ · t2
4q
+
δJ+1 − 1
2(δ − 1)
+
δt · rt(q)
2
·
(
δj2+1 − 1
2(δ − 1) +
1
2
− rt(q)
2q
+
δj1+1 − 1
2(δ − 1) +
1
2
− rt(q)
2q
)
+
(
δt
2
+
rt(q) · δt
2q
+
t(δj2+2 − 1)
2(δ − 1) +
δt
2
− δt · rt(q)
2q
+
δt · rt(q)
2q
)
‖V1‖
+
(
δt
2
+
rt(q) · δt
2q
+
t(δj1+2 − 1)
2(δ − 1) +
δt
2
− δt · rt(q)
2q
+
δt · rt(q)
2q
)
‖V2‖
+
(
δt
q
+
δt
q
+
δt
q
)
‖V1‖ · ‖V2‖
=
(3δt+ 2) · rt(q)
4
+
rt(q) · δ · t(∆t− 2rt(q))
4q
+
δt · rt(q) · (δj2+1 + δj1+1 − 2)
4(δ − 1) +
δJ+1 − 1
2(δ − 1)
+
(
δt+
δt(δj2+1 − 1)
2(δ − 1) +
δt · rt(q)
2q
)
‖V1‖
+
(
δt+
δt(δj1+1 − 1)
2(δ − 1) +
δt · rt(q)
2q
)
‖V2‖
+
(
3δt
q
)
‖V1‖ · ‖V2‖
=
(3δt+ 2) · rt(q)
4
+
rt(q) · δ · t(q − 3rt(q))
4q
+
δt · rt(q) · (δj2+1 + δj1+1 − 2)
4(δ − 1) +
δJ+1 − 1
2(δ − 1)
+
(
δt+
δt(δj2+1 − 1)
2(δ − 1) +
δt · rt(q)
2q
)
‖V1‖
+
(
δt+
δt(δj1+1 − 1)
2(δ − 1) +
δt · rt(q)
2q
)
‖V2‖
+
(
3δt
q
)
‖V1‖ · ‖V2‖
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=
δJ+1 − 1
2(δ − 1) +
δt · rt(q) · (δj2+1 + δj1+1 − 2)
4(δ − 1) +
(2δt+ 1) · rt(q)
2
− 3δt · (rt(q))
2
4q
+
(
δt+
δt(δj2+1 − 1)
2(δ − 1) +
δt · rt(q)
2q
)
‖V1‖
+
(
δt+
δt(δj1+1 − 1)
2(δ − 1) +
δt · rt(q)
2q
)
‖V2‖+
(
3δt
q
)
‖V1‖ · ‖V2‖
≤ δ
J+1 − 1
2(δ − 1) +
t2δ(δj2+1 + δj1+1 − 2)
4(δ − 1) +
2δt2 + t
2
− 3δt
3
4q
+
(
δt+
δt(δj2+1 − 1)
2(δ − 1) +
δt2
2q
)
‖V1‖+
(
δt+
δt(δj1+1 − 1)
2(δ − 1) +
δt2
2q
)
‖V2‖
+
(
3δt
q
)
‖V1‖ · ‖V2‖ .

Next we consider the inherent noise growth in a relinearization operation.
Lemma 41. Let ct be a ciphertext of size M + 1 encrypting m, and having inherent
noise vinh. Let ctrelin of size N + 1 be the ciphertext encrypting m, obtained by the
relinearization of ct, where 2 ≤ N + 1 < M + 1. Then, the inherent noise vrelininh
in ctrelin is given by
vrelininh = vinh −
M−N−1∑
j=0
∑`
i=0
eM−j,ic
(i)
M−j ,
and can be bounded as
‖vrelininh‖ ≤ ‖vinh‖+ (M −N)(`+ 1)δBw .
Proof: The relinearization of a ciphertext from size M + 1 to size N + 1, where
2 ≤ N + 1 < M + 1, consists of M − N one-step relinearizations. In each step,
the current ciphertext (c0, c1, . . . , ck) is transformed to an intermediate ciphertext
ct′ = (c′0, c′1, . . . , c′k−1) using the appropriate evaluation key
evkk = [([−(ak,is+ ek,i) + wisk]q, ak,i) : i = 0, . . . , `] .
In the following step, ct′ becomes the current ciphertext, and so on until the inter-
mediate ciphertext produced is of size N + 1, at which point it is output as ctrelin.
By definition of the inherent noise in the input ciphertext we have for some integer
coefficient polynomial a:
ct(s) = c0 + c1s+ · · ·+ cMsM = ∆m+ vinh + aq .
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The input ciphertext is ct = (c0, c1, . . . , cM ), and after the first one-step relineariza-
tion, the intermediate ciphertext is ct′ = (c′0, c′1, . . . , c′M−1), where
c′0 = c0 +
∑`
i=0
evkM [i][0]c
(i)
M , c
′
1 = c1 +
∑`
i=0
evkM [i][1]c
(i)
M ,
and c′j = cj for 2 ≤ j ≤M − 1. So, for some polynomials ai with integer coefficients,
where 0 ≤ i ≤ `+ 1:
ct′(s) =
(
c′0 + c
′
1s+ . . .+ c
′
M−1s
M−1)
= c0 +
∑`
i=0
evkM [i][0]c
(i)
M +
(
c1 +
∑`
i=0
evkM [i][1]c
(i)
M
)
s+ . . .+ cM−1sM−1
=
∑`
i=0
evkM [i][0]c
(i)
M + s
∑`
i=0
evkM [i][1]c
(i)
M + c0 + c1s+ . . .+ cM−1s
M−1
= −
∑`
i=0
eM,ic
(i)
M +
∑`
i=0
aiqc
(i)
M + s
M
∑`
i=0
wic
(i)
M + c0 + c1s+ . . .+ cM−1s
M−1
= −
∑`
i=0
eM,ic
(i)
M +
∑`
i=0
aiqc
(i)
M + s
McM + c0 + c1s+ . . .+ cM−1sM−1
= −
∑`
i=0
eM,ic
(i)
M + c0 + c1s+ . . .+ cM−1s
M−1 + sMcM + q
∑`
i=0
aic
(i)
M
= −
∑`
i=0
eM,ic
(i)
M + ∆m+ vinh + aq + q
∑`
i=0
aic
(i)
M
= ∆m+ vinh −
∑`
i=0
eM,ic
(i)
M + q
(
a+
∑`
i=0
aic
(i)
M
)
.
Hence, the noise grows by an additive factor −∑`i=0 eM,ic(i)M in a one-step relineariza-
tion. Iterating this process, we find the noise after relinearization:
vrelininh = vinh −
M−N−1∑
j=0
∑`
i=0
eM−j,ic
(i)
M−j .
We can bound ‖vrelininh‖ as follows:
‖vrelininh‖ ≤ ‖vinh‖+
M−N−1∑
j=0
∑`
i=0
∥∥∥eM−j,ic(i)M−j∥∥∥
≤ ‖vinh‖+ (M −N)(`+ 1)δBw .

Next we consider the inherent noise growth in a plain multiplication operation.
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Lemma 42. Let ct be a ciphertext encrypting m1 with inherent noise vinh and let
m2 be a plaintext. Let ctmultp denote the ciphertext obtained by plain multiplication
of ct with m2. Then the inherent noise vmultpinh in ctmultp is bounded as follows:
‖vmultpinh‖ ≤
t
2
+
δt2
4
+
δt
2
‖vinh‖ .
Proof: By definition of plain multiplication, ctmultp = (m2c0,m2c1, . . . ,m2ck). For
some polynomial b with integer coefficients, [m1m2]t = m1m2 + bt. We can then
bound ‖b‖ as follows:
‖b‖ = 1
t
‖[m1m2]t −m1m2‖
≤ 1
t
(‖[m1m2]t‖+ ‖m1m2‖)
≤ 1
t
(
t
2
+ δ · ‖m1‖‖m2‖
)
=
1
2
+
δ
2
‖m2‖ .
We have for some polynomial a with integer coefficients:
ctmultp(s) = c0m2 + c1m2s+ · · ·+ ckm2sk
= m2ct(s)
= ∆m1m2 +m2vinh +m2aq
= ∆[m1m2]t − (∆t)b+m2vinh +m2aq
= ∆[m1m2]t + rt(q)b+m2vinh + (m2a− b)q .
Hence the inherent noise is
vmultpinh = rt(q) · b+m2 · vinh .
Thus we can bound this inherent noise as follows:
‖vmultpinh‖ = ‖rt(q) · b+m2 · vinh‖
≤ rt(q)
(
1
2
+
δ
2
‖m2‖
)
+ δ · ‖m2‖ · ‖vinh‖
≤ t
2
+
δt
2
‖m2‖+ δ · ‖m2‖ · ‖vinh‖
≤ t
2
+
δt2
4
+
δt
2
‖vinh‖ .

Next we consider the inherent noise growth in a plain addition operation.
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Lemma 43. Let ct = (c0, c1, . . . , ck) be a ciphertext encrypting m1 with inherent
noise vinh and m2 be a plaintext. Then the result ctaddp of plain addition of ct and
m2 has inherent noise vaddpinh such that
‖vaddpinh‖ ≤ ‖vinh‖+ t .
Proof: By definition of plain addition ctaddp = (c0 + ∆m2, c1, . . . , ck). By definition
of inherent noise, ct(s) = ∆m1 + vinh +aq for some integer coefficient polynomial a.
Let [m1 +m2]t = m1 +m2 + bt for some integer coefficient polynomial b. Note that
‖m1‖ < t/2 and ‖m2‖ < t/2 so ‖m1 +m2‖ ≤ ‖m1‖+ ‖m2‖ ≤ t. Therefore ‖b‖ ≤ 1,
and
ctaddp(s) = c0 + ∆m2 + c1s+ · · ·+ cksk
= ∆m2 + ∆m1 + vinh + aq
= ∆([m1 +m2]t − bt) + vinh + aq
= ∆[m1 +m2]t − (q − rt(q))b+ vinh + aq
= ∆[m1 +m2]t + rt(q) · b+ vinh + (a− b)q .
So the inherent noise vaddpinh = rt(q) · b + vinh. We can then bound this inherent
noise as follows:
‖vaddpinh‖ ≤ ‖vinh‖+ rt(q) · ‖b‖ ≤ ‖vinh‖+ t .

Next we consider the inherent noise growth in a homomorphic negation operation.
Lemma 44. Let ct be a ciphertext encrypting m with inherent noise vinh and ctneg
be its negation. The inherent noise vneginh in ctneginh satisfies
‖vneginh‖ ≤ ‖vinh‖+ t .
Proof: If ct = (c0, c1, . . . , ck) then its negation ctneg = (−c0,−c1, . . . ,−ck). Note
that since ‖m‖ < t/2 we have [−m]t = −m+ bt for ‖b‖ ≤ 1. Thus for some integer
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coefficient polynomial a:
ctneg(s) = −(c0, c1, . . . , ck)
= −(∆m+ vinh + aq)
= ∆([−m]t − bt)− vinh − aq
= ∆[−m]t − (q − rt(q))b− vinh − aq
= ∆[−m]t + rt(q) · b− vinh − (b+ a)q .
Hence the noise vneginh = rt(q) · b− vinh and can be bounded as
‖vneginh‖ = ‖rt(q) · b− vinh‖
≤ rt(q) · ‖b‖+ ‖vinh‖
≤ t+ ‖vinh‖ .

Finally, we consider the inherent noise growth in a homomorphic subtraction.
Lemma 45. Let ct1 = (c0, c1, . . . , cj) and ct2 = (d0, d1, . . . , dk) be two ciphertexts
encrypting m1,m2 ∈ Rt, and having inherent noises v1inh , v2inh, respectively. Then
the inherent noise vsubinh in the ciphertext ctsub obtained as the result of homomor-
phic subtraction satisfies
‖vsubinh‖ ≤ t+ ‖v1inh‖+ ‖v2inh‖ .
Proof: By definition of homomorphic subtraction, ctsub encrypts [m1 − m2]t. Let
[m1 −m2]t = m1 −m2 + a0t for some integer coefficient polynomial a0. Note that
‖m1‖ < t/2 and ‖m2‖ < t/2 so ‖m1 −m2‖ ≤ ‖m1‖+ ‖ −m2‖ = ‖m1‖+ ‖m2‖ ≤ t.
Therefore ‖a0‖ ≤ 1.
Suppose without loss of generality that max (j, k) = j, so that
ctsub = (c0 − d0, . . . , ck − dk, ck+1, . . . cj) .
By definition of inherent noise in ct1 and ct2, we have
ct1(s) = ∆m1 + v1inh + a1q ,
ct2(s) = ∆m2 + v2inh + a2q ,
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for some polynomials a1, a2 with integer coefficients, so
ctsub(s) = (c0 − d0) + (c1 − d1)s+ · · ·+ cjsj
= ct1(s)− ct2(s)
= ∆m1 + v1inh + a1q − (∆m2 + v2inh + a2q)
= ∆([m1 −m2]t − a0t) + v1inh − v2inh + (a1 − a2)q
= ∆[m1 −m2]t − (q − rt(q))a0 + v1inh − v2inh + (a1 − a2)q
= ∆[m1 −m2]t + rt(q) · a0 + v1inh − v2inh + (a1 − a2 − a0)q .
We conclude that the inherent noise vsubinh = rt(q) ·a0 +v1inh +v2inh . We can bound
this inherent noise as follows:
‖vsubinh‖ = ‖rt(q) · a0 + v1inh + v2inh‖
≤ rt(q) · ‖a0‖+ ‖v1inh‖+ ‖v2inh‖
≤ t+ ‖v1inh‖+ ‖v2inh‖ .

7.4.2 Invariant noise growth analysis
In this subsection we analyse the invariant noise growth behaviour for the various
homomorphic evaluation operations that can be performed in SEAL. We begin with
bounding the initial invariant noise in a fresh ciphertext.
Lemma 46. Let ct = (c0, c1) be a fresh encryption of a message m ∈ Rt. The
invariant noise v in ct satisfies
‖v‖ ≤ t
q
‖m‖+ tB
q
(2δ + 1) .
Proof: Let ct = (c0, c1) be a fresh encryption of m under the public key pk =
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(p0, p1) = ([−(as+ e)]q, a). Then, for some integer coefficient polynomials k0, k1, k,
t
q
(c0 + c1s) =
t
q
(∆m+ p0u+ e0 + k0q + p1us+ e1s+ k1qs)
=
q − rt(q)
q
m+
t
q
(p0u+ e1 + p1us+ e2s) + t(k1 + k2s)
= m+
t
q
(−rt(q)m
t
+ p0u+ e0 + p1us+ e1s
)
+ t(k0 + k1s)
= m+
t
q
(−rt(q)
t
m− eu+ e1 + e2s
)
+ t(k0 + k1s+ ku) ,
so the invariant noise is
v =
t
q
(−rt(q)
t
m− eu+ e1 + e2s
)
.
To bound ‖v‖, we use the fact that the error polynomials sampled from χ have
coefficients bounded by B, and that ‖s‖ = ‖u‖ = 1. Then
‖v‖ =
∥∥∥∥ tq
(−rt(q)
t
m− eu+ e1 + e2s
)∥∥∥∥
≤ rt(q)
q
‖m‖+ t
q
(δ‖e‖‖u‖+ ‖e1‖+ δ‖e2‖‖s‖)
≤ t
q
‖m‖+ tB
q
(2δ + 1) .

Next we consider the invariant noise growth in a homomorphic addition operation.
Lemma 47. Let ct1 = (c0, c1, . . . , cj) and ct2 = (d0, d1, . . . , dk) be two ciphertexts
encrypting m1,m2 ∈ Rt, and having noises v1, v2, respectively. Then the noise vadd
in their sum ctadd is vadd = v1 + v2, and satisfies
‖vadd‖ ≤ ‖v1‖+ ‖v2‖ .
Proof: By definition of homomorphic addition, ctadd encrypts [m1 + m2]t. Let
[m1 + m2]t = m1 + m2 + a0t for some integer coefficient polynomial a0. Suppose
without loss of generality that max (j, k) = j, so that
ctadd = (c0 + d0, . . . , ck + dk, ck+1, . . . cj) .
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By definition of invariant noise in ct1 and ct2, we have
t
q
ct1(s) = m1 + v1 + a1t ,
t
q
ct2(s) = m2 + v2 + a2t ,
for some polynomials a1, a2 with integer coefficients. Thus:
t
q
ctadd(s) =
t
q
(
(c0 + d0) + (c1 + d1)s+ · · ·+ cjsj
)
=
t
q
ct1(s) +
t
q
ct2(s)
= [m1 +m2]t + v1 + v2 + (a1 + a2 − a0)t ,
so the noise is vadd = v1 + v2, and ‖vadd‖ = ‖v1 + v2‖ ≤ ‖v1‖+ ‖v2‖. 
Next we consider the invariant noise growth in homomorphic multiplication.
Lemma 48. Let ct1 = (x0, . . . , xj1) be a ciphertext of size j1 + 1 encrypting m1
with noise v1, and let ct2 = (y0, . . . , yj2) be a ciphertext of size j2 + 1 encrypting m2
with noise v2. Then the invariant noise vmult in their product ctmult satisfies the
following bound:
‖vmult‖ ≤
[
δt+
(
δt
2
· δ
j2+1 − 1
δ − 1
)]
‖v1‖+
[
δt+
(
δt
2
· δ
j1+1 − 1
δ − 1
)]
‖v2‖
+ 3δ · ‖v1‖ · ‖v2‖+ t(δ
J+1 − 1)
2q(δ − 1) .
Proof: By the definition of homomorphic multiplication the product ciphertext
ctmult = (c0, . . . cJ) is of size J + 1 where J = j1 + j2 and, for 0 ≤ i ≤ J , ci is
such that for some polynomials i with coefficients in
(−12 , 12], and for some polyno-
mials Ai with integer coefficients,
ci =
[⌊
t
q
( ∑
k+l=i
xkyl
)⌉]
q
=
⌊
t
q
( ∑
k+l=i
xkyl
)⌉
+Aiq =
t
q
( ∑
k+l=i
xkyl
)
+ i +Aiq .
For some polynomial b with integer coefficients, [m1m2]t = m1m2 + bt. By definition
of invariant noise in ct1 and ct2, we have for some polynomials a1, a2 with integer
coefficients,
t
q
ct1(s) = m1 + v1 + a1t
t
q
ct2(s) = m2 + v2 + a2t .
155
7.4 Noise growth in SEAL
We write ait = tqcti(s)−mi − vi and using ‖s‖ ≤ 1 we note that:
‖ait‖ =
∥∥∥∥ tqcti(s)−mi − vi
∥∥∥∥
≤ t
q
‖cti(s)‖+ ‖mi‖+ ‖vi‖
≤ t
q
(‖c0‖+ δ · ‖c1‖ · ‖s‖+ · · ·+ δji · ‖cji‖ · ‖s‖ji)+ ‖mi‖+ ‖vi‖
≤ t
q
(q
2
+ δ · q
2
· 1 + · · ·+ δji · q
2
· 1
)
+ ‖mi‖+ ‖vi‖
=
t
2
· δ
ji+1 − 1
δ − 1 + ‖mi‖+ ‖vi‖ .
We can also bound:∥∥∥∥∥
J∑
i=0
is
i
∥∥∥∥∥ = ‖0 + 1s+ 2s2 + · · ·+ JsJ‖
≤ ‖0‖+ δ‖1‖ · ‖s‖+ δ2‖2‖‖s‖2 + · · ·+ δJ‖J‖‖s‖J
≤ 1
2
+ δ · 1
2
· 1 + δ2 · 1
2
· 1 + · · ·+ δJ · 1
2
· 1
=
1
2
· δ
J+1 − 1
δ − 1 .
We can determine the invariant noise vmult in ctmult as follows:
t
q
ctmult(s) =
t
q
(c0, . . . , cJ)(s)
=
t
q
[
t
q
J∑
i=0
( ∑
k+l=i
xkyl
)
si +
J∑
i=0
is
i
]
+
(
J∑
i=0
Ais
i
)
t
=
t
q
· t
q
[
J∑
i=0
( ∑
k+l=i
xkyl
)
si
]
+
t
q
J∑
i=0
is
i +
(
J∑
i=0
Ais
i
)
t
=
t
q
ct1(s) · t
q
ct2(s) +
t
q
J∑
i=0
is
i +
(
J∑
i=0
Ais
i
)
t
= (m1 + v1 + a1t)(m2 + v2 + a2t) +
t
q
J∑
i=0
is
i +
(
J∑
i=0
Ais
i
)
t
= [m1m2]t +m1v2 +m2v1 + v1v2 + v1a2t+ v2a1t+
t
q
J∑
i=0
is
i
+
(
m1a2 +m2a1 + a1a2t+
J∑
i=0
Ais
i − b
)
t .
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Thus the invariant noise is given by
vmult = m1v2 +m2v1 + v1v2 + v1a2t+ v2a1t+
t
q
j1+j2∑
i=0
is
i .
We can now bound the invariant noise as follows:
‖vmult‖ =
∥∥∥∥∥m1v2 +m2v1 + v1v2 + v1a2t+ v2a1t+ tq
J∑
i=0
is
i
∥∥∥∥∥
≤ ‖m1v2‖+ ‖m2v1‖+ ‖v1v2‖+ ‖v1a2t‖+ ‖v2a1t‖+ t
q
∥∥∥∥∥
J∑
i=0
is
i
∥∥∥∥∥
≤ δ · t
2
· ‖v2‖+ δ · t
2
· ‖v1‖+ δ · ‖v1‖ · ‖v2‖
+ δ · ‖v1‖ ·
(
t
2
· δ
j2+1 − 1
δ − 1 + ‖m2‖+ ‖v2‖
)
+ δ · ‖v2‖ ·
(
t
2
· δ
j1+1 − 1
δ − 1 + ‖m1‖+ ‖v1‖
)
+
t
q
· 1
2
· δ
J+1 − 1
δ − 1
≤ δ · t
2
· ‖v2‖+ δ · t
2
· ‖v1‖+ δ · ‖v1‖ · ‖v2‖+ t
q
· 1
2
· δ
J+1 − 1
δ − 1
+ δ · ‖v1‖ ·
(
t
2
· δ
j2+1 − 1
δ − 1
)
+ δ · ‖v1‖ · ‖m2‖+ δ · ‖v1‖ · ‖v2‖
+ δ · ‖v2‖ ·
(
t
2
· δ
j1+1 − 1
δ − 1
)
+ δ · ‖v2‖ · ‖m1‖+ δ · ‖v2‖ · ‖v1‖
≤
[
δt+
(
δt
2
· δ
j2+1 − 1
δ − 1
)]
‖v1‖+
[
δt+
(
δt
2
· δ
j1+1 − 1
δ − 1
)]
‖v2‖
+ 3δ · ‖v1‖ · ‖v2‖+ t(δ
J+1 − 1)
2q(δ − 1) .

Next we consider the invariant noise growth in a relinearization operation.
Lemma 49. Let ct be a ciphertext of size M + 1 encrypting m, and having noise v.
Let ctrelin of size N+1 be the ciphertext encrypting m, obtained by the relinearization
of ct, where 2 ≤ N + 1 < M + 1. Then, the noise vrelin in ctrelin is given by
vrelin = v − t
q
M−N−1∑
j=0
∑`
i=0
e(M−j),ic
(i)
M−j ,
and can be bounded as
‖vrelin‖ ≤ ‖v‖+ t
q
(M −N)δB(`+ 1)w .
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Proof: The relinearization of a ciphertext from size M + 1 to size N + 1, where
2 ≤ N + 1 < M + 1, consists of M − N one-step relinearizations. In each step,
the current ciphertext (c0, c1, . . . , ck) is transformed to an intermediate ciphertext
ct′ = (c′0, c′1, . . . , c′k−1) using the appropriate evaluation key
evkk = [([−(ak,is+ ek,i) + wisk]q, ak,i) : i = 0, . . . , `] .
In the following step, ct′ becomes the current ciphertext, and so on until the inter-
mediate ciphertext produced is of size N + 1, at which point it is output as ctrelin.
By definition of the invariant noise in the input ciphertext, we have for some integer
coefficient polynomial a`+1,
t
q
ct(s) =
t
q
(
c0 + c1s+ · · ·+ cMsM
)
= m+ v + a`+1t .
The input ciphertext is ct = (c0, c1, . . . , cM ), and after the first one-step relineariza-
tion, the intermediate ciphertext is ct′ = (c′0, c′1, . . . , c′M−1), where
c′0 = c0 +
∑`
i=0
evkM [i][0]c
(i)
M , c
′
1 = c1 +
∑`
i=0
evkM [i][1]c
(i)
M ,
and c′j = cj for 2 ≤ j ≤M − 1. So, for some polynomials ai with integer coefficients,
where 0 ≤ i ≤ `+ 1,
t
q
ct′(s) =
t
q
(
c′0 + c
′
1s+ . . .+ c
′
M−1s
M−1)
=
t
q
[
c0 +
∑`
i=0
evkM [i][0]c
(i)
M +
(
c1 +
∑`
i=0
evkM [i][1]c
(i)
M
)
s+ . . .+ cM−1sM−1
]
=
t
q
(∑`
i=0
evkM [i][0]c
(i)
M + s
∑`
i=0
evkM [i][1]c
(i)
M
)
+
t
q
(
c0 + c1s+ . . .+ cM−1sM−1
)
=
t
q
(
−
∑`
i=0
eM,ic
(i)
M +
∑`
i=0
aiqc
(i)
M + s
M
∑`
i=0
wic
(i)
M
)
+
t
q
(
c0 + c1s+ . . .+ cM−1sM−1
)
=
t
q
(
−
∑`
i=0
eM,ic
(i)
M +
∑`
i=0
aiqc
(i)
M
)
+
t
q
sMcM +
t
q
(
c0 + c1s+ . . .+ cM−1sM−1
)
= − t
q
∑`
i=0
eM,ic
(i)
M +
t
q
(
c0 + c1s+ . . .+ cM−1sM−1 + cMsM
)
+ t
∑`
i=0
aic
(i)
M
= m+ v − t
q
∑`
i=0
eM,ic
(i)
M +
(
a`+1 +
∑`
i=0
aic
(i)
M
)
t .
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Hence, the noise grows by an additive factor − tq
∑`
i=0 eM,ic
(i)
M in a one-step relin-
earization. Iterating this process, we find the noise after relinearization:
vrelin = v − t
q
M−N−1∑
j=0
∑`
i=0
eM−j,ic
(i)
M−j .
We can then bound ‖vrelin‖ as follows:
‖vrelin‖ =
∥∥∥∥∥∥v − tq
M−N−1∑
j=0
∑`
i=0
eM−j,ic
(i)
M−j
∥∥∥∥∥∥
≤ ‖v‖+ t
q
M−N−1∑
j=0
∑`
i=0
∥∥∥eM−j,ic(i)M−j∥∥∥
≤ ‖v‖+ t
q
(`+ 1)(M −N)δBw .

Next we consider the invariant noise growth in a plain multiplication operation.
Lemma 50. Let ct be a ciphertext encrypting m1 with invariant noise v, and let
m2 be a plaintext polynomial. Let ctmultp denote the ciphertext obtained by plain
multiplication of ct with m2. Then the invariant noise in ctmultp is vmultp = m2v,
and we have the bound
‖vpmult‖ ≤ δt
2
‖v‖ .
Proof: By definition the ciphertext ctmultp = (m2c0, . . . ,m2ck). For some polyno-
mial b with integer coefficients, [m1m2]t = m1m2 + bt. Hence for some polynomial a
with integer coefficients:
t
q
ctmultp(s) =
t
q
(
m2c0 +m2c1s+ · · ·+m2cksk
)
= m2
t
q
ct(s)
= m2(m1 + v + at)
= [m1m2]t +m2v + (m2a− b)t .
Hence the invariant noise is vmultp = m2v and we have:
‖vmultp‖ = ‖m2v‖ ≤ δ · ‖m2‖ · ‖v‖ ,
from which the claimed bound follows. 
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Next we consider the invariant noise growth in a plain addition operation.
Lemma 51. Let ct be a ciphertext encrypting m1 with invariant noise v, and let m2
be a plaintext polynomial. Let ctaddp denote the ciphertext obtained by plain addition
of ct with m2. Then the invariant noise vaddp in ctaddp can be bounded as
‖vpadd‖ ≤ ‖v‖+ t
2
q
.
Proof: By definition of plain addition we have ctaddp = (c0 + ∆m2, c1, . . . , ck). For
some polynomial b with integer coefficients, [m1 + m2]t = m1 + m2 + bt. Hence for
some polynomial a with integer coefficients:
t
q
ctaddp(s) =
t
q
(
c0 + ∆m2 + c1s+ · · ·+ cksk
)
=
∆t
q
m2 +
t
q
ct(s)
=
q − rt(q)
q
m2 +m1 + v + at
= [m1 +m2]t + v − rt(q)
q
m2 + (a− b)t
Hence the noise is vaddp = v − rt(q)q m2 and this can be bounded as:
‖vaddp‖ ≤ ‖v‖+ rt(q)
q
‖m2‖
≤ ‖v‖+ rt(q) · t
q
≤ ‖v‖+ t
2
q
.

Next we consider the invariant noise growth in a homomorphic negation operation.
Lemma 52. Let ct be a ciphertext encrypting m with invariant noise v and ctneg
be its negation. The invariant noise vneg in ctneg is given by vneg = −v and we have
‖vneg‖ = ‖v‖ .
Proof: If ct = (c0, c1, . . . , ck) then its negation ctneg = (−c0,−c1, . . . ,−ck). Note
that since ‖m‖ < t/2 we have [−m]t = −m + bt for ‖b‖ ≤ 1. So for some integer
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coefficient polynomial a:
t
q
ctneg(s) =
t
q
(−(c0, c1, . . . , ck))
= − t
q
ct(s)
= −m− v − at
= [−m]t − v − (b+ a)t
Hence the noise vneg in ctneg is −v and ‖vneg‖ = ‖v‖. 
Finally, we consider the invariant noise growth in a homomorphic subtraction.
Lemma 53. Let ct1 = (c0, c1, . . . , cj) and ct2 = (d0, d1, . . . , dk) be two ciphertexts
encrypting m1, m2 and having invariant noises v1, v2 respectively. The invariant
noise vsub in their difference ctsub is given by vsub = v1 − v2 and is bounded as
‖vsub‖ ≤ ‖v1‖+ ‖v2‖.
Proof: By definition of homomorphic subtraction, ctsub encrypts [m1 − m2]t. Let
[m1 − m2]t = m1 − m2 + a0t for some integer coefficient polynomial a0. Suppose
without loss of generality that max (j, k) = j, so that
ctsub = (c0 − d0, . . . , ck − dk, ck+1, . . . cj) .
By definition of invariant noise in ct1 and ct2, we have
t
q
ct1(s) = m1 + v1 + a1t ,
t
q
ct2(s) = m2 + v2 + a2t ,
for some polynomials a1, a2 with integer coefficients. Thus:
t
q
ctsub(s) =
t
q
(
(c0 − d0) + (c1 − d1)s+ · · ·+ cjsj
)
=
t
q
ct1(s)− t
q
ct2(s)
= [m1 −m2]t + v1 − v2 + (a1 − a2 + a0)t ,
so the invariant noise is vsub = v1 − v2, and is bounded as
‖vsub‖ = ‖v1 − v2‖ ≤ ‖v1‖+ ‖v2‖ .

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7.4.3 Discussion
In Table 7.3 we summarise the inherent and invariant noise bounds presented in
the previous subsections. We have seen that many of the bounds involve the ring
expansion factor δ. In general δ can be bounded as δ ≤ n and so the strictest
noise bounds should use δ = n. However, in certain situations we can estimate
more accurately the value of δ and obtain tighter upper bounds on the noise growth
behaviour. For example, we typically do not know the underlying plaintexts of the
inputs of homomorphic evaluation operations. However, when performing a plain
multiplication, we know the plaintext m2 that forms part of the product, and in
particular we know the number N of nonzero coefficients it has and its norm ‖m2‖.
Although at worst N = n, in some cases N is much less than n, for example if the
plaintext is the binary encoding of a small integer. The inherent noise vmultpinh in
the output of a plain multiplication of a ciphertext with inherent noise vinh and a
plaintext m2 contains a term m2 ·vinh, and similarly the invariant noise vmultp in the
output of a plain multiplication of a ciphertext with invariant noise v and a plaintext
m2 is vmultp = m2 · v. In both cases when considering the noise growth we need to
bound a term ‖m2 · v‖. Since m2 has N nonzero coefficients, the maximal coefficient
of m2 · v is at worst formed of N cross terms each of size equal to the maximal
coefficient of m2 multiplied by the maximal coefficient of v. So we can estimate that
the expansion factor δ when multiplying by the particular element m2 is at most N .
This means we can bound ‖m2 · v‖ ≤ N · ‖m2‖ · ‖v‖ and so we estimate δ = N .
From Table 7.3 we conclude that the invariant noise is both more natural, and more
convenient to use, than the inherent noise. For example, we can see that the invariant
noise growth bounds have fewer terms and hence are simpler than their inherent noise
analogues. This can be explained because the definition of inherent noise does not
capture all parts of the ciphertext that could cause rounding error. As we saw in the
proof of Lemma 35, what we need to bound to ensure correctness is
∥∥∥− rt(q)t m+ vinh∥∥∥.
This is the critical quantity used by Costache and Smart [76]. The inherent noise does
not take into account the − rt(q)t m term in the critical quantity. In turn, this term
introduces additional cross terms in multiplication and plain multiplication which
explain why these inherent noise bounds especially are more complicated than their
invariant noise analogues. From Table 7.3 it is clear which terms in the inherent
noise bounds correspond with a term in the analogous invariant noise bound and
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Inherent noise bound Invariant noise bound
Initial B(1 + 2δ) tq‖m‖+ tqB(1 + 2δ)
Addition ‖v1inh‖+ ‖v2inh‖+ t ‖v1‖+ ‖v2‖
Multiplication + δ
J+1−1
2(δ−1)
t(δJ+1−1)
2q(δ−1)
+
(
δt+ δt(δ
j2+1−1)
2(δ−1) +
δt2
2q
)
‖v1inh‖ +
(
δt+ δt(δ
j2+1−1)
2(δ−1)
)
‖v1‖
+
(
δt+ δt(δ
j1+1−1)
2(δ−1) +
δt2
2q
)
‖v2inh‖ +
(
δt+ δt(δ
j1+1−1)
2(δ−1)
)
‖v2‖
+
(
3δt
q
)
‖v1inh‖ · ‖v2inh‖ +3δ · ‖v1‖ · ‖v2‖
2δt2+t
2 − 3δt
3
4q +
t2δ(δj2+1+δj1+1−2)
4(δ−1)
Relinearization ‖vinh‖+ (M −N)(`+ 1)δBw ‖v‖+ tq (M −N)(`+ 1)δBw
Multiply plain δt2 ‖vinh‖+ t2 + δt
2
4
δt
2 ‖v‖
Add plain ‖vinh‖+ t ‖v‖+ t2q
Negation ‖vinh‖+ t ‖v‖
Subtraction ‖v1inh‖+ ‖v2inh‖+ t ‖v1‖+ ‖v2‖
Table 7.3: Summary of bounds for the growth of invariant and inherent noise in
ciphertexts after various homomorphic operations in SEAL.
which are extra terms arising from this − rt(q)t m term. In all cases, except for the
initial noise in a fresh ciphertext, these extra terms are found in the inherent noise
bounds rather than the invariant noise bounds.
By definition the invariant noise captures all parts of the ciphertext that could cause
rounding error. This can also be seen from the fact that the critical quantity is a
scaling of the invariant noise (see Lemma 34). We believe this makes the invariant
noise a very intuitive definition of noise. This intuition carries into the noise bounds.
For example, the invariant noise after addition is bounded by the sum of the input
noises, and the invariant noise after negation is the negation of the input noise.
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7.4.4 Heuristic noise growth estimates
The strict upper bounds for the noise growth presented in Sections 7.4.1 and 7.4.2
result in poor practical estimates. Indeed, to implement noise growth estimates
to enable automatic parameter selection functionality in SEAL 2.0 and SEAL v2.1
average-case heuristic inherent noise growth estimates were used. In this section we
give a heuristic noise growth analysis, similar to that implemented in SEAL v2.2,
using the invariant noise. These heuristic noise bounds are analogous to the estimates
presented by Costache and Smart [76] using the critical quantity and are derived in
the same way.
The heuristic upper bounds are obtained by using the canonical embedding norm
‖·‖can, as used in [76, 110, 108], instead of the usual infinity norm ‖ · ‖ as used in
Sections 7.4.1 and 7.4.2. The canonical embedding norm of an element a ∈ K is
defined to be the infinity norm of the canonical embedding of a, so ‖a‖can = ‖σ(a)‖.
We will use the following properties of the canonical embedding norm. For any
polynomial a we have ‖a‖ ≤ ‖a‖can ≤ ‖a‖1 and for any polynomials a, b we have
‖ab‖can ≤ ‖a‖can ‖b‖can. Since the usual infinity norm is always bounded from above
by the canonical norm, and we require ‖v‖ < 12 for correctness, it suffices to ensure
that ‖v‖can ≤ 12 .
A polynomial e drawn from the SEAL error distribution, which has standard devi-
ation σ, is such the canonical embedding of e has standard deviation σe = σ
√
n. A
polynomial s drawn from the SEAL secret key distribution is such that the canonical
embedding of s has standard deviation σs =
√
2
3n. A polynomial c
(i) distributed
uniformly in [−w2 , w2 ] is such that the canonical embedding of c(i) has standard de-
viation σc(i) =
w
√
n√
12
and similarly a polynomial c distributed uniformly in [− q2 , q2 ] is
such that the canonical embedding of c has standard deviation σc =
q
√
n√
12
. A poly-
nomial ε distributed uniformly in [−12 , 12 ] is such that the canonical embedding of ε
has standard deviation σε =
√
n√
12
.
Following Costache and Smart [76] we use the following estimates: ‖a‖can ≤ 6σa and
‖ab‖can ≤ 16σa σb and ‖abc‖can ≤ 40σa σb σc. This is sufficient to present the bounds
below, but multiplication is not presented for ciphertexts of size larger than 2 as this
would require bounding the canonical norm of a product of four or more polynomials.
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We could easily produce a similar bound to those presented in [76] for the canonical
norm of the product of four elements in terms of the standard deviations of the four
elements (and so on), and generalise the multiplication heuristic accordingly.
We first give a heuristic bound for the initial invariant noise in a fresh ciphertext.
Lemma 54. Let ct be a fresh encryption of a message m ∈ Rt. Let Nm be an upper
bound on the number of nonzero terms in the polynomial m. With high probability,
the invariant noise v in ct satisfies
‖v‖can ≤ rt(q)
q
·Nm · ‖m‖+ t
q
· 2σ
(
16
√
2√
3
n+ 3
√
n
)
.
Proof: By Lemma 46, the invariant noise in a fresh ciphertext is
v =
t
q
(−rt(q)
t
m− eu+ e1 + e2s
)
.
So we can bound:
‖v‖can ≤ rt(q)
q
‖m‖can + t
q
‖eu+ e1 + e2s‖can
≤ rt(q)
q
‖m‖1 +
t
q
(‖eu‖can + ‖e1‖can + ‖e2s‖can)
≤ rt(q)
q
·Nm · ‖m‖+ t
q
(
16 · σ√n ·
√
2√
3
√
n+ 6σ
√
n+ 16 · σ√n ·
√
2√
3
√
n
)
≤ rt(q)
q
·Nm · ‖m‖+ t
q
· 2σ
(
16
√
2√
3
n+ 3
√
n
)
.

Next we give a bound for the invariant noise in homomorphic addition.
Lemma 55. Let ct1 and ct2 be two ciphertexts encrypting m1,m2 ∈ Rt, and having
invariant noises v1, v2, respectively. Then the invariant noise vadd in their sum ctadd
satisfies ‖vadd‖can ≤ ‖v1‖can + ‖v2‖can.
Proof: By Lemma 47 the invariant noise vadd = v1 + v2. Hence
‖vadd‖can = ‖v1 + v2‖can ≤ ‖v1‖can + ‖v2‖can .

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Next we give a heuristic bound for the invariant noise in homomorphic multiplication.
Lemma 56. Let ct1 be a ciphertext of size 2 encrypting m1 with invariant noise v1,
and let ct2 be a ciphertext of size 2 encrypting m2 with invariant noise v2. Let Nm1
and Nm2 be upper bounds on the number of nonzero terms in the polynomials m1
and m2, respectively. Then with high probability, the invariant noise vmult in the
product ctmult satisfies the following bound:
‖vmult‖can ≤ 3 ‖v1‖can ‖v2‖can + 2t
√
n
q
√
12
(
3 +
8
√
2√
3
√
n+
40
3
n
)
(
2Nm2‖m2‖+
2t
√
n√
12
(
3 +
8
√
2√
3
√
n+
40
3
n
))
‖v1‖can(
2Nm1‖m1‖+
2t
√
n√
12
(
3 +
8
√
2√
3
√
n+
40
3
n
))
‖v2‖can
Proof: By definition of invariant noise in the input ciphertexts we have:
‖ait‖can =
∥∥∥∥ tqcti(s)−mi − vi
∥∥∥∥can
≤ t
q
‖cti(s)‖can + ‖mi‖can + ‖vi‖can .
We can bound ‖cti(s)‖can as follows:
‖cti(s)‖can =
∥∥ci,0 + ci,1s+ ci,2s2∥∥can
≤ ‖ci,0‖can + ‖ci,1s‖can +
∥∥ci,2s2∥∥can
≤ 6 · q
√
n√
12
+ 16 · q
√
n√
12
·
√
2
3
n+ 40 · q
√
n√
12
·
√
2
3
n ·
√
2
3
n
=
2q
√
n√
12
(
3 +
8
√
2√
3
√
n+
40
3
n
)
.
We can bound
∥∥∥∑2i=0 isi∥∥∥can as follows:∥∥∥∥∥
2∑
i=0
is
i
∥∥∥∥∥
can
≤ ‖0‖can + ‖1 · s‖can + ‖2 · s · s‖can
≤ 6 ·
√
n√
12
+ 16 ·
√
n√
12
·
√
2
3
n+ 40 ·
√
n√
12
·
√
2
3
n ·
√
2
3
n
=
2
√
n√
12
(
3 +
8
√
2√
3
√
n+
40
3
n
)
.
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By Lemma 48 the invariant noise is given by:
‖vmult‖can =
∥∥∥∥∥m1v2 +m2v1 + v1v2 + v1a2t+ v2a1t+ tq
2∑
i=0
is
i
∥∥∥∥∥
can
≤ ‖m1v2‖can + ‖m2v1‖can + ‖v1v2‖can + ‖v1a2t‖can + ‖v2a1t‖can
+
t
q
∥∥∥∥∥
2∑
i=0
is
i
∥∥∥∥∥
can
≤ ‖m1‖1 ‖v2‖can + ‖m2‖1 ‖v1‖can + ‖v1‖can ‖v2‖can
+ ‖v1‖can ( t
q
∥∥c0 + c1s+ · · ·+ cj2sj2∥∥can + ‖m2‖can + ‖v2‖can)
+ ‖v2‖can ( t
q
∥∥c0 + c1s+ · · ·+ cj1sj1∥∥can + ‖m1‖can + ‖v1‖can)
+
t
q
∥∥∥∥∥
2∑
i=0
is
i
∥∥∥∥∥
can
≤ 2Nm1‖m1‖ ‖v2‖can + 2Nm2‖m2‖ ‖v1‖can + 3 ‖v1‖can ‖v2‖can
+
2t
√
n√
12
(
3 +
8
√
2√
3
√
n+
40
3
n
)
‖v1‖can
+
2t
√
n√
12
(
3 +
8
√
2√
3
√
n+
40
3
n
)
‖v2‖can
+
2t
√
n
q
√
12
(
3 +
8
√
2√
3
√
n+
40
3
n
)
.

Next we give a heuristic bound for the invariant noise in a relinearization operation.
Lemma 57. Let ct be a ciphertext of size M+1 encrypting m, and having invariant
noise v. Let ctrelin of size N + 1 be the ciphertext obtained by the relinearization
of ct, where 2 ≤ N + 1 < M + 1. Then with high probability, the invariant noise
vrelin in ctrelin can be bounded as
‖vrelin‖can ≤ ‖v‖can + t
q
(M −N)(`+ 1) 8√
3
σ nw .
Proof: By Lemma 49 the invariant noise is given by
vrelin = v − t
q
M−N−1∑
j=0
∑`
i=0
e(M−j),ic
(i)
M−j .
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Thus we have:
‖vrelin‖can =
∥∥∥∥∥∥v + tq
M−N∑
j=0
∑`
i=0
−e(M−j),ic(i)M−j
∥∥∥∥∥∥
can
≤ ‖v‖can + t
q
M−N∑
j=0
∑`
i=0
∥∥∥−e(M−j),ic(i)M−j∥∥∥can
= ‖v‖can + t
q
(M −N)(`+ 1)
∥∥∥e(M−j),ic(i)M−j∥∥∥can
≤ ‖v‖can + t
q
(M −N)(`+ 1) · 16 · σ√n · w
√
n√
12
.

Next we give a heuristic bound for the invariant noise in plain multiplication.
Lemma 58. Let ct be a ciphertext encrypting m1 with invariant noise v, and let
m2 be a plaintext polynomial. Let Nm2 be an upper bound on the number of nonzero
terms in the polynomial m2. Let ctmultp denote the ciphertext obtained by plain
multiplication of ct with m2. Then the invariant noise vmultp in ctmultp can be
bounded as
‖vmultp‖can ≤ Nm2 · ‖m2‖ · ‖v‖can .
Proof: By Lemma 50 we have vmultp = m2 · v. Therefore we can bound
‖vmultp‖can = ‖m2 · v‖can
≤ ‖m2‖can · ‖v‖can
≤ ‖m2‖1 · ‖v‖can
≤ Nm2 · ‖m2‖ · ‖v‖can .

Finally, we give a heuristic bound for the invariant noise in plain addition.
Lemma 59. Let ct be a ciphertext encrypting m1 with invariant noise v, and let m2
be a plaintext polynomial. Let ctaddp denote the ciphertext obtained by plain addition
of ct with m2. Then the invariant noise vaddp in ctaddp can be bounded as
‖vaddp‖can ≤ ‖v‖can + rt(q)
q
·Nm2 · ‖m2‖ .
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Proof: By Lemma 51 we have the invariant noise vaddp = v − rt(q)q m2. Therefore we
can bound:
‖vaddp‖can =
∥∥∥∥v − rt(q)q m2
∥∥∥∥can
≤ ‖v‖can + rt(q)
q
‖m2‖can
≤ ‖v‖can + rt(q)
q
‖m2‖1
≤ ‖v‖can + rt(q)
q
·Nm2 · ‖m2‖ .

7.5 Parameter selection in SEAL
In Table 7.1 we saw that the user in SEAL must specify certain encryption pa-
rameters. These parameters are: poly_modulus, a polynomial xn + 1 specifying
the ring R; coeff_modulus, an integer q specifying the modulus in the ciphertext
space; plain_modulus, an integer t specifying the modulus in the plaintext space;
noise_standard_deviation and noise_max_deviation, which specify the error dis-
tribution via its standard deviation σ and a bound B on the maximum size of the
error; and decomposition_bit_count, the logarithm logw of the base w used in
relinearization.
The choice of encryption parameters can significantly affect the performance, ca-
pabilities, and security of the encryption scheme. Some choices of parameters may
be insecure, give poor performance, yield ciphertexts that will not work with any
homomorphic operations, or a combination of all of these. In this section we will
describe the parameters n, q and t and their impact on performance, and justify
the choice of the default parameters. We defer a discussion of the decomposition bit
count, and the related parameters ` and w, to Section 7.6. In order to assist the
user in choosing parameters for a specific computation, SEAL provides an automatic
parameter selection module. This is described in Section 7.5.1.
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n q Estimated security upper bound
(log of cost of best attack)
2048 260 − 214 + 1 118.8
4096 2116 − 218 + 1 121.7
8192 2226 − 226 + 1 124.1
16384 2435 − 233 + 1 130.2
32768 2889 − 254 − 253 − 252 + 1 127.4
Table 7.4: Default pairs (n, q) in SEAL v2.2 and an upper bound of their estimated
security, expressed as a log of the estimated cost of the the best attack according to
commit f13c4a7 of the LWE estimator. (See also Table 7.2.)
Default values. Some of the encryption parameters, namely σ and B, are optional
in the sense that if the user does not specify a value they will automatically be set
to default values σ = 3.19 and B = 6σ. The choice of σ means that αq ≈ 8.
Although the parameters q and xn+1, which implicitly specifies n, must be manually
chosen by the user, a recommended q is provided for typical values of n. These default
(n, q) pairs are given in Table 7.4.
Choosing the polynomial modulus. The polynomial modulus (poly_modulus)
must be a polynomial of the form xn + 1, where n is a power of 2. This is both for
security and performance reasons. The benefit of using a larger n is that it allows
for a larger q to be used without decreasing the security level. This in turn increases
the maximal inherent noise and initial invariant noise budget, and thus allows for
larger t to be used, which can be beneficial for encoding. The drawback of using a
larger n is that it will significantly decrease performance.
Choosing the coefficient modulus. Suppose the polynomial modulus is held
fixed. Then the choice of the coefficient modulus q affects two things: the noise
budget in a freshly encrypted ciphertext and the security. A larger q means a larger
initial noise budget but lower security.
In principle we can take q to be any integer that is not so large that the resulting
Ring-LWE instance parameterised by n, q, and σ is insecure. However, there are
special forms of q that can provide a huge performance benefit. If q is of the form
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2A − B, where B is an integer of small absolute value, then modular reduction
modulo q can be sped up, yielding overall better performance. If 2n | (q − 1), the
Number Theoretic Transform (NTT) [75] for polynomial multiplications can be used,
resulting in huge performance benefits. In particular SEAL uses Harvey’s algorithm
for NTT [125], which additionally requires that 4q ≤ β, where β = 264dlog(q)/64e is
the word size of q. The reason for this is due to the modification to the butterfly
operation suggested by Harvey [125], which could cause a wrap around modulo q if q
is chosen to be any closer to the word boundary. The default choices of q in Table 7.4
are prime numbers that satisfy all of these guidelines.
Choosing the plaintext modulus. In principle, the plaintext modulus t can be
any integer. However, it must be chosen large enough such that decoding works cor-
rectly: the coefficients in the underlying plaintext grow in size during homomorphic
operations, and if they wrap around modulo t then decoding may fail. The degree of
the underlying plaintext polynomial will also grow during homomorphic operations,
so we must also ensure n is large enough. Costache et al. [78] give detailed bounds
for n and t such that decoding will succeed.
We have seen that t must be chosen sufficiently large. However, the larger t is, the
faster we would expect invariant and inherent noise to grow in certain operations,
especially homomorphic multiplication (see Table 7.3). Furthermore, the inherent
noise growth in certain operations also depends on the remainder rt(q) of q on division
by t, which could be as large as t in general. Suppose the choice of q is fixed, then
we can choose t to ensure rt(q) is a small value, which means inherent noise growth
behaviour is improved. For example if t is such that t | (q − 1) then rt(q) = 1.
If batching is used, the requirements on t are different. Firstly, t must be chosen
large enough to ensure that the values in each slot do not wrap modulo t. We should
also choose t to be a prime such that t = 1 mod 2n, as this provides the maximal
number of plaintext slots.
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7.5.1 Automatic parameter selection in SEAL
We now describe the automatic parameter selection module in SEAL, which suggests
appropriate parameter choices to the user. The user describes the computation they
wish to obtain parameters for, and gives information on the plaintext polynomials:
namely, the number of nonzero coefficients and a bound on the size of the nonzero
coefficients. The tool simulates both the growth of the noise using heuristic estimates
similar to those described in Section 7.4.4, and the growth of the coefficients in the
underlying plaintext polynomials. It then tries to find optimal parameters that will
support this computation in the following way. It begins by setting σ and B as the
default values. Then, it chooses t as the smallest power of 2 such that the coefficients
in the underlying plaintext should not wrap modulo t. Next, it chooses n and q from
the default pairs as the smallest pair such that there is enough room for the expected
noise growth. For this (n, q) pair, a suitable value for the decomposition bit count is
searched for (finding such a value will be discussed in Section 7.6). If no such value
is found, then the next (n, q) pair is tried, and so on.
7.6 When to relinearize in SEAL
In this section, we discuss the relinearization operation in SEAL. Unlike in FV,
relinearization is not performed by default and so ciphertext sizes grow after multi-
plication operations. Indeed, in SEAL the relinearization operation is very general.
A ciphertext of any size k ≥ 2 can be relinearized down to any size j where 2 ≤ j ≤ k
and relinearization need not occur immediately after a multiplication (as in FV), but
rather can be performed at any time. It is natural to ask when or if it makes sense
to relinearize a large ciphertext to some smaller size, and this is what we will discuss
in Section 7.6.1. In general the optimal answer is not clear and will depend on the
specific overall homomorphic evaluation operation we wish to perform. Relineariza-
tion affects both overall noise growth and the choice of the parameters ` and w. We
will discuss its impact on both in Section 7.6.2.
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7.6.1 Effect of relinearization on overall noise growth
Clearly, in itself, the relinearization operation introduces noise. However, a lack of
relinearization can also cause larger noise. As can be seen from Table 7.3, the noise
growth in a multiplication operation depends on the sizes of the ciphertexts input to
the operation: the larger the input ciphertexts, the larger the noise bound. Therefore,
relinearizing one or both of the input ciphertexts before performing a multiplication
could result in the output ciphertext of the multiplication having less noise than
would be the case if neither input is relinearized, even though the relinearization
process would add noise. There is also a performance benefit when performing re-
linearization in advance of a subsequent multiplication: the multiplication of two
large ciphertexts involves computing many cross terms, so will be slower than the
multiplication of two smaller ciphertexts.
It is important to note that relinearization increases the (inherent or invariant) noise
only by an additive factor, whereas multiplication increases the noise also by a mul-
tiplicative factor. Therefore, after sufficiently many multiplications have been per-
formed, the additive increase in the noise from a relinearization can be insignificant
compared to the noise already present in the ciphertext before relinearization. In
this case it would only be beneficial to relinearize due to the smaller noise increase
in any subsequent multiplications.
On the other hand, relinearizing after the very first multiplication is typically not
an optimal strategy due to the additive factor being significantly larger than the
noise that would result from a multiplication of two fresh ciphertexts. Subsequent
multiplications will then build more noise on top of the (relatively large) additive
factor that came from relinearization. In SEAL v2.2 [60] an example is provided
illustrating that performing relinearization too early can reduce the invariant noise
budget in the final result. This code is reproduced in Appendix A. Four plaintexts
are encrypted to form fresh ciphertexts c1, c2, c3, c4 that each have a noise budget
of approximately 97 bits. The ciphertexts are multiplied together as (c1 · c2) · (c3 · c4)
and we explore the effect of intermediate relinearization on the noise budget. We can
either relinearize one or both of the ciphertexts (c1 · c2) and (c3 · c4) before they are
finally multiplied to form the end result, or we can perform no relinearization. When
no relinearization is performed, the resulting ciphertext (c1 · c2) · (c3 · c4) has a noise
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budget of around 51 bits. However, after relinearization the intermediate ciphertext
(c1 · c2) has a noise budget of around 40 bits, and when the relinearization of (c1 · c2)
is multiplied with the relinearization of (c3 · c4) the result has a noise budget of only
around 19 bits.
7.6.2 Choosing relinearization parameters
Both the computational cost of the relinearization operation and the computational
cost of evaluation key generation depend on the size of the evaluation key, which
depends on the parameters w and `. Since the evaluation keys are only used in
relinearization, the cost of their generation can also be thought of as a computational
cost of relinearization (although this can be amortised). The inherent and invariant
noise growth in relinearization also depends on w and ` (see Lemmas 41 and 49). We
now discuss the choice of these parameters. Note that computational cost of, and
noise growth in, relinearization are the only things affected by the choice of w and `,
and hence if a user does not intend to perform relinearization then they do not need
to worry about selecting an appropriate w or `.
The number of terms in the decomposition into base w of a ciphertext element,
and hence the number of pairs of ring elements in each evaluation key, is given by
` + 1 = blogw(q)c + 1. Thus, the choice of ` is entirely determined by the choice
of w (assuming q has been chosen). Typically, ` is a small integer greater than or
equal to 2. In a computation involving relinearization, it cannot be the case that
` = 1, which would occur for example when w = q. This would imply the size of
an element in the decomposition of a ciphertext component could be as large as the
ciphertext component itself, and so its norm could be anything up to q. It is therefore
likely that the noise growth from a relinearization operation with these parameters
would exceed the maximal noise bound, so decryption would fail. So, we must have
` ≥ 2. However, as ` increases, w gets smaller, and the size of the evaluation keys
grows bigger. When the other parameters are fixed this makes relinearization and
evaluation key generation slower. Therefore we would want to keep ` as small as
possible.
Although we would desire a small `, it may be the case that ` must be somewhat
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larger than 2 in order for decryption to succeed for a given n. This motivates the
question of whether it is better to use a candidate ring of dimension n and a given `
or to choose the next larger ring and use a smaller ` such as ` = 2. In the automatic
parameter selection module in SEAL, this is addressed as follows. For a given choice
of n, the parameter ` ≥ 2 is chosen to be the smallest value such that decryption of
the output ciphertext is expected to succeed. However, if no ` ≤ 10 can be found,
then the next larger n is tried, and so on. It is important to note that since ` depends
on the homomorphic evaluation operation we wish to perform (some choices may not
lead to successful decryption), this choice of upper bound ` ≤ 10 may not be optimal
in all cases. Determining whether or not there is always an optimal choice for ` is
an interesting direction for future work.
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Appendix A
SEAL code used in Section 7.6
void example_re l inear i zat ion_part1 ( )
{
cout << "Example : e a r l y r e l i n e a r i z a t i o n e f f e c t on no i s e . " << endl ;
// Set up encryp t ion parameters
EncryptionParameters parms ;
parms . set_poly_modulus ( "1x^4096 + 1" ) ;
parms . set_coeff_modulus (
ChooserEvaluator : : default_parameter_options ( ) . at ( 4 0 9 6 ) ) ;
parms . set_plain_modulus (1 << 8 ) ;
parms . set_decomposition_bit_count ( 5 8 ) ;
// Va l ida t e the parameters
parms . v a l i d a t e ( ) ;
// Generate keys
KeyGenerator generato r ( parms ) ;
genera to r . generate ( 1 ) ;
Ciphertext public_key = generato r . public_key ( ) ;
P l a in t ex t secret_key = generator . secret_key ( ) ;
EvaluationKeys evaluat ion_keys = generato r . evaluat ion_keys ( ) ;
// Encrypt p l a i n t e x t s to genera te the four f r e s h c i p h e r t e x t s
Pla in t ex t p l a in1 ( "5" ) ;
P l a in t ex t p l a in2 ( "6" ) ;
P l a in t ex t p l a in3 ( "7" ) ;
P l a in t ex t p l a in4 ( "8" ) ;
Encryptor encryptor ( parms , public_key ) ;
Ciphertext enc1 = encryptor . encrypt ( p l a in1 ) ;
Ciphertext enc2 = encryptor . encrypt ( p l a in2 ) ;
Ciphertext enc3 = encryptor . encrypt ( p l a in3 ) ;
Ciphertext enc4 = encryptor . encrypt ( p l a in4 ) ;
// We need a Decryptor to be a b l e to measure the i n va r i an t no i se
Decryptor decryptor ( parms , secret_key ) ;
// What are the no i se budge t s ?
cout << "Noise budgets in the four f r e s h c i ph e r t e x t s : "
<< decryptor . invar iant_noise_budget ( enc1 ) << " b i t s , "
<< decryptor . invar iant_noise_budget ( enc2 ) << " b i t s , "
<< decryptor . invar iant_noise_budget ( enc3 ) << " b i t s , "
<< decryptor . invar iant_noise_budget ( enc4 ) << " b i t s "
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<< endl ;
// Construct an Eva luator
Evaluator eva lua to r ( parms , evaluat ion_keys ) ;
// Perform f i r s t par t o f computation
Ciphertext enc_prod1 = eva luato r . mul t ip ly ( enc1 , enc2 ) ;
Ciphertext enc_prod2 = eva luato r . mul t ip ly ( enc3 , enc4 ) ;
// F i r s t compute the r e s u l t wi th no r e l i n e a r i z a t i o n
cout << endl ;
cout << "Path 1 : No r e l i n e a r i z a t i o n " << endl ;
// Compute product o f a l l f our
cout << "Computing r e s u l t as enc_prod1∗enc_prod2 . . . " << endl ;
Ciphertext enc_res = eva luato r . mul t ip ly ( enc_prod1 , enc_prod2 ) ;
// Now enc_res has s i z e 5
cout << " S i z e o f enc_res : " << enc_res . s i z e ( ) << endl ;
// How much no i se budget are we l e f t wi th ?
int nb_norel in = decryptor . invar iant_noise_budget ( enc_res ) ;
cout << "Noise budget in enc_resu l t : " << nb_norel in
<< " b i t s " << endl ;
// Now compute the r e s u l t wi th r e l i n e a r i z a t i o n
cout << endl ;
cout << "Path 2 : With r e l i n e a r i z a t i o n " << endl ;
// In termed ia te r e l i n e a r i z a t i o n o f enc_prod1 and enc_prod2
cout << " Re l i n e a r i z i n g enc_prod1 and enc_prod2 to s i z e 2 . . . "
<< endl ;
Ciphertext enc_relin_prod1 = eva luato r . r e l i n e a r i z e ( enc_prod1 ) ;
Ciphertext enc_relin_prod2 = eva luato r . r e l i n e a r i z e ( enc_prod2 ) ;
// What i s the no i se budge t a f t e r in t e rmed ia t e r e l i n e a r i z a t i o n ?
cout << "Noise budgets in enc_relin_prod1 : "
<< decryptor . invar iant_noise_budget ( enc_relin_prod1 )
<< " b i t s , and in enc_relin_prod2 : "
<< decryptor . invar iant_noise_budget ( enc_relin_prod2 )
<< " b i t s " << endl ;
// Now mu l t i p l y the r e l i n e a r i z e d produc t s t o g e t h e r
cout << "Computing enc_res as enc_relin_prod1∗ enc_relin_prod2 . . . "
<< endl ;
enc_res = eva luato r . mul t ip ly ( enc_relin_prod1 , enc_relin_prod2 ) ;
// Now enc_res has s i z e 3
cout << " S i z e o f enc_res : " << enc_res . s i z e ( ) << endl ;
// How much no i se budget are we l e f t wi th ?
int nb_rel in = decryptor . invar iant_noise_budget ( enc_res ) ;
cout << "Noise budget in enc_res : " << nb_rel in
<< " b i t s " << endl ;
}
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